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ABSTRACT:
The  thesis  aims  to  underline  the  Eurocentrism  of  the  field  of  international 
relations  and the  way in  which  the  conceptualizations  and writings  of  history 
contribute to the reproduction of specific narratives of international relations. The 
thesis  argues  that  the  ‘decentering’  of  the  field  should  not  only  focus  on 
questioning  the  narratives  produced  in  the  center  but  also  focus  on  the 
reproduction of Eurocentrism in the ‘periphery’. The thesis through the example 
of the ‘Cold War’ discusses the way in which the ‘Cold War’ has been written and 
the  presuppositions  about  international  relations  that  has  been  produced  and 
reproduced in the center and in the periphery.
KEYWORDS: Eurocentrism,  Historiography,  Cold  War,  Decentering, 
International Relations
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INTRODUCTION
“When I began going to school and learned to read, I encountered stories 
of other people and other lands. In one of my essays,  I remember the 
kind of things that fascinated me. Weird things,  even, about a wizard 
who lived in Africa and went to China to find a lamp . . . Fascinating to  
me because they were about things remote, and almost ethereal.
Then I grew older and began to read about adventures in which I didn’t 
know that I was supposed to be on the side of those savages who were 
encountered by the good white man. I instinctively took sides with the 
white  people.  They  were  fine!  They  were  excellent.  They  were 
intelligent. The others were not . . . they were stupid and ugly. That was 
the way I was introduced to the danger of not having your own stories.  
There  is  that  great  proverb—that  until  the  lions  have  their  own 
historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter. That did 
not come to me until  much later.  Once I  realized that,  I  had to be a 
writer.  I had to be that  historian. It’s  not one man’s job. It’s  not one 
person’s job. But it is something we have to do, so that the story of the 
hunt will also reflect  the agony,  the travail—the bravery,  even, of the 
lions”.1
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the ways in which one can tell the story of the 
hunt without glorifying the hunter and “also reflect the agony, the travail – the 
bravery,  even of the lions”.  The focus of the thesis is the debates surrounding 
‘decentering IR’, and the underlying argument is that one of the most important 
steps  in  decentering  IR is  questioning  the  ‘history’  upon which  it  is  built.  In 
reference to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s  Provincializing Europe2,  Cooper ponders the 
question, “can one really provincialize Europe” and answers by stating that “one 
way to do is to dig more deeply into European history itself”.3 Whereas Cooper 
focuses on the myth of “narrating European history around the triumph of the 
nation-state4” this thesis focuses on the period entitled as the ‘Cold War’ and the 
historiographical  boundaries  drawn  around  it  that  silence,  edit  out,  naturalize 
concepts, identities and events. Furthermore, the thesis aims to discuss the ways in 
1 Jerome Brooks, “Interviews: Chinua Achebe, The Art of Fiction No.139”, The Paris Review 133, 
Winter (1994)
2 Dipesh Chakrabarty,  Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2000).
3 Frederick  Cooper,  Colonialism in Question: Theory,  Knowledge,  History (Berkeley  and  Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 22
4 Ibid.
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which  these  historiographical  boundaries  are  re/produced  within  the  Turkish 
context  and  how  these  boundaries  and  silences,  edited  out  and  naturalized 
concepts,  identities and events can be used to destabilize and disrupt the story 
imposed by the historiographical operations on the Cold War.
I. DECENTERING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
International Relations “as a body of knowledge and set of discourses, as a 
discipline/field  of  study  in  which  we  participate  as  scholars,  theorists,  and 
students,  and  as  a  field  of   ‘practical’  political  decisions  and  structures  -  is 
‘centred’”.5  The center   -  the West -  established the concepts,  periodizations, 
theories used to make sense of the international system. Thus breaking out of the 
hierarchical  system is  impossible  as  long as  the  discourses  and  concepts  that 
reproduce the hierarchical system themselves are employed. 
As Branwen Gruffydd Jones summarizes;
International  Relations  (IR)  scholarship  and  teaching  has  remained 
concerned predominantly with relations between and issues of concern to 
the great  powers,  the hegemons,  the large and powerful  in the global 
political  economy.  The  standard  historical  reference  points  of  the 
discipline’s  rendering  of  international  relations  are  drawn  almost 
exclusively  from  Europe’s  ‘internal’  history.  The  acknowledged 
disciplinary canon of modern IR consists of European classical thought. 
For much of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the field of 
IR has been dominated by North American, European, and to a lesser 
extent  Australian  scholars.  Thus,  the  majority  of  literature  in  the 
discipline of IR is written by and about only some of the peoples of the 
world - predominantly Americans and Europeans. IR remains guilty of 
forgetting  and  detracting  from  the  thought  and  acts  of  not  only  the 
people of Africa but also the ‘rest’ of the non-Western world.6
The  literature  has  developed  considerably  since  Stanley  Hoffman’s  article 
declaring International Relations an American social science.7 The last decade has 
seen  a  plethora  of  work  on  decolonizing  international  relations,  decentering 
International Studies, non-western thought and international relations that have all 5 Meghana Nayak  and Eric  Selbin,  Decentering  International  Relations (London:  Zed Books, 
2010), 2
6 Branwen  Gruffydd  Jones,  “Introduction:  International  Relations,  Eurocentrism,  and 
Imperialism,” in  Decolonizing International Relations,  ed.,  Branwen Gruffydd  Jones (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 1-27 Stanley Hoffman,  “An American  social  science -  International  Relations,”  Daedalus, 106: 3 
(1977): 68-82
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employed  various  strategies  to  overcome  the  issue  of  western  centrism  in 
international relations8.  Sabaratnam identifies five ‘decolonizing strategies’ that 
“aim at reconfiguring our understanding of world politics through subjecting its 
main perspectives to philosophical and empirical challenges”.9 This study aims at 
“pluralizing the various potential subjects of social inquiry and analyzing world 
politics from subaltern perspectives”.10
In order to decentralize IR the thesis argues that attention needs to be paid to 
the use of history by the field. History is an intricate part of IR in that it is used to  
narrate the evolution of the international system and historical ‘events’ are used as 
in  explaining  and  validating  theories.  Yet,  the  understanding  of  history  is 
premised upon a certain narrative of European history whereby;
“ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat  Christian Europe, Christian 
Europe begat the Renaissance, the Renaissance the Enlightenment,  the 
Enlightenment  political  democracy  and  the  industrial  revolution. 
Industry  crossed  with  democracy,  in  turn  yielded  the  United  States, 
embodying the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. […] 
History is thus converted into a tale about the furtherance of virtue, about 
how the virtuous win out over the bad guys”.11 
This linear narrative presents not only a Eurocentric view of events but also 
silences  other  possible  stories  of  Europe’s  past.12 As  such,  the  way in  which 
8 Nayak and Selbin, Decentering International Relations ; B.G. Jones, Decolonizing International  
Relations ;  Amitav  Acharya  and  Barry  Buzan,  Non-Western  International  Relations  Theory :  
Perspectives on and Beyond Asia eds, (London and New York , 2010) ; Naeem Inayatullah and 
David L. Blaney,  International Relations and the Problem of Difference eds,(London and New 
York : Routledge, 2003) ; Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever,  International Relations Scholarship  
around the World eds, (London and New York, Routledge, 2009) ; Arlene Tickner and David L. 
Blaney, Thinking the International Differently (London and New York : Routledge, 2012) ; Arlene 
Tickner  and  David  L.  Blaney,  Claiming  the  International eds,  (London  and  New  York : 
Routledge,  2013) ;  L.H.M.  Ling,  The  Dao  of  World  Politics :  Towards  a  Post-Westphalian,  
Worldist  International  Relations  (London  and New York :  Routledge,  2013) ;  Arlene  Tickner, 
‘Core,  periphery  and  (neo)imperialist  International  Relations,  European  Journal  International  
Relations, 19 :3 (2013) : 627-646 ; Robbie Shilliam, ed., International Relations and Non-Western  
Thought  (London : Routledge, 2011) ; Arlene Tickner, ‘Dealing with Difference : Problems and 
Possibilities  for  Dialogue  in  International  Relations’,  Millennnium :  Journal  of  International  
Relations,  39 :3  (2011) :  607-618 ;  Giorgio  Shani,  ‘Towards  a  post-Western  IR :  The  Umma, 
Khalsa Panth,  and critical International Relations theory’,  International Studies Quarterly,  10 :4 
(2008) : 722-734.9 Meera Sabarathnam, ‘IR in Dialogue …. But Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of 
Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics’,  Millennium: Journal of International  
Relations, 39 (2011): 78210 Ibid.; 789
11 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1982), 5
12 Halperin argues that the history of Europe that is utilized as the backdrop of the main theoretical  
approaches itself is problematic and silences and distorts much of Europe’s own history. She states 
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history is defined, narrated and comes to construct the ‘past’ in a central way is a 
central component of the field of IR and should be a central part of the projects to 
decenter it. As Said notes;  
“a comparative or, better, a contraptual perspective is required in order to 
see a connection between coronation rituals in England and the Indian 
dunbars of the late nineteenth century. That is, we must be able to think 
through and interpret together experiences that are discrepant, each with 
its  particular  agenda  and  pace  of  development,  its  own  internal 
formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships, 
all of them coexisting and interacting with others”.13
The thesis will as stated focus on the historiographical operations on the Cold 
War and the manner in which these are re/produced in the Turkish context. The 
‘Cold War’ is one of the defining epochs of Western-centric historiography of IR 
and has also been instrumental  in shaping the field and the theories  produced 
within the field. As such, “the dominant discourse in security studies embodied a 
‘Cold War narrative’ in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but 
constantly  shifting  clash  between  two  global  empires,  and  from  the  repeated 
introduction of new technologies possibilities and threats into the story line”.14 
The example of Turkey is important because it demonstrates not ‘difference’ but 
rather a ‘similarity’ that also needs to be problematized in the efforts to decenter 
IR. It needs to be underlined that;
“the seeming ‘similarity’ may be rooted in policies of survival shaped in 
an international political context characterized by an unequal division of 
labour and distribution of power. What is more, this may be true not only 
for ‘non-Western’ policy-making, but also for ‘non-Western’ scholarly 
studies of IR. That is to say, if ‘non-Western’ scholars come across as 
‘social science socialized’ products of ‘Western’ IR, the domestic and 
international  politics  of  such  socialization  is  worth  inquiring  into. 
Arguably,  such  inquiry  into  the  agency  of  the  non-West  in  the 
production of ways of thinking and doing, that are ‘almost the same but 
that, 
“the historical accounts on which much of mainstream IR 
theory depends are shaped by a profound mythology about modern 
European history, one that wrongly places Europe at the root and 
center of modernity and the modern world and transforms Europe’s 
brutal  expansion and political-military hegemony into a  story of 
enlightenment  and  progress.  The  notion  of  European  modernity 
was produced as part of a hegemonic project”.
Sandra  Halperin,  “International  Relations  Theory  and  the  Hegemony  of  Western 
Conceptions of Modernity”, in Decolonizing International Relations, 57
13 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 32
14 Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,” in  Cultures of  
insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger, eds. Jutta Weldes et.al (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 327
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not quite’ will allow the project of thinking past ‘Western’ IR to further  
flourish”.15
It is with this intervention in mind that the thesis focuses on Turkey and the way 
in  which  the  historiographical  operations  on  the  Cold  War  were  re/produced, 
re/formulated by the works discussing Turkish foreign policy in general and the 
Cold War in particular. The paradoxes of the Turkish case, of being similar but 
not the same and of where it is situated is an important point that needs to be 
underlined.
II. SITUATING TURKEY
“we formulate our policies through a solid and rational judgment of the 
long-term  historical  trends  and  an  understanding  of  where  we  are 
situated in the greater trajectory of  world history. More importantly, we 
constantly question and self-reﬂect on our position and make revisions 
where  necessary.  By  adopting  such  a  deep-rooted  stance  on  current 
affairs,  we  manage  to  tackle  the  challenges    of  the  drastic 
transformations taking place in the global system”.16 
“But now Turkey's  priority should not be persisting that “Esad should 
go" instead it should be to put  the dreamy, emotional, ideological and 
extremely personalized Syria policy within the orbit of realism”.17
“On the one hand depending on the status of the international system and 
on the other depending on Turkey's economic status there are periods of 
"relative autonomy" and "dependence". But in all of them Turkey paints 
a  typical  Middle  Sized  State  rationality:  Supporter  of  the  "hegemon" 
state of the West but can affect the regional issues it deems vital”.18 
15 Pinar Bilgin, “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, Third World Quarterly, 29:1 (2008), 19-2016 Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring’, 
Turkey  Policy  Brief  Series,  2012  (3),  Accessed  from: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.pdf17 Kadri  Gursel,  ‘Islami  monserlere  buyuk ihtiyac  var’,  Milliyet,  18 February 2013, Accessed 
from:  http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/islami-monserlere-buyuk-ihtiyac-
var/dunya/dunyayazardetay/18.02.2013/1670114/default.htm
18 Baskin Oran, Interview with Radikal Newspaper about Turkish Foreign Policy, November 2011 
Aceessed from: http://baskinoran.com/roportaj/RadikalKitapEki.pdf
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The underlying theme of these quotes19 is the centrality of an idea/ideal of 
“rationality”.  Turkish  foreign  policy  either  is  rational  or  needs  to  be  rational. 
Rationality  as  the  desirable  and  acceptable  approach  is  present  amongst 
policymakers,  the  media  and  academics.  Furthermore,  it  cuts  across  political 
affiliations.  A  foreign  policy  approach  can  be  defended  as  being  the  rational 
choice by the policymaker  as the media  and/or  academic criticize it  for being 
emotionally  driven  and  not  rational  enough.  Making  rationality  the  yardstick 
against  which  policies  are  measured  is  not  a  value-free  endeavor.  Invoking 
rationality  associates  the  speaker  with  a  myriad  of  notions  related  to  truth, 
progress and reason. Such invocations function to delineate between the good/the 
acceptable/the Western and the bad/the unacceptable/the Eastern. Being rational 
automatically embeds the speaker with an authority denied to them if they did not 
invoke the word. 
This is a binary reproduced in all aspects of Turkish political space and the 
academia that attempts to study it. As such it should not be overlooked that, with 
respect  to  the  study  of  security  studies  in  non-Western  states,  “Doing  inter- 
national relations and security studies in the ‘Western’ way emerged as a way of 
signaling a break with the (ostensibly ‘non-rational’) past and an embrace of post-
Enlightenment/modern  (‘rational’)  ways”.20 These  binaries  become  further 
complicated since even as they are employed in order to delineate a Westernness 
as opposed to non-Westernness,  there is also a continuing reaction against  the 
West.  It  is  a  constant  process  of  using,  reproducing  and  striving  to  fit  the 
definitions of what is Western at the same time as reacting against it. 
This  dual  process of belonging and not  belonging is  visible  in  the foreign 
policy discourses of the Justice and Development Party;
19 The first quote is from Ahmet Davutoglu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey explaining the main 
approach of Turkish foreign policy, the second quote is from a newspaper article written by Kadri 
Gursel criticizing Davutoglu’s foreign policy approach, the third quote is from Baskin Oran, a 
renowned academic working on Turkish foreign policy and the editor of the three volume set on 
Turkish Foreign Policy that is considered to be compulsory reading material in most, if not all,  
Turkish foreign policy courses given in Turkey. See; Baskin Oran, ed., Turk Dis Politkasi Cilt 1:  
1919-1980  (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001);  Turk Dis Politikasi Cilt II: 1980-2001  (Istanbul: 
Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001) and Turk Dis Politkasi Cilt III: 2001-2012 (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 
2013).20 Pinar  Bilgin,  “The  'Western-Centrism'  of  Security  Studies:  'Blind-Spot'  or  Constitutive 
Practice?”, Security Dialogue, 41 (2010): 618.
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“Should  NATO  intervene  in  Libya?  Can  there  be  such  nonsense? 
What has NATO got to do with Libya? This could become an issue if 
there was an interference with a NATO member. But outside of that 
how can one intervene in Libya? Look as Turkey we are against this, 
something like this cannot be spoken of, it cannot be thought”.21
“NATO should enter Libya in order to determine and affirm that Libya 
belongs to Libyans”.22
The  above  quotes23 demonstrate  the  constant  battle  within  the  Turkish 
imagination with the idea/ideal and reality of the West. These binaries and the 
questions they raise are the starting point of this study. How to make sense of this 
constantly reproduced duality that permeates not only understanding of Turkish 
foreign policy but Turkish identity in general.  
Zarakol24 explains  this  duality  with the manner  in  which Turkey -  and the 
Ottoman Empire  before it  -  were socialized  into the international  system.  She 
argues that “the Turkish modern state identity was a deliberate  construction in 
direct  response to  the  lessons drawn from the international  interactions  of  the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” and the reason for this construction was 
“to change the hierarchical, stigmatizing relationship between Turkey and Europe, 
and  join  the  circle  of  the  “established”  states”.25 According  to  Zarakol,  the 
constant duality of wanting to be Western but also being deeply suspicious of it is 
a  result  of  the  manner  in  which  Turkey has  reacted  to  the  hierarchies  in  the 
international system. Thus the,
21 ‘NATO’nun  ne  isi  var  Libya’da?’,  Sabah,  28  February  2011,  Accessed  from: 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/02/28/natonun_ne_isi_var_libyada22 ‘Hangisi  Erdogan’,  Radikal,  22  February  2013  Accessed  from: 
http://blog.radikal.com.tr/Sayfa/hangisi-erdogan-1511223 It  might be argued that the change in discourse with respect to Libya was a consequence of  
balance of power considerations and as such it was not an example of the identity split  being 
discussed here. The reasons for the change in discourse are not the focus point here but rather that 
such a change in discourse can occur and can be accepted in such a short time. Most policymakers 
display these alterations in discourse because of the issue of identity split. Moreover, it should be 
underlined that the ‘anti-Western’ stance is not an alternative per se of the ‘Western’ stance. The 
‘anti-Western’ discourse itself is defined with respect  to the West and reproduces the Western 
hegemony as much as the ‘Western’ discourses. In that sense rather than being monumental shifts 
in foreign policy, these stances are mirror-reflections of each other.24 Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011)25 Ibid.; 156-7
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“Ottoman Empire did not lose all of its sovereign power in battlefields; 
that  power was chipped away by her  own gradual  acceptance  of and 
aspirations to the Standard of Civilization by which the European powers 
ostensibly  operated.  The  more  the  Ottoman  Empire  aspired  to  meet 
European standards, the weaker it became. Indeed, the more the Ottoman 
Empire participated in the international system, the more she internalized 
the norms of modernity, the more “ashamed” the leaders became of their 
own people and institutions, dedicating limited resources  to emulation 
efforts which were doomed to fail”.26 
As the loss of material  forces alone cannot explain the decline of Ottoman 
Empire neither can material factors alone explain the present issues with respect 
to Turkish foreign policy. Its reproduction of the hierarchies of IR discourse needs 
to be taken into account. Zarakol in her conclusion argues that the way out of 
constantly reproducing these binaries is if the outsiders “accept that an ordered 
world with a fixed center is itself a sham, they may perhaps be able to liberate 
themselves”.27 
The  question  then  becomes  where  should  research  focus  on  in  order  to 
overcome this constant duality? How to define Turkey, Turkish foreign policy and 
how  to  locate  Turkey  within  the  international  arena?   Where  to  go  on  from 
Zarakol's analysis, if the “center is a sham” and Turkey needs to go to the side 
without a center, how does Turkey go there? How does one analyze the policies of 
a state whether in the international arena or internally that is so entrenched in the 
narratives  of  the  centre.  Thus  this  thesis  argues  that  one  of  the  strategies  of 
decentering IR should be if decentering the instances of reproducing the centre as 
well.  In  that  sense,  decentering  Turkey,  problematizing  Turkey’s  narrative  of 
itself and decentering the texts produced within the field of Turkish foreign policy 
is an important step in understanding how the periphery works to re/produce the 
hierarchies of the field.
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis will be divided into two main sections; Historiographical Operations on 
the Cold War and Stories of Silences.  Before proceeding to these sections the 26 Ibid,; 11927 Ibid,; 255
12
thesis  will  first  discuss  the  concept  of  history  and the  stories  of  international 
relations.  The  first  chapter  entitled  ‘Problematizing  History’  will  provide  an 
overview of the concept  of history and underline the differences  between ‘the 
past’, ‘the chronicle’ and ‘the narrative’. As such, the aim of this chapter will be 
to problematize history by elaborating upon what Louis Mink summarizes as;
“Stories are not lived but told. Life has no beginnings, middles or ends: 
there are meetings, but the start of an affair belongs to the story we tell 
ourselves later, and there are partings, but final partings only in the story. 
There  are  hopes,  plans,  battles,  and  ideas,  but  only  in  retrospective 
stories are hopes unfulfilled, plans miscarried, battles decisive, and ideas 
seminal. Only in the story is it America which Columbus discovers, and 
only in the story is the kingdom lost for want of a nail …. So it seems 
truer to say that narrative qualities are transferred from art to life. We 
could learn  to  tell  stories  of  our  lives  from nursery  rhymes,  or  from 
culture-myths if we had any, but it is from history and fiction that we 
learn how to tell and to understand complex stories, and how it is stories 
answers questions”.28
The second chapter entitled ‘Stories of International Relations’ will discuss the 
different stories of the field and concepts that are constitutive of the field such as 
the  international  system,  state  and  sovereignty  and  security.  The  aim  of  this 
chapter is to provide an overview of the discourses on IR and the different stories 
that ‘critical’ perspectives are attempting to tell with respect to the international 
system, the state and sovereignty and security. This chapter will also discuss the 
way in which non-Western stories are embedded into the stories of international 
relations and why it is important to problematize this centering of non-western 
narratives that works to silence and naturalize concepts, events and identities.
These two chapters will establish the foundations of the main aim of the thesis. 
Firstly, problematizing the way in which history is used in the field of IR and the 
historiographical  operations  that  draw the  boundaries  of  epochs,  concepts  and 
events  based on Eurocentric  conceptualization  of  world politics.  Secondly,  the 
Eurocentric  conceptualization  of  world  politics  is  reproduced  in  non-western 
contexts whereby stories are embedded within these meta-narratives and in the 
process events, concepts and identities are fixed or edited out. As such, the thesis 
aims  to  underline  that  projects  to  decenter  IR  should  not  only  focus  on 
decentering IR and the Eurocentric knowledge production in the center but also 
28 Louis Mink, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension”, New Literary History, 1 (1970), 
557–558
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the way that knowledge is produced and re/produced in the non-Western context. 
The next  two sections  of  the  thesis  ‘Historiographical  Operations  on the Cold 
War’ and ‘the Stories of Silences’ elaborate further on these points.
SECTION I:  HISTORIOGRAPHICAL OPERATIONS ON THE 
COLD WAR
This section aims to discuss the historiographical operations on the Cold War. The 
section is divided into two chapters. Chapter III entitled; ‘Stories of Origins’ will 
focus  on  the  way  in  which  the  historiography  of  the  Cold  War  defines  the 
boundaries of the Cold War, which occurrences constitute events to be prioritized 
and which actors to be focused upon. Chapter IV entitled ‘Re/producing the Cold 
War’ will focus on the literature on Turkey and the Cold War in an attempt to 
demonstrate the embeddedness of the Turkish story. It needs to be underlined that 
these chapters are not literature reviews but rather overviews of the literature in 
order to underline the main structures and abstractions in the stories. The main 
questions to be asked when approaching these literatures will be:
1. How was the Cold War defined, periodized, and narrated?
2. How the Soviet Union and United States were defined?
3. How was Turkey defined?
4. What  was  the  degree  of  agency  given  to  Turkey  within  the 
narrative?
5. How were the main events of the origins of the Cold War such as 
the    Truman  Doctrine and Marshall Plan characterized and narrated?
6. What events were omitted from the narrative?
These chapters will underline two main points. Firstly, that the historiography of 
the  Cold  War  is  rooted  in  a  Eurocentric  conceptualization  of  world  politics. 
Secondly,  that the story Turkey gets edited out whereby concepts,  events,  and 
identities are naturalized and linearized in order to fit into the story of the Cold 
War.  The  next  section  focuses  on  problematizing  these  naturalized  concepts, 
events and identities.
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SECTION II: STORIES OF SILENCES
This section aims to underline the ‘process’ of the re/formulation and re/definition 
of  the  concepts,  events  and  identities  that  were  naturalized  through  the 
historiographical operations on the Cold War. The focus will be on disrupting the 
linearity of the story of Turkey and underlining that neither Turkey as an object of 
study nor the concepts of democratization and westernization were static concepts. 
These were debated upon  and re/negotiated, re/formulated and re/defined. The 
concepts of identity, narrative and frames will be employed in order to elucidate 
upon the relationship between the Cold War narratives and the (re)formulation, 
(re)remembering  and  (re)articulation  of  national  identities.  The  narratives  that 
exist  about  the  Cold  War  and  the  silences  within  these  storylines  construct  a 
certain  idea  of  the  Cold  War  that  privileges  some  ideas,  policies  and 
comprehensions of the international relations over others. As Barnett states “in 
order for actors to have a sense of how they should proceed, they must have some 
understanding  of  where  they  have  been,  and  those  narrative  understandings 
constitute the cultural stock that individuals use to reason, calculate probabilities 
and estimate the consequences of their actions for the future”.29 The narratives of 
the past also condition the present and the future of the actors. The manner in 
which the Cold War is narrated shapes the definition of the present threats and 
‘lessons of history’  that  are applied in present policymaking circles.  Thus,  the 
continuous references in the “post-Cold War” era to “Cold War” problems and 
how they were solved and who supposedly won condition the actions considered 
by the states.
The aim of this section is to problematize and disentangle the logic of the Cold 
War and how it became established. Searching for alternative stories that can be 
told will  complicate  the  dominant  narratives  about  the  Cold War  and provide 
29 Michael  Barnett,  “Culture,  Strategy  and  Foreign  Policy  Change:  Israel’s  Road  to  Oslo,” 
European Journal of International Relations, 5:1 (1999), 14
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instances of how narratives could have been constructed differently. As Campbell 
states  “telling  a  story  establishes  order  and  meaning.  Scripting  a  narrative, 
providing a  sequentially  ordered  plot,  a  cast  of  characters,  identifiable  forces, 
attributable motivations, and lessons for the future, is one of the most common 
ways  we  ascribe  intelligibility  when  confronted  with  the  novel  or  the 
unfamiliar”.30 Hence the aim is to problematize the sequential order existent in the 
literature  narrating and defining the Cold War by questioning the sequence of 
events, the cast of characters, the forces and motivations ascribed to the actors in 
an attempt to bring forth the silences in the narratives of the Cold War
30 David Campbell, Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf  
War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1993), 7
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CHAPTER I: PROBLEMATIZING 
HISTORY
I. INTRODUCTION
This is  true;  so we must repress  this savage character,  this  fury,  this 
ambition, just in case we dream again. And that will happen sooner or 
later, for we live in such an exceptional world that living is no more than 
dreaming; and experience teaches me that he who lives dreams what he 
is until waking. The king dreams that he’s king, and he lives under this 
deception commanding, planning, and governing; and his acclaim, which 
he receives  on loan,  is  scribbled in  the wind and  turned  to  ashes  by 
death.  What  grave  misfortune!  To  think  that  anyone  should  wish  to 
govern knowing that he will awaken in the sleep of death! The rich man 
dreams of more riches,  which only bring him more worries;  the poor 
man  dreams  that  he  suffers  in  misery  and  poverty;  the  man  who 
improves his lot dreams; the man who toils and petitions dreams; the 
man  who  insults  and  offends  dreams.  And  in  this  world,  in  short, 
everyone dreams what he is although no one realizes it. I dream that I’m 
here, weighed down by these chains, and I’ve dreamt that I found myself 
in more flattering circumstances. What is life? A frenzy. What is life? A 
vain hope, a shadow, a fiction. The greatest good is fleeting, for all life is 
a dream and even dreams are but dreams.31
The field of International Relations in the last decades has undergone what has 
been dubbed as the ‘historical turn’ or the ‘historiographical turn’.32 The aim has 
been to bring ‘history’ back in to IR as a way of overcoming the shortcomings of 
the  field  since  the  mis/use  of  history  was  identified  as  one  of  the  persistent 
problems of the field. Barry Buzan and Richard Little identify five shortcomings;
“presentism, or the tendency to view the past in terms of the present;  
ahistoricism, or the insistence that there are trans- historical concepts that 
allow  us  to  identify  universal  regularities;  Eurocentrism,  or  the 
privileging of European experience in our understanding of international 
relations;  anarchophilia,  or  the  propensity  to  equate  international 
relations with the existence of an anarchic system; and state-centrism, or 
the preoccupation  with the  state  at  the expense  of  other  international 
actors.33”
31 Pedro Calderon de la Barca, Life is a Dream [translated by Michael Kidd] (Boulder , Colorado : 
University of Colorado Press, 2004), 131-2.
32 Stephen  Hobden,  ‘Historical  Sociology:  Back  to  the  Future  of  International  Relations?,  in 
Historical  Sociology  of  International  Relations,  eds.  Stephen  Hobden  and  John  Hobson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Duncan S.A Bell “International Relations: The 
Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?”, British Journal of International Relations, 3:1 (2001): 115-
126;  George  Lawson,  “The  Eternal  Divide?  History  and  International  Relations”,  European 
Journal  of  International  Relations,18:2  (2010):  203-226;  Timothy  Smith,  History  and 
International relations (London: Routledge, 1999).
33 Barry  Buzan  and  Richard  Little,  ‘World  history  and  the  development  of  non-Western 
international relations theory’, in Non-Western International Relations Theory, 197
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Three of the five shortcomings;  presentism,  ahistoricism and Eurocentrism are 
directly linked to the role history plays in the field. John Hobson in similar vein 
identifies  two  main  shortcomings;  “tempocentrism”  and  “chronofetishism”. 
Tempocentric ahistoricism extrapolates the characteristics of the present system 
and  actors  “back  in  time”  which  “smooths  out  historical  ruptures  and  social 
differences”.34 Problematizing  this  enables  a  rethinking  of  the  “specific  and 
unique origins of the modern intenrational system”.35 Chronofetishism focuses on 
the present  by “bracketing  or ignoring the past” and “portray the present as a 
natural, spontaneous, self-constituting entity that is […..] eternalized”.36 
Both discussions underline the mis/use of history as something that needs to be 
remedied in the field. As a consequence there have been increasing number of 
works that historicise concepts, events, issues and the field in general. History is 
being used as an explanatory tool to deepen the understanding within the field yet 
history as a concept that also needs to be explained and engaged critically is being 
overlooked37.  Even though history has  been brought  in,  it  is  often  overlooked 
which history is being brought in thus privileging one understanding of history 
over others as a result of which “the discourse of the historical turn actually runs 
the  risk  of  facilitating  continued  hegemony of  an  ahistorical  or  at  worst  anti-
historical research culture in IR”.38 History should not be just brought in as an 
unproblematic concept but rather engaged with critically. As Vaughan-Williams 
states; “in order to historicize the concepts, logics and theories with which we 
study  international  relations  it  is  necessary  not  to  bring  ‘history’  but  more 
specifically the ‘problem of history’ into the discipline”.39
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 For  works  that  engage  critically  with  the  concept  of  history;  R.B.J.  Walker,  “History  and 
Structure  in  the  Theory  of  International  Relations”,  Millennium :  Journal  of  International  
Relations, 18:2 (1989);  David Campbell, “Meta-Bosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War”, Review 
of International Studies, 24 (1998): 261-81; Patrick Finney, “Still Marking Time? Text, Discourse, 
and Truth in International History”, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001): 291-308; Hidemi 
Suganami,  “Narrative  Explanation  and  International  Relations:  Back  to  Basics”,  Millennium :  
Journal of International Relations, 37:2 (2008): 327-356.
38 Nick Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the ‘Problem of History’”,  Millennium :  
Journal of International Relations, 34:1 (2005): 133
39 Ibid.
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The concept of ‘history’ is not unproblematic and has always been contested and 
widely  discussed.  Overlooking  these  debates  privileges  one  version  of  the 
definition of history rather than opening up for discussion its contested nature. 
The discussions revolving around the ‘problem of history’  can be divided into 
three  perspectives:  reconstructionism,  constructionism,  deconstructionism.40 
Reconstructionism argues that primary sources can lead to achieving the Rankean 
aim of knowing the past ‘as it actually happened’. Marwick, one of the leading 
proponents of reconstructionism, defines history as “a body of knowledge about 
the  human  past  based  on  the  systemic  study  of  sources”.41 According  to  this 
perspective; the past is real and history can correspond to that reality through the 
use of evidence. As summarized by Elton; 
“We  are  looking  for  a  way  to  ground  historical  reconstruction  in 
something that offers a measure of independent security - independent 
of  the  concerns  of  his  day,  independent  of  the social  and political 
conditions imposed on him. And the obvious answer to this quest, as it 
has always been and must continue to be, lies in the sources he has at 
his disposal”.42 
Marwick  and Elton  are  one  side  of  the  reconstructionist  spectrum which  also 
includes  practical  realists  like  Peter  Novick,43 Joyce  Appleby,44 Lynn  Hunt,45 
Gabrielle  Spiegel.46 Both  sides  of  this  spectrum aim to  reconstruct  “historical 
explanations  around  the  evidence  while  maintaining  a  foundational  belief  in 
empiricism and historical  meanings  ultimately  deriving  from sense  experience 
mediated by their constructed narratives”.47  Constructionism consists of a wide 
array of ‘schools’ “that appeal to general laws in historical explanation”.48 French 
Annalistes, modernization theory and the Marxist/neo-Marxist approaches are all 
included  under  the  heading  of  constructionism.  According  to  constructionism 
“history  can  explain  the  past  only  when  the  evidence  is  placed  within  a 
40 Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History (London: Routledge, 1997). 
41 Arthur Marwick (1998) “A Fetishism of Documents? The Salience of Source-Based History” 
cited in Alun Munslow, The New History  (London: Routledge, 2003), 54
42 Geoffrey Elton cited in Alun Munslow, The Routledge Companion to Handbook to Historical 
Studies (London and New York : Routledge, 2005), 217
43 Peter  Novick,  That  Noble  Dream:  The ‘Objectivity  Question’  and the  American  Historical 
Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
44 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob,  Telling the Truth About History (New York: 
Norton, 1994).
45 Lynn Hunt, The New Cultural History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989)
46 Gabrielle M. Spiegel, Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2005)
47 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 20
48 Ibid.
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preexisting explanatory framework that allows for the calculation of general rules 
of human action”.49 Deconstructionist history questions the assumption of writing 
history  ‘as  it  actually  was’  and  focuses  on  a  postmodern  understanding  of 
history.50 The main proponents of this perspective are; Hayden White,51 Dominik 
LaCapra,52 David  Harlan,53 Allan  Megill54,  Keith  Jenkins55,  F.R.Ankersmit56 
among many others. Deconstructionism views “history and the past as a complex 
series of literary products that derive their chains of meaning(s) or significations 
from the nature of narrative structure (or forms of representation) as much as from 
other culturally provided ideological factors”.57 This brief sketch58 demonstrates 
clearly how erroneous it is to automatically bring in history as if it was a neutral  
concept.
Bringing  in  history  into  the  discussion  also  needs  to  mean  bringing  in  the 
following questions in to the discussion;
49 Ibid. 24
50 Hayden  White,  Dominik LaCapra,  David Harlan.  Allan Megill,  Keith Jenkins are  generally 
classified under ‘deconstructionist history’. 
51 Hayden  White,  Metahistory:  The  Historical  Imagination  in  Nineteenth-Century  Europe 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural 
Criticism (Baltimore,  MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,  1978) ;  The Content of  the Form:  
Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore,  MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1987)
52 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopins University 
Press,  2001) ;  History  in  Transit :  Experience,  Identity,  Critical  Theory  (Ithaca  and  London : 
Cornell University Press, 2004).
53 David Harlan, The Degradation of American History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997)
54 Allan Megill,  Prophets of Extremity: Nietzche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley,  CA: 
University  of  California  Press,1985) ;  Historical  Knowledge,  Historical  Error  (Chicago  and 
London : The University of Chicago Press, 2007).
55 Keith Jenkins, On ‘What is History?’(London: Routledge, 1995);  Rethinking History (London: 
Routledge, 2003);  Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline (London: Routledge, 
2003)
56 F.R. Ankersmit,  Historical Representation (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2002); 
Narrative logic: a semantic analysis of the historian’s language (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1983) ; 
Political Representation (Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2002) ; Meaning, truth  
and reference in historical representation (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2012).
57 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 21
58 It  needs  to  be  underlined  the  outline  provided  here  and  the  division  of  ‘schools’  and 
‘approaches’ can itself be contested and was used in order to provide a bird eyes  view of the  
discussions about the nature of history. For further reading see : Michael Bentley,  Companion to 
Historiography (London : Routledge, 1997) ; Georg G. Iggers,  Historiography in the Twentieth  
Century :  From  Scientific  Objectivity  to  the  Postmodern  Challenge (Hanover  and  London : 
Wesleyan  University  Press,  1997) ;  Keith  Jenkins,  Postmodern  History  Reader (London : 
Routledge,  1997) ;  Michael  C.Lemon,  The  Discipline  of  History  and the  History  of  Thought  
(London : Routledge) ; John Lechte,  Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers : From Structuralism to  
Postmodernity (London : Routledge, 1994) ; Geoffrey Roberts, The History and Narrative Reader 
(London and New York : Routledge, 2001). 
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“Who gets  to tell  the story of  the past? What are the implications of 
where the story starts and stops; which characters and topics are included 
and  excluded;  what  ‘voice’  is  adopted;  what  metaphors  provide 
structure? … What dynamic relationship does each of us bring to the 
process  of  meaning  and  representation?  Conscious  or  unconcious 
decisions about form, voice, and metaphor shape the content of historical 
stories, and many interpretive differences in historiography (especially in 
the international  field) arise from this ‘content of the form’ and from 
inescapable issues of subjectivity and partiality”.59
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the problem of history and attempt find an 
answer  to  ‘what  is  history?’  The  first  section  will  engage  critically  with  the 
concept of history and attempt to elaborate on questions such as what is history?, 
can the past be known? Can history ever recover the past? The second section will 
discuss the role of the narrative and how the past is transformed into history. The 
third section will focus on Hayden White’s theory and discuss the ways in which 
historical  narratives  are  constructed  by  employing  a  series  of  strategies.  The 
fourth section will focus on what historiography means and how concepts, periods 
and historiographical debates should be approached. 
II. STORIES OF THE PAST
The first section will elaborate on the question of ‘what is history?60’ Is history the 
writing  of  the  past  ‘as  it  happened’?  The primary question  of  what  is  history 
becomes complicated once the question is extended to ask what is the past? Is the 
past  and history the same or  are  they different?  Does the ‘it’  in  the  Rankean 
dictum of ‘as it really happened’ actually exist? 
In its simplest terms the past is what has happened and history is a retelling of a  
story of what has happened. There are a series of qualifications here:
1. History is not the telling of a story but the retelling, the past cannot be recreated in 
its entirety within a story and as such is always incomplete, history can retell a 
part of the past but never recreate it.
59 Emily  Rosenberg,  ‘Considering  Borders’  in  Explaining  the  History  of  American  Foreign  
Relations, ed, M.J : Hogan and T.G. Paterson, (Cambridge : Camridge University Press, 2004), 
192 
60 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History (New York : Vintage, 1967).
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2. History is not the retelling of the story of the past but a retelling of a story of the 
past. Since history cannot capture the past in its entirety it is always a partial story 
of what has happened and is never a final, closed, settled account of the past.
As Paul Veyne states;
“History is an account of events: all else flows from that. Since it is a 
direct account,  it  does not revive, any more than the novel does.  The 
actual experience, as it comes from the hands of the historian, is not that 
of  the  actors;  it  is  a  narration,  so  it  can  eliminate  certain  erroneous 
problems.  Like  the  novel,  history  sorts,  simplifies,  organizes,  fits  a 
century into a page. […]to speculate on the interval that always separates 
the actual  experience  and  the  recollection  of  the event  would simply 
bring us to see that Waterloo was not the same thing for a veteran of the 
Old Guard and for a field marshal; that the battle CJln be related in the  
first or the third person; that it can be spoken of as a battle, as an English 
victory, or as a French defeat; that from the start one can drop a hint of 
the outcome or appear to discover it. […]Even if I am a contemporary 
and a witness of Waterloo, even if I am the principal actor and Napoleon 
in person, I shall have only a perspective of what historians will call the 
event  of  Waterloo;  I  shall  be  able  to  leave  to  posterity  only  my 
statement, which, if it reaches them, they will call an impression. Even if 
I  were  Bismarck  deciding  to  send  the  Ems  dispatch,  my  own 
interpretation of the event would per- haps not be the same as that of my 
friends, my confessor, my regular historian, and my psychoanalyst, who 
may have their own version of my decision and think they know better 
than I do what it was I wanted. In essence, history is knowledge through 
documents.61” 
All the actors involved do not experience events in the same manner. The past 
does not have clearly delineated beginnings, middles and ends, it does not occur 
in a linear causal mechanism. It does not exist as a story to be told, the past has to 
be fashioned into a story. The events and actors of the past are transformed into an 
easily followable story and it is that story that is history rather than the past itself. 
This point leads to two further elaborations on what history is;
3. If history is the retelling of a story and the past as it was cannot be captured than 
every retelling is a construct. 
4. If  every  retelling  is  a  construct  then  this  construction  occurs  not  based  on 
recreating  the  past  but  according  to  the  questions  asked  in  the  present.  The 
retelling  of  a  story necessitates  that  the  past  be fashioned into a  story with a 
61 Paul Veyne, Writing History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 4
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beginning,  middle  and  end,  with  answers  to  questions  such  as  why  is  this 
important? 
The past is not lived in narrative form, it is written as such. This writing is as 
much  about  the  facts  of  the  past  as  about  the  concerns  of  the  present.  The 
questions the historians direct towards the text are questions conditioned by the 
present. 
5. Because the past is not retrieved the writing of history is oriented in the present 
and related to the questions we have about the past in the present. 
As such, “is it possible that the past unfolded as a particular kind of narrative the 
first  time  around  and  can  we  recover  it  more  or  less  intact,  or  are  we  only 
selecting and imposing an emplotment or story line on it derived from our own 
present? Are stories lived in the past or just told in the present”?62  Whatever is 
lived in the past is not the story told in the present, history is the story of the past 
told in the present and for the present. 
In that sense, the question of ‘what is history’ needs to be extended even further. 
As discussed, in order to understand what history is, it was necessary to elaborate 
on its differences with the ‘past’ and the relationship between the past and history 
and ask the question what is the past? If the past is not retrievable and history is a 
retelling of the past, the next question becomes why retell the past? It is not only 
‘what is history?’ but also ‘what is the purpose of history’ or rather who is history 
for? Similar to Cox’s oft-cited quote of “theory is always for someone”63 Jenkins 
states that “History is never for itself, it is always for someone”.64
6. History is not only and maybe not even primarily about events, issues, debates 
and actors of the past but what their story means for the issues, debates, events 
and actors in the present.
62 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 5
63 Robert Cox, “States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”,  Millennium :  
Journal of International Relations, 10:2 (1981): 126-155.
64 Jenkins, Re-thinking History, 21
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As Jenkins states;
“The fact that history per se is an ideological construct means that it is 
constantly  being  re-worked  and  re-ordered  by  all  those  who  are 
variously affected by power relationships; because the dominated as 
well as the dominant also have their versions of the past to legitimate 
their practices, versions which have to be excluded as improper from 
any place on the agenda of the dominant discourse. In that sense re-
orderings  of  the  messages  to  be  delivered  (often  many  such  re-
orderings are referred to academically as ‘controversies’) just have to 
be  constructed  continuously  because  the  needs  of  the 
dominant/subordinate are constantly being re-worked in the real world 
as they seek to mobilise people(s) in support of their interests. History 
is  forged  in  such  conflict  and  clearly  these  conflicting  needs  for 
history impinge upon the debates (struggle for ownership) as to what 
history is”.65
7. History is not only a construct but also an ideological construct. If it is written 
always  with  a  purpose  and  for  someone,  then  the  fashioning  of  the  story  is 
determined by the questions and frames necessitated by the purpose of the story.
As such, history is not the past  but rather a discourse on the past.  Discourses 
“work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to exclude, by limiting and 
restricting  authorities  and experts  to  some groups,  but  not  others,  endorsing a 
certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizations and judging 
meaningless,  impractible,  inadequate  or  otherwise  disqualified”.66 As  such 
discourses should be conceptualized as “a system of statements  in which each 
individual statement makes sense, produces interpretive possibilities by making it 
virtually  impossible  to  think  outside  of  it.  A  discourse  provides  discoursive  
spaces,  i.e.,  concepts,  categories,  metaphors,  models,  and  analogies  by  which 
meanings are created”.67 
8. History is a series of discourses that work to define, categorize, periodize, limit, 
silence and make the past intelligible. 
65 Ibid.
66 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discouse in International Relations: A Critique of Research  
and Methods”, European Journal of International Relations, 5:2 (1999): 229
67 Roxanne Doty,  “Foreign Policy as a Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Phillippines”, International Studies Quarterly, 37:3 (Sept, 1993): 
302
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As history is written for some purpose then the transformation of the past into 
history and the definitions, categories, periodizations and inclusions/exclusions of 
that written work are there to reinforce, reproduce and reify the discursive spaces 
of a specific rendering of the past. 
9. The past is not what is in contestation but the historiographical renderings of it.
History is a retelling of a story of the past with a purpose in mind that works 
within already existing discourses about the past. Thus historical debates are not 
debates about the past itself but rather a debate between the discourses of the past. 
In that sense, “history results not from the debate about the past reality as such, 
but from competing narrative proposals about the nature and possible meanings of 
past  events”  68 and  when  “a  narrative  proposal  has  achieved  a  more  or  less 
universal  acceptance  (like  ‘the  Cold  War’  or  ‘the  Industrial  Revolution’)  it 
becomes concretized as past reality. It is no longer a narrative proposal, but has  
become the past.”69
As  discussed  so  far,  history  is  not  the  past  and  its  acceptance  as  being 
representative of the past is the result of the dominance and acceptance of the 
discourses of the past70. This section attempted to open up the definition of history 
primarily by underlying the difference between the past and history. Furthermore, 
only asking ‘what is history’ is not sufficient in questioning the nature of history, 
what  also needs to be asked is  ‘who is history for’? The writing of history is 
always informed by some purpose that conditions the questions the historian asks 
the past, the text, the archive and transforms the past into history. The next section 
will elaborate further on how the past is transformed into history.
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE PAST
68 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 69
69 Ibid.
70 More discussion on historiography and role of debates will be discussed in the fourth section of 
this chapter
25
The previous section focused upon answering the question “what is history?” and 
the way in which the past and history are not the same. This section will elaborate  
on  how the  transformation  of  the  past  into  history  occurs.  History  is  written 
through the narrativization of past events. Narrative “is a discourse that places 
disparate events in an understandable order”71 and that order does not exist in the 
evidence but is imposed upon the events by the historian. 
Hayden White in Tropics of Discourse reproduces the below list from the Annals  
of Saint Gall  chronicling events in Gaul. 
“
707. Hard Winter. Duke Gottfried died.
708. Hard year and deficient in crops
709.
710. Flood everywhere
711. ..
712. Pippin, mayor of the palace, died
713. ….716. ……717.
718. Charles fought against the Saxons.
719. Theudo drove the Saracens out of Aquitaine.
720. Great crops.
721.  
722.
723. Saracens came for the first time.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729. Blessed Bede, the presbyter died.
730. Charles fought against the Saracens at Poitiers on 
Saturday.
731.732. 72”
The list is of the “past”, those events did happen when the annalist entered them 
yet it is not a historical account mainly because it does not have a story or a plot. 
The past events have not been narrativized. Firstly, there is no hierarchy among 
events. The great crops of 722 deserve an entry equal to that of Charles fighting 
against the Saracens. Secondly, there is no causality between the events. There is 
71 Munslow, Deconstructing History,12
72 White, Tropics of Discourse, 9 
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no further  elaboration  on  Duke Gottfried  dying  in  709 such as  what  were its 
implications. Thus as White states;
“modern commentators  have  remarked  on the fact  that  the annalist 
recorded the Battle of Poiters of 732 but failed to note the battle of 
Tours which occurred in the same year and which as every schoolboy 
knows was one of ‘the ten greatest battles of the world history’. But 
even if the annalist  had known of Tours,  what  principle or rule of 
meaning would have required him to record it? It  is only from our 
knowledge of the subsequent history of Western Europe that we can 
presume  to  rank  events  in  terms  of  their  world-historical 
significance”.73
The above lists  chronicles  a  set  of  events  during  a  given time  and place  and 
imparts knowledge about the past. What this list does not do is tell the story of the 
past; hence it is not history as such. As Oakeshott states; “History is the historian's 
experience. It is ‘made’ by nobody save the historian; to write history is the only 
way of making it”.74 As such, the events in the chronicle are assigned importance 
or placed within a causal  relationship  when the events are narrativized  by the 
historian.  Past  events  do  not  come  with  hierarchy  of  significance  or  causal 
relationships inscribed into them, the historian imposes it on them. As Munslow 
explains;
“All such narratives make over events and explain why they happened, 
but are overlaid by the assumptions held by the historian about the forces 
influencing the nature of casuality. These might well include individual 
or  combined  elements  like  race,  gender,  class,  culture,  whether, 
coincidence, geography, region, blundering politicians, and so on and so 
forth. So, while individual statements may be true/false, narrative as a 
collection  of  them is  more  than  their  sum.  The  narrative  becomes  a 
complex  interpretative  exercise  that  is  neither  conclusively  true  nor 
false”.75
An example from the Cold War76 about the hierarchization of events might put 
this  point  in  context.  A list  of  events  between  1945 and 1950 might  look as 
follows:
 February 1945 - Yalta Conference
 April 1945 - Death of President Franklin Roosevelt
73 Ibid.
74 Michael Oakeshot,  Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
99
75 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 12
76 The periodization itself and the events chosen to exemplify the narrativization process are the 
ones that are ones accorded significance in the narratives of the ‘Cold War’ and the events are 
described in the same manner used in the narratives of the Cold War. 
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 May 1945 - End of World War II in Europe
 September 1945 – Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam an independent republic
 February 1946 – George F. Kennan writes the Long Telegram
 March 1946 - Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech
 April 1946 – NATO Treaty is signed
 July 1946 – Philippines gains independence from the United States
 March 1947 - speech by President Truman announcing the ‘Truman Doctrine’
 June 1947 - Secretary of State George Marshall’s announcement of an economic 
aid plan
 July 1947 – Congress passes the National Security Act
 September 1947 - establishment of COMINFORM
 February 1948 – Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia
 June 1948 – West Germany is formed
 June 1948 - Berlin Blockade
 August 1949 – USSR detonates first atomic bomb
 October 1949 – Communist Mao Zedong takes control of China and establishes 
the People’s Republic of China
 June 1950 - Korean War
In order to make these series of events into a story what is necessary is a central 
subject, a geographical center, and a proper beginning in time. The central subject 
of these events can be the Cold War or United States foreign policy or US-Soviet 
rivalry;  the  geographical  center  can  shift  based  on which  events  are  included 
excluded from the  story;  the  story can  concentrate  primarily  on the  events  in 
Europe, in South-East Asia, in the Middle East, and a proper beginning in time; it 
might begin in 1917 with the Russian Revolution, in May 1945 with the end of the 
Second World War in Europe or in February 1946 with the writing of the George 
Kennan’s Long Telegram. As can be seen there are a series of choices to be made 
by the historian when approaching past events and facts. 
There is a dual process of exclusion and inclusion of facts whereby the historian 
imposes their own narrative upon the facts. The exclusion of facts occurs because 
there is always more facts than can be included in a narrative. Thus all the events 
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between 1945 and 1946 cannot  be included in the story;  the historian decides 
which events to include based on a series of considerations (the central subject, 
the geographical center, etc) and a series of questions (what happened next; how 
did  it  happen;  why did  events  occur  in  be  one  way or  another).  The  second 
process of inclusion occurs because; 
“On the other hand, in his efforts to reconstruct ‘what happened’ in any 
given  period  of  history,  the  historian  inevitably  must  include  in  his 
narrative an account of some event or complex of events for which the 
facts  that  would  permit  a  plausible  explanation  of  its  occurrence  are 
lacking. And this means that the historian must ‘interpret’ his materials 
by filling in  the gaps  in  his  information on inferential  or  speculative 
grounds.77”
To take the example of the facts of the period between 1945-1950 again, even 
though the events might remain the same, there are a series of possible narratives 
about the period in question depending upon how the hierarchy of significance is 
allocated;
Narrative 1: End of Second World War, Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Korean 
War
Narrative  2:  End  of  Second  World  War,  Marshall  Plan,  Truman  Doctrine, 
Korean War
Narrative 3:  End of the Second World War,  Marshall  Plan,  Truman Doctrine, 
Korean War
Narrative 4: End of the Second World War,  Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, 
Korean War
The italics denote the narrative prioritizing one event in the narrative over others 
as  the  “turning  point”.  This  alters  the  rhythm  of  the  story  being  told.  If  the 
narrative characterizes the death of Franklin Roosevelt as a turning point then the 
story is that of President Truman’s culpability in the start of the tensions with the 
Soviet Union with the underlying assumption that had Roosevelt been alive this 
77 White, Tropics of Discourse, 51
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turn  of  events  could  have  been avoided.  If  the  Marshall  Plan  is  taken  as  the 
starting point of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union then not 
only is the United States designated as having responsibility in the rise of tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union but because it is the Marshall 
Plan that is singled out capitalism and the opening up of markets also becomes an 
important factor in the story of the evolution of the Cold War. Taking the same 
period  including/excluding  certain  events  the  number  of  possible  narratives 
increases even more;
Narrative 5: End of Second World War, Long Telegram, NATO Treaty, National 
Security Act 
Narrative 6: Yalta Conference, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed Vietnam as independent 
republic,  Philippines gains independence from the United States, Korean War
Narrative 7: End of World War II, establishment of COMINFORM, communist 
takeover  in     Czechoslovakia,  Berlin  Blockade,  USSR detonates  first  atomic 
bomb
The narratives include and exclude different events resulting in different stories 
about the past. The events have all happened, evidence can be found in archives 
about all  these events yet  their  inclusion/exclusion and the construction of the 
narratives determine the story being told. Narrative 5 inscribes significance upon 
events belonging to United States foreign policy, including the NATO Treaty, and 
the National Security Act within the story constructs the United States as the main 
agent of the story and the establishment of the national security state an important 
factor in the development  of the Cold War.  Narrative 6 focuses on the ‘Third 
World’  and  includes  events  that  were  absent  from  Narrative  5  whereby  the 
developments  in  the  international  system are  not  solely  explained  through the 
United  States.  Narrative  7  in  direct  opposition  to  Narrative  5  establishes  the 
Soviet Union as the main agent of the developments in the international system 
casting the expansion of communism as the main  factor  in  the Cold War.  As 
White states;
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 “No such  thing as  a  single  correct  view of  any object  of  study but  
[rather]  there  are  many  .  .  .  views  each  requiring  its  own  style  of 
presentation. This [position allowing] us to therefore entertain seriously 
those creative ‘distortions’ offered by minds capable of looking at the 
past . . . but with different affective and intellectual orientations. Then 
we should no longer expect that  statements about a given epoch as a 
complex of events in the past ‘correspond’ to some pre-existent body of 
raw facts. For we should recognise that what constitutes the facts is the 
problem that the historian, like the artist, has tried to solve in the choice 
of metaphor by which he/she orders the world past, present and future”.78
Thus, in order to transform the past into history what is necessary is an ordering of 
events and a plot.  As discussed in this section, any series of events can be plotted 
differently  depending  on  the  choices  the  historian  makes.  These  choices  are 
related to the questions the historian asks to the past and also the explanatory 
strategies the historian employs in constructing their historical narrative. The next 
section will elaborate further upon these explanatory strategies mainly focusing 
upon Hayden White’s work.
IV. CONSTRUCTING HISTORIES
The previous section discussed how the past is transformed into history through 
ordering and hierarchization of past events. This ordering and hierarchization are 
initial steps in constructing historical narratives. According to Hayden White79, the 
historian  constructs  narratives  (stories)  by  employing  three  main  explanatory 
strategies:  explanation  by  emplotment,  explanation  by  formal  argument  and 
explanation by ideological implication.  This section will discuss these strategies 
in more detail and their implications for the narratives being constructed.
78 White, Tropics of Discourse ,47.
79 This section focuses on the way in which Hayden White has configured the construction of 
historical narratives. This was done order to provide a summary of the way in which events in the 
‘past’ can be configured into ‘history’ and the myriad of operations necessary for the process. Yet 
it  should  be  underlined  that  Hayden  White  is  not  the  only  theorists  to  provide  such  a 
conceptualization and that  this section remains a  simplification of  the way in which narrative 
comes about. For further see, Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York : Columbia 
University  Press,  2007) ;  F.R.  Ankersmit,  Narrative  Logic :  A  Semantic  Analysis  of  the  
Historian’s Language,  F.R. Ankersmit,  History and Tropology : The Rise and Fall of Metaphor  
(California : University of California Press,  1994) ; Paul Ricoeur,  Time and Narrative,  vol.1-3  
(Chicago :  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1990),  Northrop  Frye,  Anatomy  of  Criticism :  Four 
Essays (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1957) ; Vladimir Propp,  Morphology of the Folk  
Tale (Austin : University of Texas Press, 2010) .
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Stories are made out of chronicles by an operation that White calls emplotment. 
Emplotment  is  “the  encodation  of  the  facts  contained  in  the  chronicle  as 
components of specific kinds of plot structures”.80 The emplotment provides the 
kind of story that the historian is telling. There are four modes of emplotment: 
Romance, Tragedy, Comedy and Satire. The choice of emplotment is determined 
mainly by the historian’s conceptionalization of the agent/structure debate: how 
much the protagonist has power over its environment and how determining the 
envorinment is over the protagonist. Romance is a drama of redemption, “of self-
identification symbolized by the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, 
his victory over it and his final liberation from it” and in that sense it’s a “drama 
of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice”.81 Satire is the opposite of 
Romance  in  that  it’s  not  a  drama  of  redemption  but  rather  “a  drama  of 
diremption82” whereby the protagonist is a “captive of their world and destined to 
a life of obstacles and negation”.83 Where Romance and Satire are polar opposites 
in  terms  of  the  agency  of  the  protagonist  over  its  environment,  Comedy  and 
Tragedy are qualifications on Romance. Both Comedy and Tragedy conceive of a 
“temporary  triumph  of  man  over  his  world  by  the  prospect  of  occasional 
reconciliations  of  the  forces  at  play  in  the  social  and  natural  worlds”.84 The 
difference  is  how  the  reconciliations  are  played  out.  In  Comedy  “such 
reconciliations are symbolized in the festive occasions which the Comic writer 
traditionally  uses  to  terminate  his  dramatic  accounts  of  change  and 
transformation” whereas in Tragedy “there are no festive occasions, except false 
illusory ones”.85 
The second step in transforming the past into history is explanation by formal 
argument  that  determines  ‘the point of it  all’  by employing “accepted laws of 
historical change or human behavior upon which we all draw to explain events”.86 
Choice of formal argument depends on the way in which the historian conceives 
of  the  direction  the  explanation  will  take  within  a  spectrum of  integrative  to 
80 White, Tropics of Discourse, 83
81 White, Metahistory, 8
82 Ibid.
83 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 158
84 White, Metahistory, 8
85 Ibid.
86 Munslow, Deconstring History,158
32
dispersive  analysis  of  past  events,  acts  and  actors.  There  are  four  formal 
arguments; Formist, Mechanistic, Organist and Contextualist.  Formist argument 
focuses  on  describing  the  uniqueness  of  past  events,  acts  and  actors  and 
identifying their dispersive character. It “considers an explanation to be complete 
when a given set of objects has been properly identified, its class, generic, and 
specific attributes assigned, and labels attesting to its particularity attached to it”.87 
Organicist  arguments  are  integrative  whereby  past  events,  acts  and  actors  are 
considered to be components of a greater whole. This argument takes “the form of 
a synthesis in which the historian strives to identify the principles by which the 
different aspects of history can be integrated into a single macrocosmic process of, 
say, development”.88 Mechanistic arguments are integrative as well but tend to be 
reductionist  rather  than  synthetic  like  the  organicist  argument  because  they 
“search for the causal laws that determine the outcomes of processes discovered in 
the historical field”.89 Contextualist arguments explain past events, acts and actors 
by setting them within the ‘context’ in which they occurred. The reason for the 
occurrence  of  events  and  acts  “is  explained  by  the  revelation  of  the  specific 
relationship they bore to other events occurring in their circumambient historical 
space”.90
The third step in  the transformation  of the past  into history is  explanation  by 
ideology. Ideology is an integral component of historical writing because as White 
states; “commitment to a particular form of knowledge predetermines the kinds of 
generalizations one can make about the present world, the kinds of knowledge one 
can have of it, and hence the kinds of projects one can legitimately conceive for 
changing  that  present  or  for  maintaining  it  in  its  present  form indefinitely”.91 
White identifies four ideological positions: Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism 
and Liberalism. The historian’s position is mainly dependent on how the historian 
explains change; its desirability and its pace. Conservative and Liberal positions 
are suspicious of change especially structural transformations of the system yet 
they  both  recognize  the  inevitability  of  change.  Conservatives  maintain  that 
87 White, Metahistory, 13
88 Jenkins, On “What is History , 159
89 White, Metahistory, 3
90 Ibid.; 13
91 Ibid.; 21
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piecemeal change should occur according to the ‘natural rhythm’ of society while 
its  structure  remains  unchanged.  They  “imagine  historical  evolution  as  a 
progressive  elaboration  of  the  institutional  structure  that  currently  prevails”.92 
Liberals envision change but one that occurs according to the ‘social rhythm’ of 
the society,  as a process that will  come about through education and elections 
rather  than  one  that  will  occur  immediately  to  alter  the  structure  of  society. 
Liberal position does “imagine a time in the (future) when this structure will have 
been improved, but they project this utopian condition into the remote future, in 
such a way as to discourage any effort in the present to realize it”.93 Radicals and 
Anarchists believe in the necessity of structural transformation. Radicals aim at 
completely transforming society whereas Anarchists aim at abolishing it.  Thus, 
Radicals “view the utopian condition as imminent” whereas Anarchists “idealize a 
remote past of natural-human innocence”.94
To sum up; explanation by emplotment determines the kind of story being told, 
the  structure  of  the  plot  whether  it  is  Romance,  Satire,  Tragedy  or  Comedy. 
Explanation by formal argument determines the explanatory strategies employed 
by the historian, the way in which past events, acts and actors are brought together 
within the  story whether  it  is  formist,  organicist,  mechanistic  or  contextualist. 
Explanation by ideological position determines the attitude of the narrative with 
respect to change whether it is Conservative, Liberal, Radical or Anarchist. White 
argues  that  “the  types  of  interpretive  strategies  identified  are  structurally 
homologous.  ..Their  homology can be graphically represented in the following 
table of correlations.
Mode of Emplotment
Mode  of 
Explanation
Mode of Ideology
Romance Formist Anarchist
Comedy Organicist Conservative
92 Ibid.; 25
93 Ibid
94 Ibid.
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Tragedy Mechanistic Radical
Satire Contextualist Liberal95
White does not of course suggest that such correlations appear in every historical 
work  but  rather  that  there  is  a  recurrence  of  patterns  in  the  historical  work 
analyzed. White’s work brings forth important questions with respect to historical 
analysis and demonstrates the processes that the past has to undergo in order to 
become history. As Jenkins states; “The past has occurred. It has gone and history 
is what historians make of it when they go to work.96” Stories of the past with its 
plot  structures,  explanatory  forces,  and  ideological  implications  cannot  be 
excavated from archives, evidences and facts as ready narratives. As demonstrated 
in this section, the facts of the past as found in archives are turned into histories 
by employing a plethora of strategies none of which are value-free. 
 As Munslow states,  “history does not pre-exist  in any body of facts  that will  
allow unmediated  access to  the  real  past.  History as opposed to the past,  is  a 
literary creation because it is always interpreted through textualized relics which 
themselves  are  only  to  be  understood  through  layers  of  interpretation  as  the 
historian’s facts”.97 If history is a literary creation, a construct, a discourse on the 
past then the meaning of historiography,  historiographical debates,  periods and 
concepts also need to be problematized. The next section will elaborate on what 
historiography means  and how historiographical  debates  should be  understood 
and analyzed.
V. HISTORY AS HISTORIOGRAPHY
This  section  will  focus  on  the  meaning  of  historiography.  Problematizing  the 
concept of history opens up the discussion for what historiography means as well. 
Thus, this section will focus on the meaning of historiography and the nature and 
role of historiographical debates, periods and concepts. 
95 White, Tropics of Discourse, 70
96 Jenkins, Rethinking History, 8
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As argued in earlier sections history and the past are not equal. Past events are 
transformed into histories through a myriad of strategies such as explanation by 
emplotment,  explanation  by  formal  argument  and  explanation  by  ideology. 
History is a discourse about the past but it is not a static one but rather “a shifting 
discourse constructed by the historians and that from the existence of the past no 
one reading is entailed: change the gaze, shift the perspective and new readings 
appear”.98 All the possible readings of the past constitute historiography. In that 
sense,  history  is  historiography because  “historiography is,  in  its  essence,  the 
making of narratives”.99 Thus; “history should be seen as what it manifestly is : a 
written  discourse  about  the  past  and pre-existing  narratives.  Strictly  speaking, 
then, there is no history only historiography defined as what we write about the 
past  in  order  to  understand  it”.100 It  is  because  history  is  historiography  that 
historiographical  debates  are  not  about  facts  of  the  past  but  about  the 
interpretations of the past (history). As Munslow states;  
“Not only do historians describe what happened, they also debate the 
meaning of their 'American Revolution' or 'Enlightenment' against that 
of others in a coherent and plausible fashion in terms that encompass 
far  more  than  reference  to  the  sources.  Unless  there  is  a  legitimate 
debate on the veracity of a particular source as used by an individual 
historian, what is contested in history are the products of the historians'  
webs  of  imaginative  connections  and  their  concepts,  not  just  their 
propositional sentences”.101
The  differentiation  between  history  and  historiography  is  made  to  delimit  the 
writing  of  history  from  history-as-past concept  in  that  historiography  is  the 
history of historical writing and history is the writing of the past. This difference 
is  constituted  in  order to constitute  the past and History as a unified concept. 
Historiography is based upon the notion that history is a reproduction of the past it 
works to fill in the blanks of the history already written;
“the basis of research is 'hard' fact derived from the critical sifting of 
sources,  and  the  purpose  of  historiography  is  either  to  furnish 
narrative accounts and 'thick descriptions' of documented facts or to 
submit  the  historical  record  to  analytic  procedures  of  hypothesis-
98 Jenkins, Rethinking History,16
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formation,  testing,  and  explanation.  The  historical  imagination  is 
limited to plausibility filling gaps in the record,  and 'throwing new 
light'  on a phenomenon requires the discovery of hitherto unknown 
information. It does not mean seeing the phenomenon differently or 
transforming our understanding of it through reinterpretation. Indeed 
all sources tended to be treated in narrowly documentary terms, that 
is, in terms of factual and referential propositions that may be derived 
from them to provide information about specific times and places”.102
The writing of history and historiography are coterminous in that the writing of 
history  aims  to  ‘fill  in  the  blanks’  of  the  history  already  written.  The 
historiography of a subject provides the historian with the road map of what has 
been  argued,  the  interpretations  of  events  and  possible  future  research  areas. 
Historiography thus also disciplines the writing of history in that what is to be 
written, the ‘periods’ to be focused upon, the terminology of the interpretations 
are  already determined  and the  historian  only  works  to  fill  in  the  blanks  and 
and/or  reinterpret  the  past.  Historiography  “makes  possible  certain  researches 
through the fact of common conjunctures and problemtizes. But it makes others 
impossible; it excludes from discourse what its basis at a given moment; it plays 
the role of a censor with respect to current - social, economic, political - postulates 
of  analysis103.”  Historiography  constructs  the  borders  of  the  historiographical 
debate  and  centers  the  understanding  of  the  past  to  specific  concepts,  events, 
actors by privileging them and their interpretations.  Furthermore,  these debates 
construct  periods  and concepts  of the past  whereby the discourses of  the past 
come to be seen as if they were the past silencing other possible renditions. Thus;
“If a narrative substance becomes widely accepted by the historians it 
sometimes looks as if  there really was a Renaissance out there and it 
has  been  discovered  But  all  that  is  actually  going  on  here  is  the 
widespread  acceptance  of  a  proposed  way  of  thinking  through  an 
ultimately arbitrary analytical category; nothing else”.104 
Ankersmit argues that ‘concepts’ such as the Enlightenment, Renaissance or the 
Cold War are not concepts but ‘images’ or ‘pictures’ of the past because “such 
concepts do not  refer to things in or aspects of the past” but rather “to narrative 
interpretations  of the past”.105 Thus “ the ‘Renaissance’, ‘the Cold War’ and so 
102 Dominik LaCapra, History and Criticism. (Ithaca : Cornell University Press,1985), 17
103 Michel DeCerteau, The Writing of History (NY : Columbia University Press, 1988), 68
104 Jenkins, Refiguring History, 50
105 Ibid. 93
37
on, are constructed or postulated, but have not been discovered in the historical 
past”.106 As Ankersmith explains; 
 “such notions as The Renaissance,  etc,  should thus be seen as the 
analytical names of narrative substances, and thus, as far as reference 
is concerned, they must be denied the capacity to refer  to anything 
outside of the text: they refer  only  to  narrative substances, that is, a 
set  of  statements  contained  by  the  text.  For  what  prevents  such 
narrative substances from referring outside of themselves is because 
the Renaissance, say, didn't actually exist to so refer to.  Which means 
that narrative substances are only ever analytically ‘true’ via the texts’ 
internal  statements and never externally (synthetically)  true because 
there is no Enlightenment ‘out there’ for them to correspond to before 
the narrative substance creates it as a collective/proper noun for its set 
of statements”.107
Historiography  presents  the  different  views  and  interpretations  about  same  or 
similar  past  events  but  in  doing so distinguishes  between history and History. 
Thus,  “although  there  are  multiple  interpretations,  there  is  only one  (hi)story; 
although there are partial  histories, there is only one Great Story as their large 
context because there is only one Great past”.108 As Berkhofer explains; “the Great 
Story, or what others might call the ‘metastory’ or the ‘metatext’ applies both to 
the  larger  context  of  the  partial  histories  and  to  the  whole  past  conceived  as 
history that justifies the synthetic expositions of normal historians.109” Berkhofer 
gives the example of the blind sages describing the different parts of the elephant 
but all of them still describing the elephant. The way in which history disciplines 
the past and constructs the basic tenets of historiography delimits the borders of 
what  History  is  whereby  historiographical  debates  are  conditioned  by  the 
assumption  that  all  that  can  be analyzed  is  the  different  interpretations  of  the 
elephant, limiting and excluding the possibilities of a myriad of Great Stories. 
To conclude, problematizing history demonstrates how the ‘differences’ between 
history and historiography are constructed in a further attempt to discipline and 
center the understanding of the past. History is used to order, define, limit the past 
and in turn historiography is used to discipline history. Opening up the definition 
of history underlines the fact that both history and historiography are constructs 
106 Ibid.177
107 Ankersmith Historical Representation cited in Jenkins, 52
108 Robert Berkhofer,  Beyond the Great Story : History as Text and Discourse  (Princeton, NJ : 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 56
109 Ibid.; 38
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and  as  such  both  constructions  are  done  for  a  purpose.  Problematizing  the 
meaning of history and as a consequence of historiography makes it possible to 
question the centering effect of history on the past.
VI. DECENTERING HISTORY
This  chapter  has  focused  upon  the  different  ways  of  understanding  the  past, 
history  and  historiography.  The  problem  of  history  is  not  one  with  a 
straightforward answer, nor is the writing of history solely about collecting facts. 
Problematizing  the  concepts  of  the  past,  history  and  historiography  aids  in 
decentering  the  notion  of  History  and  the  notion  of  the  Great  Story.  As  this 
chapter has attempted to demonstrate there is more than one possible story about 
the past and the past itself is not centered. Moreover, transforming the past into 
histories is not only about transcribing past events, it is a process that involves a 
myriad of strategies. The problem of history outlined in this chapter needs to be 
brought in the field of IR in order to open up not only the field’s history of itself 
but also its attempts to decenter IR. 
History disciplines the past and the dominant discourses on the past that constitute 
the  historiography of  a  period,  a  concept,  an  event  discipline  and delimit  the 
boundaries  of  the  field.  Unless  history  itself  is  problematized,  the  history  IR 
discusses and uses is one that has been closed off, the boundaries established and 
already centered. Thus if the field of IR is to be decentered, one of the first steps 
necessary  is  to  decenter  history  and  problematize  why,  how  and  when  it 
disciplines the past. As Munslow states; 
“History is  no longer  defined  then by the established categories  of 
analysis - economic structures, competing nationalisms, political and 
cultural revolutions, the march and opposition of ideas, great men and 
women,  periods  of  excess  and  ages  of  equipoise,  republics  and 
monarchies, empires and dynasties, famines and plagues - but instead 
by  how  societies  interpret,  imagine,  create,  control,  regulate  and 
dispose of knowledge, especially through the claims of disciplines to 
truth, authority and certainty”.110 
110 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 124-5.
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History is a discourse used to discipline the past. It organizes, limits, and defines, 
the past  according to  the question of  the present.  Thus problematizing  history 
means that the field of IR can also problematize these discourses and open up the 
discussions on the past going beyond the limits imposed on the past. The next 
section will focus upon the way in which Great Stories of IR have been told and 
resisted. The discussion will first elaborate on the Great Story of the field of IR 
and  then  move  to  discuss  the  Great  Stories  of  the  main  concepts  such  as 
international system, sovereignty and security that have defined the field and the 
ways in which these stories have been resisted. As will be expanded upon these 
resistances  and  problematizations  of  the  Great  Stories  have  been  through 
reinterpreting  history,  past  events,  acts,  actors  that  have  been  silenced  and/or 
excluded from the discourses on the past. 
CHAPTER II: STORIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
“When shall I begin, please your Majesty?” he asked.
“Begin at the beginning” the King said very gravely, “and go on 
till you come to the end: then stop”.111
111 Lewis Carrol,  Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland  (Mineola, New York : Dover Publications, 
INC, 2001),
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“Once upon a time, in a far away land…” 
The role of stories in our imaginations is not only to tell tales of far away 
magical lands but also to bring sequential order to events, to define who we are, 
where  we  belong  and  where  we  intend  to  go.  It  is  within  that  tradition  of 
storytelling that every story has a beginning, development and end. Stories present 
a well-ordered and resolved narrative of events, issues and actors. As discussed in 
the earlier chapter history is a retelling of a story of the past. The past is ordered 
through narrativization and there are a myriad of possible narratives about any 
given event, issue and actor. This chapter will focus on the stories of international 
relations whether it is of the field or of the cornerstones of the field such as the 
international system, the Westphalian state or security. 
The traditional story of IR adheres to the main tenets of storytelling; a meta-
narrative  of  linear  progression  divided  into  periods,  with  a  clear  beginning, 
identifiable ‘debates’ that develop the field, and an end? The story of IR is centred 
upon the ‘three great debates’. It begins at the origins and presents the birth of the 
field. It was 1919 and the ‘world’ had just come out of a lengthy and devastating 
war.  The field  was set  up to  deal  with  the  main  issues  that  dominated  world 
politics; mainly how to prevent war. But there was a big disagreement between 
the ‘realists’  and the ‘utopians’.  Utopians did not understand that international 
affairs had to be analysed not as one wished it to be but as it ‘really’ was. This 
was not a fairytale and wishing for peace and effective international institutions 
did not change ‘reality’  of power politics  and international  anarchy.  The ‘first 
great debate’ ended in the mid-1940s with a clear victory for the realists. In the 
aftermath of a second lengthy and devastating war the realists set out to establish 
the field of IR analysing the world as it is and attempting to find answer to the age 
old problem of war. The ‘realists’ were on their way to establishing the field of IR 
and make it a “science” when they encountered resistance and thus started the 
‘second  great  debate’.  The  debate  was  between  the  ‘traditionalists’  and 
behaviouralists. The main issue was how will the field of IR analyse the existing 
international  affairs.  The  traditionalists,  as  is  clear  from the  name,  argued  in 
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favour  of  traditional  methods  that  would  have prevented  IR from becoming  a 
science and stop the progress of the field whereas the behaviouralists argued in 
favour of adopting the methods of ‘true sciences’ hence elevating the field of IR 
into a science. According to the story, this debate is won by the behaviouralists 
and they set out to draw the parameters of the scientific field of IR. The ‘third 
great debate’ is also called the inter-paradigm debate because the main issue of 
contention was more about the priorities accorded to subjects of analysis.  This 
debate ends in what might be termed a draw with a synthesis between the neo-
realists and liberal institutionalists. The ‘great third debate’ sometimes is not taken 
as  the  inter-paradigm  debate  but  as  the  debate  between  rationalists  and 
reflectivists.112 The reflectivists  rejected the very ‘reality’  upon which the field 
had been established and challenged the core assumptions of the field. The ending 
in this version of this story has a strand of the reflectivist group - constructivists - 
breaking off from the reflectivists in an attempt to find a ‘middle ground’113 and 
the assumption that the poststructuralist approach can make no claim to scientific 
inquiry and is best ignored.114
There are several consequences to telling the story as it was outlined above. 
Firstly, there is the problem caused by the temporal delimitation that silences the 
discussions that occurred before the ‘origin’. As Schmidt has shown starting the 
field in 1919 results in ignoring a wide variety of discussions on sovereignty and 
anarchy.115   Secondly, the structure caricaturizes the schools of thought and the 
wide array of discussions that they started. The realists, idealists, traditionalists 
are all reduced to one line summaries that obscures the complicated nature of the 
112 It  should be noted that within classical accounts the three debates structure does not alter.  
Either the inter-paradigm debate or the rationalist/reflectivist debate is taken but the structure of 
three remains; the beginning, the development and the end. For an account that deals with four 
debates  see  Ole  Waever,  “Figures  of  international  thought:  introducing  persons  instead  of 
paradigms”, in, ed.  Marysia Zalewski, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-40113 For  further  discussion  on  the  ‘middle  ground’  see:  Emanuel  Adler,  “Seizing  the  Middle 
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, European Journal of International Affairs, 3:3 (1997): 
319-363 and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Pres,1999)114 For a discussion on how the debates in general  and especially the discussions on the third  
debate are used to police what  is  acceptable IR research  see;  Steve Smith,  “The discipline of  
international  relations:  still  an  American  social  science’,  British  Journal  of  Politics  and  
International Relations, 2:3 (Oct. 2000):374-402.115 Brian Schmidt,  The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International  
Relations (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998)
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discussions.  Thirdly,  the  structure  of  the  debates  serves  to  privilege  one 
theoretical approach over others. Even the naming of the ‘debates’ demonstrated 
who was doing the defining and the power structures inherent in that endeavor. 
The ‘utopians’ denotes a group that had impractical and idealistic notions of world 
politics  whereas  ‘traditional’  denotes  backwardness  and  resistance  to 
development. Furthermore, in the case of the first debate it is questionable to what 
extent it took place and to what extent it was part of victors history.116  As Booth 
states; “The Carr/Davies story was simplified and twisted, and became a myth. It 
helped  create  and  sustain  the  view that  the  academic  subject  of  International 
Politics was about ‘power politics’ between states and could only be respectably 
studied from a 'realist' perspective”.117 Fourthly, it limits the discursive space for 
discussing the field.118 As Waever states, “It makes a difference whether one tries 
to operate in today's IR according to an understanding of this as 'after the third 
debate'  or 'after  the fourth debate”.119 Thus the structure of the ‘great debates’ 
story, what was included/excluded, who won and lost, the meaning laden names 
all affect the nature of the discussion on IR.120 
116 For further discussion see; Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the “First Great Debate””,  Review of  
International Studies, 24:5 (1998): 10-12, Lucian M. Ashworth, “Did the Realist-Idealist Great 
Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations”’ International Relations, 
16:1 (2002), Cameron G. Thies, “Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: 
The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate’, European Journal of International Relations 8:2 (2002), 
Joel Quirk and Darhan Vigneswaran, “The construction of an edifice: the story of a First Great 
debate”,  Review of International Studies, 31 (2005): 89-107; Lucian Ashworth, ‘Where are the 
Idealists in Interwar International Relations?’, Review of International Studies, 32:2 (2006): 291-
308;  Brian  Schmidt,  ‘Lessons  from the  Past:  Reassesing  the  Interwar  Disciplinary  History of 
International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, 42:3 (1998): 433-459; Brian C. Schmidt, 
‘On the  History  and  Historiography of  International  Relations’,  in  Walter  Carlsnaes,  Thomas 
Risse, and Beth Simmons eds., Handbook of International Relations (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 3-
28; Nicholas Guilhot, ‘The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of 
IR  Theory’,  International  Political  Sociology  4:2  (2008):  281-304;  Nicholas  Guilhot,  ed.  The 
Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockerfeller Foundation, and the 1954  
Conference  on Theory  (New York: Columbia University Press,  2011);  Brian  C.  Schmidt,  ed., 
International Relations and the First Great Debate (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).117 Ken Booth, "75 Years On Rewriting the Subject's Past - Reinventing its Future", in Zalewski ,  
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 329118 This is reflected in the TRIP Scholar Survey where the most influential scholars in the IR field 
in the past 20 years are identified as; Alexander Wendt, Robert Keohane, Kenneth Waltz, Joseph 
Nye,  see  Daniel  Maliniak,  Susan  Peterson  and  Michael  J.Tierney,  Teaching,  research,  and  
International Policy (TRIP) Project. Virginia: The College of William and Mary, 2012, Accessed 
at: http://irtheoryandpractice.wm.edu/projects/trip/TRIPAroundTheWorld2011.pdf, p.49119 Waever,  "Figures  of  international  thought:  introducing  persons  instead  of  paradigms",  in 
Zalewski, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, 9120 Approaching the field in such a deterministic fashion is one of the reasons for the “End of IR 
theory” debate. If there is no grand debate to define the parameters of the field, then can there be 
IR theory as there was when the great debates occurred. For further on the issue of ‘End of IR 
Theory?’ see Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, ‘Special Issue: The End of International  
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The  ‘great  debates’  are  stories  told  and  retold,  myths  that  have  been 
established, ‘traditions’ invented that have come to define the field. In its attempt 
to write its own history IR has also constructed it.121 This approach draws the 
boundaries of IR discourse122 and establishes the hegemony of specific concepts 
and perspectives and determines the hierarchies within the discursive field.123 The 
writing  of  history  constructs  the  past  and  in  that  process  disciplines  it.  The 
‘traditional’ or the dominant story of IR works to define not only the field but also 
the important concepts, the evolutions, the schools and perspectives included and 
Relations  Theory?’,  European  Journal  of  International  Relations,  19:3  (2013):  405-665.  The 
debate had already ignited responses and discussions within the blogosphere before the publication 
of the special issue; Felix Berenskoetter, “The End of IR Theory As We Know it….” The Disorder  
of Things, 3 August 2012, Accessed from : http://thedisorderofthings.com/2012/08/03/the-end-of-
ir-theory-as-we-know-it/ ;  Stephen  Walt,  “Leaving  Theory  Behind:  What’s  wrong  with  IR 
scholarship  today”,  Foreign  Policy,  January  4,  2013,  Accessed  from: 
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/04/leaving_theory_behind ;  Steve  Saideman, 
“Lamenting  the  Loss  of  Light,  The  Ebbing  of  Grand  Theory  and  The  Decline  of  Old  Boys  
Network”,  January  5,  2013,  Accessed  from: 
http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/01/lamenting-the-loss-of-the-light-the-
ebbing-of-grand-theory-and-the-decline-of-old-boy-networks.html ; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and 
Daniel  Nexon,  “I  Can  Has  IR  Theory”,  The  Duck  of  Minerva  Working  paper,  1:2013, 
http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Jackson-Nexon-
DoM-WP-1.2013.pdf.  Furthermore,  the  debate  continued  within  the  blogosphere  whereby  a 
symposium was held by the Duck of Minerva site; The ‘End of IR Theory?’ Symposium, Duck of 
Minerva,  5  September  –  18  September  2013,  Accessed  from: 
http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/09/special-event-the-end-of-ir-theory-
symposium.html. Another intervention into the debates about the ‘great  debates’ was made by 
Brian  C.  Schmidt  on  E-IR:  Brian  C.  Schmidt,  ‘The  End  of  Great  Debates’,  E-International  
Relations,  2  February  2014,  Accessed  from:  http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/02/the-end-of-great-
debates/.121 Waever argues that a dialogical relationship exists whereby ‘the 'debates' operate as a dialectic  
between implicit  pictures  and articulate self-representations  of  the discipline.  In  part,  they are 
implicit operators in (and thereby shape) actual academic practice, in part they are constructed and 
artificially  imposed  on  much  more  diverse  activities.  Each  of  the  debates  first  emerged  as  a 
constellation,  an  implicit  picture.  Then,  the  second  step,  this  constellation  was  labeled,  this 
reinforced it as a constellation, but also shaped the phase of moving beyond it, because that phase 
was defined  in  relation to  this  picture  of  the  discipline’,  in  Waever,  "Figures  of  international  
thought: introducing persons instead of paradigms", in Zalewski, International Theory: Positivism 
and Beyond, 9122 This term is adopted from Krishna’s use of IR discourse, ‘I deliberealty use IR discourse rather 
than  IR theory,  IR  literature,   or  just  IR   in  order  to  inflect  theory,  discipline,  or  any social 
narrative with considerations of power’, Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of 
International Relations”, in Jones, Decolonizing International Relations, 106.123 For further discussion on the discussion of a dominant discourse on IR see; Steve Smith, “The  
discipline of international relations: still an American social science’,  British Journal of Politics  
and International Relations, 2:3 (Oct. 2000):374-402; Ole Waever “The Sociology of a not so 
international  discipline:  American  and  European  developments  in  international  relations”, 
International Organization,  52 (1998): 687-727; Anna M.Agathangelou and L.H.M Ling, "The 
House of  IR:  From Family Power  Politics  to  the  Poisies of  Worldism",  International  Studies  
Review 6  (2004):  21-49;  John M.  Hobson and  J.  C.  Sharman (2005)  'The  Enduring  Place  of 
Hierarchy  in  World  Politics:  Tracing  the  Social  Logics  of  Hierarchy  and  Political  Change,' 
European Journal of International Relations 11(1): 63–98.
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excluded.124 Despite this hegemonic structure there are sites of resistance where 
renegotiation of the main concepts and perspectives happen and the hierarchical 
structure is questioned. There is no one story of IR but a myriad of stories, thus 
this study does not take the ‘origins’ story as its starting point but treats IR as a 
discursive  space  constituted  by  a  number  of  different  stories  enabling  a 
broadening of the analytical field beyond the paradigm debates. Looking beyond 
the ‘origins’ story enables one to access the sites of resistance and engage with the 
criticism coming  from the  margins  about  the  hierarchical  and  Western-centric 
nature of the debate. There are two levels to this hierarchy; the nature of the field 
is  hierarchic  and  secondly  the  debates  and  narratives  of  the  field 
produce/reproduce  this  hierarchy.  As  Tickner  states;  “as  a  social  practice  IR 
constitutes a space in which certain understandings of the world dominate others, 
specific  interests  are  privileged  over  others,  and  practices  of  power  and 
domination acquire a normative form”.125 The story of IR is based on a specific 
understanding of its past yet it is presented as the Great Story of the field. This 
privileges one understanding of the past over other possible understandings of the 
past. Thus it needs to be underlined that there is more than one story that can be 
told about the origins and development of the field. The traditional story of IR is 
one possible  story of the field.  There are other  possible  stories and discursive 
spaces that resist, question and disrupt the Great Story of IR. 
The dominant IR discourse is premised on specific stories of the international 
system, of Westphalian state sovereignty and of security. These stories constitute 
the cornerstones of the western-centrism of IR thus discussing the other possible 
stories of the field is an important step in decentering IR. The aim of this chapter 
is  to  discuss  the  ways  in  which  the  dominant  and  privileged  stories  of  the 
international system, of the state and of security were disrupted. 
II. STORIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
124 Agathangelou and Ling, ‘The House of IR’, 
125 Arlene Tickner,  “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World”, Millennium : Journal of  
International Relations, 32:2 (2003): 300
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This section focuses on the stories of the international system and how the Great 
Story  of  the  expansion of  the  international  system predicated  upon a  specific 
understanding of the ‘rise of the West’ and centering of European history has been 
disrupted. The narrative of the expansion and establishment of the International 
System is a constitutive part  of the discourses of IR126.  It is a Western centric 
narrative focusing on the West, its history, its actions, events that shaped it and 
the manner in which these were exported to the rest of the world127. This story is 
emplotted as a romantic tale of the protagonist (the West in this case) overcoming 
obstacles and final victory over its circumstances. The predominant understanding 
of IR is premised on a very limited understanding not only of world history but 
also European history. Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that this one 
story is  presented  as  the  universal  story without  acknowledging that  there are 
multiple stories present or that the stories themselves are connected. Focusing on 
the  development  of  the  international  system  based  solely  on  a  certain 
understanding of European history obscures  other stories and voices.  Thus the 
assumption that this is West’s story to tell is a problematic one.
“The present international political structure of the world – founded 
upon the division of mankind and of the earth into separate states, 
their  acceptance  of  one  another’s  sovereignty,  of  principles  of  law 
regulating  their  coexistence  and  co-operation,  and  of  diplomatic 
conventions facilitating their intercourse – is, at least in its most basic 
features, the legacy of Europe’s now vanished ascendancy. Because it 
was  in  fact  Europe  and  not  America,  Asia,  or  Africa  that  first 
dominated and, in so doing, unified the world, it is not our perspective 
but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric”.128
126 Hedley Bull,  The Anarchical Society  (Basingstoke : Macmillan Press, 1995) ; Adam Watson 
‘European International Society and its Expansion’, in eds, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, The 
Expansion  of  International  Society (Oxford :  Clarendon  Press,  1984) ;  Adam  Watson,  The 
Evolution of International Society : A Comparative Analysis (New York : Routledge, 1992) 
127 As Buzan and Little state ; ‘the English School assessment is deeply suspect and indeed serves 
to reproduce a powerful Eurocentric myth that was established in the nineteenth century and then 
perpetuated in the twentieth century.’ , in Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “World History and the 
Development of non-Western International Relations theory”, in eds., Barry Buzan and Amitav 
Acharya, Non-Western International Relations Theory, 199.
128 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ‘Introduction’, in eds., Hedley Bull and Adam Watson.  The 
Expansion of International Society, 2.
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The above quote from Bull and Watson, the forefathers of the English school129, 
demonstrates the understanding rooted in IR discourse about the development of 
the international system; that it was West’s story to tell ignoring the myriad of 
ways in which the interaction  with the East  co-constituted  that  story.  As Seth 
states;  “any satisfactory account  of  the emergence  of  the  modern  international 
system cannot simply chart  how an international  society that developed in the 
West radiated outwards, but rather seek to explore the ways in which international 
society was shaped by the interactions between Europe and those it colonized”.130 
Furthermore,  it  needs  to  be  underlined  that  this  Eurocentric  account  of  the 
international system is constitutive of the field and defines the boundaries of the 
discourse on IR. The silences and omissions from the story of the development of 
the  international  system  condition  the  manner  in  which  concepts  of  the 
international, security, sovereignty and democracy are defined. As such retelling 
the story as it has been reproduces the implicit hierarchies inscribed within the 
narrative and continues to silence alternative voices. It needs to be highlighted 
“how  some  of  the  critical  conceptual  binding  blocks  of  IR  discourse  – 
sovereignty, property, nationness, and international law, to mention some – were 
all  emergent  in  the  encounter  between  the  West  and  the  third  world”.131 The 
narrative of the expansion of the international society works in many levels; the 
teleological rise of the West narrative, the unproblematic and linear rendering of 
European  history,  the  silencing  of  events,  issues  and  perspectives  from  the 
‘expansion’ narrative. 
129 For more on the English school see: Tim Dunne, “The Social  Construction of International 
Society”,  European  Journal  of  International  Relations,  1:3  (1995):  367-89;  Edward  Keene, 
Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English  
School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2004); Andrew Linkater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations : A 
Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006) ; Barry Buzan and 
Ana Gonzales-Pelaez, eds., International Society and the Middle East : English School Theory at  
the Regional  Level (Basingstoke :  Palgrave,  2009) ;  Cornelia  Navari,  Theorising  International  
Society : English School Methods (Basingstoke : Palgrave, 2009).
130 Sanjay Seth, ‘Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations’,  Millennium :  
Journal of International Relations, 40:1 (2011): 174
131 Sankaran Krishna, ‘Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations’, Alternatives 
26 (2001) : 408.
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Stories of international relations,  of the international society and IR theory are 
based  upon  a  story  that  has  Europe  at  its  center,  a  story  that  edits  out  the 
disruptions and constructs a linear unproblematized tale of the ‘rise of the West’, 
‘the  expansion  of  International  Society’,  ‘the  origins  of  the  state  system,  the 
‘establishment of democracy’.  The stories might have different titles and might 
prioritize different aspects; the story of security, the story of the state, the story of 
the international yet the periodisations, the events and setting is dependent upon a 
specific understanding of European history. Narratives of international society and 
its expansion rest upon an implicit and at times explicit reliance on a linear story 
of the ‘rise of the West’ which 
has a ‘triumphalist teleology’;
“with  Ancient  Greece,  progressing  on  to  the  European  agricultural 
revolution in the low middle ages, then on to the rise of the Italian-led 
commerce at the turn of the millennium. The story continues on into 
the high middle ages when Europe rediscovered pure Greek ideas in 
the Renaissance which, when coupled with the scientific revolution, 
the Enlightenment and the rise of democracy, propelled Europe into 
industrialization and capitalist modernity”.132
John  Hobson  in  ‘Eastern  Origins  of  Western  Civilization’  problematizes  this 
narrative and demonstrates the ways in which Eastern civilization played a role. 
His aim is to “counter one of Eurocentrism's most basic assumptions - that the east 
has been a passive bystander in the story of world historical development as well 
as a victim or bearer of Western power, and that accordingly it can be legitimately 
marginalized from the progressive story of world history”.133 Thus; “these two 
interrelated  claims  -  Eastern  agency and the  assimilation  of  advanced  Eastern 
‘resource portfolios’ via oriental  globalisation  on the one hand, entwined with 
European agency/identity and the appropriation of Eastern resources on the other - 
constitute the discovery of the lost story of the rise of the oriental West”.134 As 
Hobson argues, the questions we ask and the boundaries of the inquires we set 
need to be altered. Asking why it was the West rather than the East conditions that 
the  answer  “attribute  permanent  positive  characteristics  to  the  West  and 
permanent  negative  features  to  the  East”.135 Thus  he  proposes  asking  more 
“temporally relativist questions” which will not “obscure the alternative Eastern 
132 John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004),10
133 Ibid, ; 4
134 Ibid.;5
135 Ibid.; 299
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story” but rather “bring the East back from the marginalised edge or dark ghetto it 
was  consigned  to  by  the  Eurocentric  world  history”.136 Hobson’s  work  is 
important  in  problematizing  the  linear  and  teleological  ‘rise  of  the  West’ 
narrative.137
Furthermore, the narrative of the expansion itself ignores the perspectives of the 
states  the  international  society  expanded  into.  As  Suzuki  states  “many  non-
European states which were incorporated into European International Society in 
the course of European imperialism did not only witness the norms of ‘toleration’ 
and ‘coexistence’. They also witnessed the European International Society which 
often  aggressively  intervened  in  their  land  in  order  to  bring  them  closer  to 
‘civilization’”.138 In  that  sense,  telling  the  story  of  the  evolution  of  the 
international system without incorporating that it happened at the same time as 
imperialism and the perspectives of the non-Western states presents an incomplete 
picture. The reasons why the non-Western states joined the international society 
was not always as straightforward as accepting Western norms. It  needs to be 
underlined that;
“The outlook of many non-European states on international  politics 
and the reconfigurations of  their  domestic  structures  were  likely to 
have reflected the different norms which governed their relations with 
European  powers,  as  well  as  their  own  interpretations,  rather  than 
simply reflecting ‘the dominant European standard of “civilization”.139
Joining  the  international  society  was  also  part  of  a  strategy  to  overcome  the 
insecurities  created  by  the  Western  states,  the  treaty  system and the  fact  that 
relations among ‘civilized’ states was conducted according to different rules. 
136 Ibid.
137 It  needs to be underlined that the ‘rise of the West’ narrative had been problemtized before 
Hobson within the field of ‘world history’ but Hobson’s work has been crucial in bringing in those 
perspectives  into IR  discourse.  For  works  that  have  problematized  the  narratives  see :  Martin 
Bernal,  Black  Athena,  I (London :  Vintage,  1991) ;  Janet  Abu-Lughod,  Before  European 
Hegemony : The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1989) ; C.A. 
Bayly,  The  Birth  of  the  Modern  World,  1780-1914 :  Global  Connections  and  Comparisons 
(Oxford : Blackwell, 2004) ; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence : China, Europe, and the  
Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2000).
138 Shogo  Suzuki,  ‘Japan’s  Socialisation  into  Janus-Faced  European  International  Society,’ 
European  Journal  of  International  Relations,  11 :1 (2005) :  147.  Also  see :  Shogo  Suzuki, 
Civilization  and Empire :  China  and Japan’s  Encounter  with  European  International  Society  
(London and New York : Routledge, 2009).
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As Ringmar140 argues the way in which China and Japan had scripted what space 
meant and how the entities in it were defined structured their understanding of 
sovereignty  and  performances  within  the  respective  international  system.  He 
argues that, it  was the Europeans insistence that their  relationship be governed 
according to the Westphalian script that forced Chinese and Japanese systems to 
rescript their  conceptualizations.  Despite these rescriptings,  the Chinese “never 
managed to fully switch frames and their mastery of the Westphalian scripts was 
incomplete at best”141 and because their idea of sovereignty was closer to the one 
of  Western  sovereignty  “the  new  Japan  that  emerged  was  a  more  dedicated 
member of the Westphalian system than Qing dynasty China”.142 The success of 
the  rescripting  was  as  much  dependent  on  their  own  conceptualizations  of 
sovereignty than any Western action.  As Ringmar states;  “The model  that had 
placed the Chinese sun as its symbolic center could not easily be traded in for a 
model in which China was merely one billiard ball among others following an 
independent path” whereas “the way the Tokugawa system was performed made it 
resemble the Westphalian system in a number of respects”.143 
The linear rendering of the expansion of the international society overlooks two 
essential points. Firstly,  that the international system was also an imperial one. 
Secondly, that the imperial West was the determinant of the rules of the game. 
The story of the international system can not only be told through the expansion 
of the norms and values of the West but the different strategies developed by the 
Eastern states and how and why they chose to become part of that international 
system also needs to be told. As Zarakol staes;
 “outcomes taken to be functionally determined by Western observers 
are often the result of long considered and contested deliberations by 
local actors, and what are considered to be domestic failures (by both 
local and international observers) were often much more contingent 
on international social dynamics than is usually assumed”.144
140 Erik Ringmar, ‘Malice in Wonderland : Dreams of the Orient and the Destruction of the Palace 
of  the  Emperor  in  China,  Journal  of  World  History,  22 :2  (2011) :  273-298 ;  ‘Inter-Texual 
Relations : The Quarrel Over the Iraq War as a Conflict between Narrative Types’,  Cooperation 
and Conflict, 41 :4 (2006) : 403-421 ; ‘Liberal Barbarism and the Oriental Sublime : The European 
Destruction of the Emperor’s  Summer Palace’,  Millennium Journal of  International Relations,  
34 :3 (2006) : 917-933 ; ‘Performing International Systems: Two East Asian Alternatives to the 
Westphalian Order’, International Organization, 66 (2012): 1-25.
141 Ringmar, ‘Performing International Systems’, 17
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.; 17-18
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Furthermore,  the  story of  the  international  system is  told  based  on a  specific 
understanding  of  European  history  that  is  itself  in  need  of  questioning.  As 
Halperin states; “theories about the structures, processes, and events that define 
and recur within the international realm are based to a large extent on the history 
of the European states system and its  role  in world affairs  since the sixteenth 
century”.145 She problematizes the myths of European history such as the story of 
European democracy, revolutions and the industrial revolution.  With respect to 
the  industrial  revolution  she  argues  that  the  popular  account  of  the  bourgeois 
revolutions of the middle classes’ “struggle for state power against merchant and 
financial monopolists” is inaccurate, “it was the aristocracy that led and won the 
revolt  against  absolutism both  in  Britain  and  elsewhere  in  Europe”  and  “the 
aristocracy  remained  the  dominant  faction  of  the  bourgeoisie  throughout  the 
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries”.146 She  concludes  that  “political 
institutions  in  nineteenth-century  Europe  were  established  by  elites  for  the 
purpose of preserving and extending their social and economic power and, as a 
result,  were  continually  compromised  and  undermined  by  efforts  to  preserve 
privilege  and  to  forestall  the  acquisition  of  power  by  subordinate  groups  and 
classes”.147 Thus the story of Europe’s past itself needs to be problematized as it 
“transforms  Europe’s  brutal  expansion  and  political-military  hegemony  into  a 
story of enlightenment and progress”.148 As demonstrated by Halperin149 there are 
more than one possible stories of Europe’s past that can be narrated. Privileging 
certain events, actors and issues while incorporating ‘European history’ into IR 
excludes events, actors and issues that do not fit within the constructed narrative.
The processes, structures, and actors privileged by a Eurocentric understanding of 
the international system delineates events that do not ‘fit’ within the definitions of 
these structures and actors as not part of the story as with the story of the Concert  
of Europe that brought peace and stability which  “neglects to portray imperialism 
145 Halperin,  ‘International  Relations  Theory  and  the  Hegemony  of  Western  Conceptions  of 
Modernity’, in Jones, Decolonizing International Relations, 43
146 Ibid.; 52
147 Ibid.; 57
148 Ibid.
149 For further on Halperin’s argument see ; Sandra Halperin, War and Social Change in Modern  
Europe : The Great Transformation Revisited (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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as  a  violent  process  or  colonial  governance  as  institutionalized  violence”.150 
Characterizing the period from 1815 to 1914 as peaceful requires ignoring a series 
of  wars,  mutinies  and  conquests.  But  they  do  not  ‘count’  and  hence  can  not 
disrupt the “Hundred Years Peace” because “wars are defined exclusively as the 
acts of sovereign powers on each other” and as a result “the Revolt of 1857 that 
swept across northern India, that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, and that 
at one point looked likely to bring a forcible end to the British Raj there does not 
count”  rather  it  becomes  “a  mere  “Mutiny”  ..a  “domestic”  issue  by  its  very 
definition  incapable  of  altering  the  Hundred  Years’  Peace”.151 A  similar 
construction  of  a  period  of  peace  is  made  with respect  to  the  Cold War152 in 
referring to it as the “Long Peace153” focusing on the fact that the two superpowers 
did not directly engage in war yet it completely ignores the violent independence 
wars in the Third World. 
Events that do not ‘fit’ into the linear narrative and have been edited out in order 
to center Europe have also been brought into the story. The narrative of the ‘Age 
of Revolutions’ centers upon the French and American revolutions and ‘Haiti was 
purposefully  forgotten  from  historical  memory  as  something  unimaginable, 
unintelligible  and  unthinkable”.154 Taking  the  Haitian  Revolution  out  of  the 
narrative of revolutions that paved the way for the establishment of the present 
understanding of human rights presents it as originating only from the West when 
“the Haitian Revolution properly belongs to the genealogy of modern conceptions 
of constitutional power, popular sovereignty and entitlements for the citizenry”.155 
The story of the international  system is predominantly told based on a certain 
retelling of the European past and Western experience. As demonstrated in this 
150 Mark B. Salter,  Barbarians and Civilisation in International Relations (Steerling, VA : Pluto 
Press, 2002), 37
151 Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations”, Alternatives, 
26 (2001) : 404-405.
152 John  Lewis  Gaddis,  “The  Long  Peace:  Elements  of  Stability  in  the  Postwar  International 
System”, International Security, 10:4 (1986): 99-142
153 The characterization of the Cold War itself is problematic for the same reason, it characterizes a 
period solely based on the relationship between two superpowers ignoring other dynamics such as  
decolonization and the Third World that was an important part of the international system. More  
on this discussion in Chapter 3.
154 Robbie Shilliam, ‘Civilization and the poetics of slavery’, Thesis Eleven, 108 (2012): 100
155 Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, “Mind, Body, and Gut! Elements of a Postcolonial Human Rights 
Discourse”, in Decolonizing International Relations, 186
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section,  the  story  of  the  international  system  is  predicated  upon  a  limited 
interpretation of history which silences a variety of voices and presents a linear 
unproblematic  narrative  of  European history and the international  system.  The 
story of the international system is constitutive of and is constituted by Western-
centric  narratives  of  processes,  concepts  and  institutions.  One  of  the  main 
narratives that is interlinked with that of the international system is that of the 
story of the Westphalian state. Thus the next section will focus on the story of the 
Wesphalian state and Westphalian sovereignty as it constitutes an essential part of 
the story of international relations.
III. STORIES OF STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY
The previous section discussed the ways in which the story of the international 
system can be retold in different manners. Since there are a myriad of stories of 
international  system  processes,  actors,  institutions  linked  to  the  story  of 
international  system also  need  to  be  disrupted.  The  story  of  the  international 
system and its expansion is told in conjunction with the story of the Westphalian 
state  and  Westphalian  sovereignty.  Together  these  stories  comprise  the 
Westphalian International System that constitutes the cornerstone of the field of 
IR. This section will discuss the ways in which the story of the Westphalian states 
and sovereignty has been problematized. The story of the Westphalian state and 
sovereignty  has  been  disrupted  on  a  number  of  fronts156.  The  first  disruption 
questions not only whether state and sovereignty are Westphalian but also to what 
extent  they are European.  The second disruption focuses upon questioning the 
linear progression of the story especially by underlying the role of imperialism.
The designation of the Treaties of Westphalia as the origins of the state system is 
considered to be one of the “big bangs”157 of the field. According to this story it 
156 For in depths analysis of the genealogy of sovereignty see : Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of 
Sovereignty (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995) and also see Jens Bartelson, A 
Critique of the State (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997) for discussion on how 
‘critique’ itself can be a constitutive factor.
157 Benjamin de Cavalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths 
that Your Teachers Still Tell you about 1648 and 1919”,  Millennium : Journal of International  
Relations, 39:3 (2011): 735-758
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was with the Treaties  of Westphalia  that  ended the Thirty Years War that the 
concept of sovereignty and the international state system became established. This 
story “is a myth”158 and as a “typical founding myth it opens up a neat account of 
how ‘classical’ European system, the prototype of the present international system 
came  about”  and  “explains  the  origin  of  what  are  considered  the  main 
characteristics  of  that  system,  such  as  territoriality,  sovereignty,  equality  and 
nonintervention”.159
The Treaties of Westphalia should not be treated as the ‘beginning’ but rather 
should be “understood within a very complex story of advances,  setbacks  and 
messy entanglements of feudal suzerainty with rare elements of what we now call 
modern  state  sovereignty”.160 Problematizing  the temporal  dimension opens up 
space for stories of state and sovereignty not limited by the “myth of 1648”161 and 
makes it possible to tell stories within any time frame before of after Westphalia 
but the story still takes place in Europe.
A further problematization is of the spatial dimension of the story. Rather than 
asking, “when was sovereignty” it needs to be asked, “ ‘where’ was sovereignty? 
and not simply ‘why’ but ‘how’ was sovereignty”?162 Thus the linear narrative of 
origins of state and sovereignty needs to be disrupted as well. Hobson questions 
this linear narrative by “provincializing Westphalia” and revealing “the manifold 
Eastern and global forces that informed the rise of sovereignty in Europe”.163 He 
argues that sovereignty originated during the process of “oriental globalization”164 
and “eastern influences played an important role in shaping each of the sources of 
the sovereign state – economic,  geopolitical/military,  ideological/discursive and 
political”.165 Hobson  demonstrates  the  ways  in  which  situating  Europe  at  the 
158 Andreas  Osiander,  “Sovereignty,  International  Relations  and  the  Westphalian  Myth”, 
International Organization, 55:2 (2001): 251
159 Ibid.; 266
160 Cavalho, et.al, “The Big Bangs of IR”, 71
161 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648 : Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International  
Relations (London : Verso, 2003)
162 John Hobson, “Provincializing Westphalia: The Eastern Origins of sovereignty”, International  
Politics, 46 (2009): 673
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center  of  the  story  silences  the  influence  of  the  East  and  how  it  was  co-
constitutive in the emergence of state and sovereignty. 
The question of ‘where’ was sovereignty still focused on the origins story. Going 
beyond the origins story Shilliam questions the “historical narrative that assumed 
an unprecedented transformation of sovereignty from a (putatively) Westphalian 
territorial  principle to a post-Westphalian extra-territorial  principle”.166 Thus he 
brings forth the story of Marcus Garvey and the UNIA167 to demonstrate that the 
linear  unproblemtaized  passage  from Westphalia  to  post-Westphalian  order  in 
Europe also needs to be problematized. The example of UNIA where “sovereignty 
was expressed through a political subject that took the form of an impersonal Pan-
African collective168” disrupts the story of the end of Westphalia that has come 
with  the  European  Union.  Shilliam  also  points  out  that  “a  number  of  trans-
national  and/or  extra-territorial  political  and  intellectual  currents  drove  the 
political  upheavals  surrounding  World  War  I”169 hence  problematizing  the 
narrative of the development  of the state in Europe and its  passage to a post-
Westphalian order in the post-Cold War period. Even if these movements were 
unsuccessful, “rather than being rendered invisible or as curiosities in a uni-linear 
narrative, the existence of the ‘marginal’ alternatives presented at the fin-de-siecle  
and their cumulative lived experiences should be taken as constitutive of the pre-
existing and ongoing multi-linear  transformation  of sovereignty in the  modern 
epoch”.170
As with the story of the expansion of the international system, the travels of state 
and  sovereignty  cannot  be  narrated  independent  of  imperialism.  Since, 
“imperialism in its many forms was essential  in shaping the character  of both 
Europe and the non-European world; it is their common history”.171 If the state is 
taken  “as an identity or agent, and sovereignty as an institution or discourse” that 
166 Robbie Shilliam, “What about Marcus Garvey? Race and the transformation of sovereignty 
debate”, Review of International Studies, 32 :3 (2006) : 380
167 Universal Negro Improvement Association
168 Shilliam, ‘What about Marcus Garvey’, 397
169 Ibid.; 381
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171 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International Relations, 
Millennium : Journal of International Relations, 31 :1 (2002) :113
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are  “mutually  constitutive  and  constantly  undergoing  change  and 
transformation”172 then “neither state nor sovereignty should be assumed or taken 
as given, fixed or immutable”.173 Neither state nor sovereignty remained fixed as it 
developed  within  Europe  and  neither  did  it  travel  in  a  linear  unproblematic 
manner to the non-Europeans. Imperialism was an important part of the multitude 
of stories of state and sovereignty in and outside of Europe.
The story of the way in which state and sovereignty expanded to establish the 
international system assumed not only the uni-linearity of the process but also that 
it happened in an unproblematic manner. It also assumed that the decolonization 
process happened within the contours of international law ignoring that the story 
of international law and the codification of the rights of states and the extent of 
their sovereignty was also shaped by imperialism. As Anghie argues; “sovereignty 
is formulated in such a way as to exclude the non-European; following which, 
sovereignty can then be deployed to identify, locate, sanction and transform the 
uncivilized”.174 The story of the manner in which sovereignty and state travelled is 
predicated  on  a  story  of  international  law  that  is  itself  Eurocentric  and  its 
decisions with respect to who gets to be a state and who has sovereignty privileges 
the European definition and imposes the ‘ideal’ set in Europe to be the aim. The 
“sovereignty doctrine expels  the non-European world from its  realm,  and then 
proceeds to legitmise the imperialism that resulted in the incorporation of the non-
European  world  into  the  system of  international  law”.175 As  a  result  of  these 
dynamics, telling the story through the prism of international law and standards 
established by European states turns the story of the decolonization process and 
the post-colonial state to one of its lack, weakness, and failure. Thus, the post-
colonial  state  us  always  in  a  process  of  trying  to  fulfill  the  main  tenets  of 
international  law  that  will  enable  its  joining  of  the  Westphalian  international 
system.
172 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The Social Construction of state sovereignty”, in 
eds., Biersteker, Thomas and Cynthia Weber , State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: 
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The  multitude  of  stories  of  decolonization  and  post-colonial  state  formation 
cannot be told without pointing out that, “sovereignty regimes reflect historical 
distributions  of  power  and  subjectivity  within  the  international  order  and 
corresponding symbolic and material economies”.176 In that vain, Grovogui brings 
forth the story of Namibia’s decolonization demonstrating how, “the UN debate 
concerning Namibia  was driven primarily  by the desire  of Western  nations  to 
maintain  the existing  hierarchies  of  the international  order  and the  attempt  by 
Third World nations to subvert those structures”.177 Through the story of Namibia, 
Grovogui challenges the story of the “failed state” by looking at “who failed the 
‘failed state’”?178 Focusing upon the power structures of the international system 
and  the  socio-historical  context  of  the  post-colonial  state  reveals  a  myriad  of 
stories about state and sovereignty. As Bayart states;
“The passage to the State is neither in any way inevitable (the Igbo in 
the east of Nigeria have adopted another type of political organization, 
in spite of their degree of economic development and their entry into a 
prosperous commercial space), nor irreversible (the Kingo kingdoms 
and  the  Mandigo  Empire  in  Mali  have  given  way  to  segmentary 
socities). The oscillations are cumulative and belong to the  Longuee 
Duree.179”
Bringing in the stories of Eastern agency and demonstrating the ways in which 
state  and  sovereignty  were  (re)produced,  negotiated  and  practiced  in  different 
contexts  problematizes  the linear  narrative.  The story of  Westphalian  state  and 
sovereignty silences these stories and overlooks that “colonization did not radically 
weaken  their  ability  to  pursue  their  own  strategies  to  produce  their  own 
modernity”.180 On the contrary,  there exists a plethora of stories with respect to 
how state  and sovereignty were  produced and how the  international  system is 
imagined as a result of the multitude of strategies adopted and the different ways in 
which relationships were defined with European states. 
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To sum up, the story of Westphalian state and sovereignty has been challenged 
temporally and spatially problematizing not only the designation of Westphalia as 
a  starting  point  but  also  Europe.  Furthermore,  the  linear  narrative  of  the 
development  and  ‘export’  of  state  and  sovereignty  have  also  been  disrupted 
pointing especially to the manner in which imperialism and the power structure of 
the international system have been a formative part of the story. One of the central 
components of the story of the Westphalian international system is security. The 
story being that the international system is comprised of like units without any 
authority  to  dictate  their  actions  the  primary  concern  of  the  states  within  the 
system is ensuring their own survival hence establishing order and security. The 
next  section  will  discuss  the  ways  in  which  the  story  of  security  has  been 
problematized.
IV. STORIES OF SECURITY
The story of security in the Wesphalian international system was predicated upon 
the state and its survival, it was a story told mainly focusing upon military affairs 
of  the  Westphalian  state.  This  story  has  been  challenged  mainly  through  the 
widening/broadening  debate  trying  to  bring  in  actors  other  than  the  state  and 
concerns other than military ones into the narrative.181 What is broadly termed as 
‘critical  security  studies’  includes  within  itself  an  array  of  approaches  and 
perspectives to the main discussion points of security studies.182 The conventional 
narrative of critical  security studies presents a map of the field spanning from 
Wales  (Aberystwyth/Welsh  School,183),  to  Copengahen  (Copengahen 
181 Barry  Buzan  and  Lene  Hansen,  The  Evolution  of  International  Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).182 Columba Peoples  and  Nick  Vaughan-Williams,  Critical  Security  Studies:  An Introduction 
(NY: Routledge, 2010).183 Keith  Krause  and  Michael  C.  Williams,  Critical  Security  Studies:  Concepts  and  Cases. 
(London:  UCL  Press,  1997);  Ken  Booth,  Critical  Security  Studies  and  World  Politics,  ed., 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne, 2005)
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School/Securitization  Theory184)  and  to  Paris  (Paris  School)185.  The  CASE186 
(Critical  Approaches to Security in Europe) collective argues “there is enough 
common ground between the researchers to facilitate constructive debate and to 
develop new conceptual tools and empirical research from the initial works”.187 
Thus the answers each approach gives to the main questions asked by the field of 
security studies differs with respect to which actors are privileged, which sectors 
are focused upon and the juxtaposition of the internal/external threats. 
An important aspect of the widening/broadening debate is taking the individual as 
the  referent  object  and  not  the  state  as  ‘as  states  are  unreliable  providers  of 
security.188’  Furthermore,  within  this  understanding  of  security  the  state  is 
approached  with  caution  and  security  of  the  individual  is  prioritized.189 By 
privileging the individual,  this  approach also focuses upon their  emancipation. 
Booth argues that;  “security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. 
Emancipation,  not  power  or  order.  produces  true  security.  Emancipation, 
theoretically, is security”.190 
The use of the concept of emancipation has been criticized because it is; 
184 Barry  Buzan,  Ole  Waever  and  Jaap  de  Wilde,  Security:  A  New Framework  for  Analysis 
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C.A.S.E Collectives response to the criticism see CASE Collective, ‘Europe, knowledge, politics: 
Engaging the limits: The CASE Collective responds’, Security Dialogue, 38:4 (2007): 559-576.187 CASE  Collective,  ‘Critical  Approaches  to  Security  in  Europe:  A  Networked  Manifesto’, 
Security Dialogue, 37 (2006): 450
188 Ken Booth, Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Affairs,17 :4(1991) : 319189 Wny Jones argues that; ‘Even if a very narrow, military understanding of security is applied, it 
is apparent that the arms purchased and powers accrued by governments in the name of national 
security are far more potent threats to the liberty and physical safety of their citizens than any  
putative external threat. When a broader definition of security that includes non-military threats is 
applied,  it  is  clear  that  many  states  are  deeply  implicated  in  the  creation  of  other  forms  of 
insecurity  for  their  own  populations,  for  example.  in  such  issues  as  food  and  environmental  
security’  in  Richard  Wyn  Jones,  Security,  Strategy  and Critical  Theory (Boulder,  CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999), 99.
190 Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, 319
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 “an idea derived from the European Enlightenments. In this literature, 
the agent of emancipation is almost invariably the West, whether in 
the form of Western dominated international institutions, a Western-
led  global  civil  society,  or  the  'ethical  foreign  policies'  of  leading 
Western powers …Even when the concrete agents of emancipation are 
not themselves Westerners,  they are conceived of as the bearers  of 
Western ideas, whether concerning economy, politics or culture”.191
Securitization theory on the other hand defines security as the construction of an 
issue in discourse as a threat. An issue or an event is not in and of itself included 
within the definition of ‘security’  but rather through its construction through a 
speech act. Thus, “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something 
more  real;  the  utterance  itself is  the  act.192”  The issue  is  ‘securitized’  when a 
political actor speaks of it as constituting an existential threat.193 This extends the 
story of security beyond military affairs and enables an opening up of space where 
issues such as migration can also become part of the story. Securitization theory 
though explanatory in many ways has been criticised and expanded upon over the 
years. The main shortcomings of the theory are caused by the ‘narrowness’194 of 
its assumptions. Alternatively, this narrowness can also be seen as the dominance 
of specific conceptualizations that leads to the privileging of certain dynamics, 
actors and voices over others. 
The reliance on ‘speech act theory’  privileges certain forms of communication 
over  others.    What  happens  when  other  mediums  of  communication  are 
utilised?195 What happens when speaking security itself might put the speaker in 
danger  or  when  the  avenues  for  voicing  security  concerns  are  not  open.  As 
191 Barkawi and Laffey, ‘The postcolonial moment in security studies’, 350192 Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in ed., Ronnie Lipschutz, On Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 35193 Buzan explains this process as; ‘The quality is the staging of existential issues in politics to lift  
them above politics. In security discourse,  an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of  
supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it  
by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to address some objective  
threats that 'really' endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather it is to understand the 
process  of  constructing  a  shared  understanding  of  what  is  to  be  considered  and  collectively 
responded to as a threat.’ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 
26.194 Matt  McDonald,  ‘Securitization  and  the  Construction  of  Security’,  European  Journal  of  
International Relations, 14 :4 (2008): 583-587.195 The focus in this section is on the ‘security as silence’ aspect of the debate but there have also  
been works that have pointed out and analyzed the importance of visual communication such as 
images. For further on this subject see; Michael C. Williams (2003) ‘Words, Images, Enemies: 
Securitization and International Politics,’ International Studies Quarterly, 47:4 (2003) : 511-32.
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Hansen’s work focusing on the honour killings in Pakistan has shown, ‘security as 
silence’  might  mean  that  “the potential  subject  of  security  has  no,  or  limited, 
possibility of speaking its security problem”196 and speaking of its security might 
aggravate the situation when for example “discursively acknowledging the rape, 
the woman in question runs a risk of being penalised herself”.197 
The designation of when securitization occurs, the securitizing move, privileges 
dominant narrative of events and obscures the process of discursive constructions, 
historical  narratives,  socio-political  conditions  that  constitute  the  space  within 
which the ‘move’ is taking place. Thus as Bigo states; “securitization results from 
power  positions,  not  from  individuals  creating  new  frames,  new  roles  for 
differences  and repetitions  in different  context;  it  results  from struggles  inside 
institutions and between institutions for what is to count as the legitimate truth”.198 
The move itself conveys part of the story of how an issue became securitized. 
Securitization then should be situated in a longer time frame taking into account 
power relations, context and historical conditions. Focusing on the ‘end’ result of 
how the move happened obscures the conditions that enabled such a securitizing 
move.  Why  was  an  issue  securitized  and  not  others?  Which  actors  did  the 
securitizing move? Where there other voices silenced beforehand? Why did their 
attempts not succeed? Moreover, the focus on the ‘move’ itself imposes linearity 
to securitization in two respects. It obscures interactions between the securitizing 
actor,  the  issue,  the  marginalized  voices  and  how  the  process  redefines  and 
reconstitutes each one.199 
The third privileging occurs with respect to Western centric conceptualizations of 
securitzation.  Wilkinson  argues  that  securitization  theory  is  limited  by  a 
‘Westphalian straitjacket’ because of its reliance on “Euro-American assumptions 
196 Lene Hansen,‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the 
Copengahen School’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29 (2000): 294197 Ibid.
198 Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, 74
199 As Huysmans states, it ‘leads to a downplaying of the internal relationship between a process of 
securitization and a process of identification of both agents (the self-understanding of state and 
society)  and  system  (the  specific  organization  of  the  relationship  between  these  agents). 
(Securitization) … simultaneously constructs the identity of the referent object (society,  nation) 
and the agents speaking for that object (governments, bureaucrats, social movements, etc).’ Jey 
Huysmans, ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in 
Europe’, European Journal of International Relations, 4:4 (1998) :494
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about  concepts  such  as  society,  identity  and  the  state,  combined  with  the 
presumption of Western democracy and primacy of the speech-act” which means 
that  “particularly  in  a  non-Western  setting,  security  dynamics  are  edited  and 
Westernized through the application of the theoretical  framework”.200 Thus the 
manner in which concepts such as identity, society and politics is conceptualized 
is based on a Western bias. Furthermore, Wilkinson also criticizes the ‘speech act’ 
approach because it presupposes a democratic system of government where free 
speech  is  possible.  But  in  non-Western  settings  speech  might  not  always  be 
possible because;
  “significant sections of the population may not be afforded the ability 
to  express  societal  security  concerns  actively  (censorship, 
imprisonment,  threats)  or  passively  (political/social 
disenfranchisement). In such cases, other forms of expression may - or 
may not - be used to express security concerns: physical migration or 
protest actions, for example”.201
This is another manifestation of the ‘silence as security’ dilemma or the issue of 
other forms of political communication.202  Moreover, concentrating on ‘security 
studies’ within the prism of widening/broadening debate overlooks that what is 
being  widened  and  broadened  is  an  understanding  of  security  derived  from 
Western centric understanding of world politics  and hence it  might  widen and 
broaden but it does not question the concept itself. Thus the discursive space of 
security studies that has formed around the discussion of specific questions, such 
as “whether to privilege the state as the referent object, whether to include internal 
as well as external threats, whether to expand security beyond the military sector 
and the use of force, and whether to see security as inextricably tied to a dynamic 
of threats, dangers and urgency”203 obscures how “the competing paradigms and 
200 Claire Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory 
Usable Outside Europe?’, Security Dialogue, 38:1 (2007): 22201 Ibid.; 12
202 It  should be noted that the assumptions that lead to the Western (free speech) non-Western 
(other forms of communication or even silence) dichotomy is also a Eurocentric bias and also a  
reaffirmation of  the Westphalian straitjacket.  Firstly,  there is  the assumption that  the ‘form of 
government’ of a state directly correlates to the nature of a society where they are congruent with 
each  other.  There might  be sub-societies  or  supra-societies  (different  spaces  beyond the state) 
where free speech is not possible. Political, social and economic disenfranchisement is not only a 
condition  of  non-Western  societies.  Secondly,  these  non-democratic  or  disenfranchised  spaces 
might not be able to join in the dominant debates and express their security concerns through 
protest actions; London uprisings or the Swedish uprisings.203 Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security, 10
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divergent  political  persuasions  that  characterise  contemporary  security  studies 
occupy a shared Eurocentric historical and geographic terrain”.204
As Bilgin argues; “the  historical absence  of non-Western insecurities has been 
constitutive  both  of  the  discipline  and  of  subjects  and  objects  of  security  in 
different parts of the world.205” This historical absence cannot be remedied only 
through including the non-Western or making the non-Western more present, it 
needs to go “beyond adding and stirring”.206 In other words, it needs to be shaken, 
not stirred. Thus the task is to “uncover how security studies’ peripheral insight 
into non-Western insecurities has been constitutive of security in theory  and  in 
practice”.207 One way of achieving this is to render problematic the narratives that 
constitute  security  studies  and inquire  into the  ways  in  which  they have been 
constitutive of non-Western conceptions and narratives of security. 
Barkawi  and  Laffey  criticize  “security  studies’  reliance  on  histories  and 
geographies which reproduce Eurocentric conceptions of world politics”208 which 
“presuppose and reproduce,  separately and together,  a specific set of historical 
periodisations and spatial assumptions”.209  They define historical periodisations 
as  “the  taken-for-granted  chronologies  of  key  actors,  central  processes  and 
significant events that structure the field”.210 Based upon this understanding the 
Cold War  “is  seen as  one of  ‘East-West’  struggle  that  is,  between competing 
coalitions  organised around the US and USSR”.211 Furthermore,  this  historical 
periodisation is coupled with a spatial assumption that narrates world politics as 
“happening  almost  exclusively  in  Europe,  or  latterly  in  the  Northern 
hemisphere”.212 These  historical  periodisations  and  spatial  assumptions  that 
narrate  world  politics  in  a  Western-centric  manner  need  to  be  disrupted.  The 
stories  of  security  though  widened  and  deepened  have  nonetheless  mainly 204 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey,  ‘The postcolonial moment in security studies’,  Review of  
International Relations, 32 (2006): 334.205 Pinar  Bilgin,  ‘The  ‘Western-centrism’  of  Security  Studies:  ‘Blind  Spot’  or  Constitutive 
Practice?’, Security Dialogue, 41:6 (2010): 616206 Ibid.; 617207 Ibid.; 618
208 Barkawi and Laffey, ‘The postcolonial moment in security studies’, 331209 Ibid.; 334
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
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remained centred. As Honke and Muller state, “while there has been a growing 
interest in postcolonial approaches within the field of international relations as a 
way  of  moving  beyond  the  limits  and  problems  of  dominant  western-centric 
approaches to global politics [….] this has been less visible within the subfield of 
security studies”.213 As discussed in this  section,  though the dominant  story of 
security has been disrupted, there are still many hegemonic discourses of security 
and of security studies that need to be questioned.
As the previous sections discussed dominant stories of the international system, of 
sovereignty  and  of  security  have  been  disrupted  to  varying  degrees,  the  non-
Western story remains centred within the Great Story of IR. The next section will 
problematize  the  way  in  which  non-western  stories  are  embedded  into  these 
stories of IR. 
V. EMBEDDING NON-WESTERN STORIES 
The previous sections outlined the Great Story of IR whether with respect to the 
field, the international system, Westphalian sovereignty or security. Furthermore, 
these  sections  presented  the  different  ways  in  which  these  Great  Stories  that 
constitute  hegemonic  narratives  of  the  field  were  challenged  through  the 
presentation of alternative stories. Thus the previous sections demonstrated that 
there is no one great story of the field, of the international system, of Westphalian 
sovereignty and of security. Despite these disruptions to the Great Story of IR, 
non-Western stories remains centered within the dominant stories of IR, of the 
international system, of Westphalian sovereignty and of security. This section will 
present  an  overview  of  the  centering  of  the  story  of  Turkey.  An  important 
component  of decentering IR has been to look at the myriad of other possible 
stories that could be told. These possible stories demonstrate that the hegemonic 
Great  Story  need  not  be  the  only  way to  approach  the  concepts,  institutions, 
processes and history of the field. Outlining these discussions brings forth another 
important component in decentering IR. If there are many possible stories how is 
the hegemonic one reproduced in such a manner to continue to silence alternative 
213 Jana  Honke  and  Markus-Michael  Muller,  ‘Growing  (in)security  in  a  postcolonial  world: 
Transnational  entanglements  and  the  worldliness  of  ‘local’  practice’,  Security  Dialogue,  43:5 
(2012) : 383
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stories? The example of Turkey is used in order to demonstrate the way in which 
the Great Story of IR is reproduced and the process of centering is not only one of 
imposition but also one of complicity.
Turkey’s  reproduction  of  Western  narratives  can  be  understood  as  part  of  its 
‘postcolonial anxiety’. Krishna defines ‘postcolonial anxiety’ as;
“social constructions of the past, present, and futures for state elites 
and  educated  middle  classes  in  the  third  world  are  mimetic 
constructions  of  what  supposedly  already  happened  elsewhere; 
namely,  Europe  or  the  west.  The  story  of  what  once  happened  in 
Europe constitutes the knowledge that empowers state elites as they 
attempt  to  fashion  their  nations  image  of  what  are  considered 
successful  nation-states.  Premised  on  this  narrative  of  what  once 
happened  ‘out  there’  postcolonial  elites  attempt  to  remake  the 
recalcitrant  clay  of  plural  civilizations  into  lean,  uniform, 
hypermasculine and disciplined nation-states”.214
Turkey’s  reproduction  of  Western  narratives  is  a  result  of  its  ‘postcolonial 
anxiety’  and  its  postcolonial  condition  needs  to  be  problematized  in  order  to 
decenter Turkey from the Westerncentric IR discourse. Taking the periodizations, 
categories,  narratives  that  have  travelled,  been  adopted,  negotiated  as 
unproblematic truths is a condition of postcoloniality. Postcoloniality is “a global 
phenomenon of interactions based on unequal power relations in an era that goes 
beyond  the  world  of  colonialism,  but  that  has  been  (and  continues  to  be) 
decisively  shaped  by  the  logic  of  coloniality”.215 It  is  the  ‘geopolitics  of 
knowledge’ that underlines this condition of postcoloniality that this thesis aims to 
disrupt and question. As Mignolo states;
“Western people have disciplines and Eastern people have cultures to 
be studied by Western disciplines. The West was, and still is, the only 
geo-historical  location  that  is  both  part  of  the  classification  of  the 
world  and the only perspective that has the privilege of possessing  
dominant categories of thoughts from which and where the rest of the  
world can be described, classified, understood, and ‘improved’”.216
A look at the way in which the reproduction of Western narratives, concepts and 
theories has been analyzed within the context of Turkey can better illuminate this 
point. In her analysis of ‘securitization studies’ application to Turkey, Bilgin has 
214 Sankaran Krishna Postcolonial Insecurities : India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood 
(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xix
215 Walter Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America (Malden MA : Blackwell, 2005), 69
216 Ibid.; 36
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found  that  the  texts  firstly  “underscore  the  appropriateness  of  current 
policymaking” and secondly “locate(s) Turkey in Europe by way of highlighting 
how  it  presently  exhibits  a  ‘proper  European  way  of  behavior’”.217 These 
strategies she argues have to be analyzed based on the “specific historical and 
political  context  from where it  emerged and to where it  travelled”  rather  than 
“being explained away as an instance of international relations’ ethnocentrism or 
as an outcome of peripheral international relations scholars’ socialization”.218  The 
question  is  can  they  be  separated  from each  other?  Bilgin  overlooks  that  the 
‘specific historical and political context’ that facilitated the emergence of these 
strategies is linked to the ethnocentrism of international relations. They are not 
separate  but  rather  mutually  constitutive.  The  historical,  social  and  political 
contexts  of  ‘adopting’  or  ‘translating’  Western  security  narratives  into  non-
Western settings’ is influenced by the hierarchical structure of these narratives. It 
is  because  these  narratives  occupy  a  dominant  place  within  the  hierarchical 
structure  that  the  non-Western  ‘chooses’  to  adopt  or  translate  them.  Thus  the 
production of texts that code security in terms of “utilizing securitization theory as 
a Western European security theory in explaining Turkey’s dynamic” in order to 
“underscore(s) the significance of what has been achieved and assures audiences 
that the future promises well”219 is informed by an understanding of security that 
situates Turkey within the “Eurocentric historical and geographical terrain”.  It is 
because  of  the  reproduction  of  the  historical  and geographical  assumptions  of 
Western centric security conceptualisations that the historical, social and political 
context creates the space for producing such texts. This reproduction is the result 
of having ‘adopted’ and ‘translated’ Western security narratives in the past again 
as a result of historical, social and political reasons. 
It should be underlined that “policymakers or scholars in non-core settings were 
no mere vessels but also merchants of the increasing production and consumption 
of ‘standard’ notion of security”.220 The reproduction of Western centric narratives 
was  not  only  about  the  dominance  of  the  West,  it  was  also  about  a  specific 
217 Pinar Bilgin,  “The Politics of studying securitization? The Copenhagen School in Turkey”, 
Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011): 408
218 Ibid.; 409
219 Ibid.
220 Bilgin, ‘The ‘Western-centrism’ of Security Studies’, 618
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narrative of the state, of security and of the international system that the Turkish 
state  wanted  to  produce  and  reproduce.  Thus,  the  narratives  of  the  state,  of 
security  and  of  the  international  system  are  all  interrelated  and  mutually 
constitutive of each other. In order to understand, how Western centric narratives 
travelled into the Turkish context, the historical, social and political context of 
these  definitions  and  how  they  were  negotiated  between  the  dominant  and 
alternative narratives needs to be brought forward. 
Thus the next chapter will focus on re-reading of the way in which the story of the 
Cold War has been narrated. Furthermore, it will discuss how Turkey has been 
narrated within that story. The aim is not to present a definitive account of the 
period but rather to re-read it in order to destabilize the linear narrative. The first 
chapter entitled ‘Discussing the Origins’ will focus specifically on the ‘Cold War’ 
literature and outline the historiographical debates. The second chapter will focus 
on  the  literature  on  Turkey  to  demonstrate  how  the  ‘narrative  substances’ 
established by the ‘Cold War’ literature are reproduced. This will demonstrate the 
way in which the security narratives of the West are reproduced within the ‘Non-
West’ perspectives of the Turkish academia.
The discussions within these chapters  will  demonstrate  the ways  in  which the 
Great Stories of IR based on a specific understanding of history  based on the 
Western experience are reproduced in non-West context underlying the fact that 
bringing forth non-Western perspectives themselves is not sufficient in decentring 
IR. What  further needs to  be done in questioning the power relationships  and 
postcolonial anxieties that produce those perspectives.
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SECTION I: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL 
OPERATIONS ON THE COLD 
WAR
“Historiography presents  itself  as  a  discourse  which  ‘understands’  its 
other – the chronicles, the archives,  the movement: it  is the discourse 
which  ….authorises  itself  to  say  what  the  other  signifies  without 
knowing it. Through ‘citations’, through references,  through notes and 
through the whole apparatus of permanent referral to a primary language 
(what Michelet called ‘the chronicle’), it sets itself up as  knowledge of  
the other. It is constructed according to a problematic of judgement or 
citation,  at  once  capable  of  ‘summoning’  a  referential  language  to 
function as reality and empowered to judge that language on the strength 
of its own knowledge”.221
221  Michel De Certeau,  The Writing of History (New York : Columbia University Press, 1975), 
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This dual construction (construction dedoublee) that de Certeau explains is at the 
centre of the historiographical operation. It produces objects but it is also limited 
by them. The production of objects happens within already set parameters. Thus; 
“a particular study will be defined by the relations that it upholds with 
others that are contemporaneous with it, with a ‘state of the question’, 
with  the  problematic  issues  exploited  by  the  group  and  the  strategic 
points that  they constitute,  and with the outputs and divergences thus 
determined or given pertinence in relation to a work in progress”.222
The historiographical operations on the Cold War present a similar picture. This 
section will focus on the way in which the ‘writing’ and the ‘making’ of the Cold 
War as a historiographical terrain configured events, accorded different degrees of 
importance  to  certain  actors  and structured  the  narrative.  The dual  function  of 
historiography is  present  in  the discussions  surrounding the Cold  War because 
there are many Cold War(s),  but  they operate  within the same Cold War.  The 
terrain of the Cold War is preconfigured and the roads one might take and the 
stories  of  the  Cold  War  one  might  tell  are  possible  itinerary  within  the  same 
terrain.  The terrain  itself  (the Cold War)  does  not  alter  but  there  are  different 
possible routes that can be taken and as such there are many possible stories of the 
Cold War. Rigney discusses the pre-configured nature of ‘received events’ with 
respect to the French Revolution as follows;
“It is a ‘site to be visited’ or, if the nominal reference is to be expanded 
into a narrative account, it is a pre-arranged itinerary marking out the 
recommended scenic route (and the beaten track) from one major point 
of interest to the next – the Jeu de Paume (20 June 1789); the Taking of  
Bastille  (14  July 1789);  the  abolution  of  feudal  privileges  (4  August 
1789);  the  women  at  Versailles  (5-6  October  1789);  the  Flight  to 
Varennes (20-22 June 1791); the crowd’s invasion of Tulieres (20 June 
1792); the Storming of the Tulieres on 10 August 1792; the execution of 
Louis  XVI  (21  January  1793);  and  so  on  through  the  fall  of  the 
Girondins (2 June 1793), the Terreur, the trial and execution of Danton 
(13-16 Germinal an 11, 2-5 April 1794), and the fall of Robespierre on 9 
Thermidor an 11 (27 July 1794)”.223
Thus,  despite  all  the  different  ways  in  which  the  French Revolution  might  be 
narrated and differences “in the degree of detail with which they treat particular 
episodes  and  in  the  particular  links  they  establish  between  them,  each  one  is 
structures  around  these  canonical  events,  these  areas  of  common  historical 
account”.224 The  Cold  War(s)  are  based  upon  a  similar  narrative  base  which 
222 Ibid., 64
223 Ann  Rigney,  The  Rhetoric  of  Historical  Representation :  Three  narrative  histories  of  the  
French Revolution (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,1990), 37
224 Ibid., 37
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determines  the boundaries  of  the Cold War.  There are  different  itineraries  that 
might be followed but the main sites to be visited are already inscribed into the 
very concept of the Cold War. Thus, one stops by Yalta, Potsdam, Poland, events 
in Eastern Europe in general, Turkey, Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. Yet, 
the time one spends in each stop differs according to the narrative configuration of 
the  writer.  As  such,  the  master  event  and  the  narrative  schema  is  already 
preconfigured when discussing the Cold War.  It  is  within this  schema that  the 
historiographical  operation  takes  place.  The  particular  frames  employed,  the 
degrees of importance accorded to an event, how an ‘event’ is constituted as an 
event and the degrees of silence will determine the form of the content. In that 
sense, just like the French Revolution, the Cold War is also part of the ‘cultural  
code”.225 As  such,  “the  commonplace  of  the  revolutionary  ship  provides  each 
writer with an empty frame or narrative grid, which can be filled in by different 
actors, depending on the particular configuration of the Revolution: the significant 
roles  are  already marked  out,  the  historian  only  has  to  give  them a  figurative 
manifestation”.226 The  frame  of  the  Cold  War  is  the  terrain  upon  which  the 
historian navigates and the different accounts of the Cold War(s) is mainly based 
upon the prioritization of events and different actors. All accounts of the Cold War 
might visit Yalta and Potsdam but the manner in which the events are categorized 
within the narrative schema might be different. Were they when the Soviet Union 
showed its intentions, was the United States being idealistic, was the balance of 
power in Europe the reason for the failure of the talks. Is the Marshall Plan the 
main stop of the story or is it the events in Poland? Which actor’s motives and 
actions are seen as the drivers of events? Which factor is narrated as a central 
factor, economic determinants or the security dilemma of the international system. 
As such, the ‘Cold War’ serves to enable certain actions over others and prioritize 
certain actors over others. The main narrative terrain upon which the ‘Cold War’ 
is  built  is  a  Western-centric  one.  As  Andrew  Hammond  states  “the  art  of 
understanding a historical period exclusively through the Western experience of 
that period partakes in the same hegemonic Euro-Americanism that defined the 
conflict itself, privileging a limited range of subjectivities and relegating all others 
225 Ibid., 39
226 Ibid., 46
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to  insignificance”.227  In  that  sense,  the  ‘Cold  War’  story  is  reflective  of  the 
subjectivities and priorities of a Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics. 
The ‘Cold War’ is a specific construction of a crisis serving a specific purpose 
with respect  to  the narrative  of  American  foreign policy and the  international 
system. As Weldes states “the dominant discourse in security studies embodied a 
“Cold War narrative” in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but 
constantly  shifting  clash  between  two  global  empires,  and  from  the  repeated 
introduction of new technological possibilities and threats into the story line”.228 
In that  respect,  “if  all  representation  is  political,  then all  historical  writing  on 
international relations conveys and perpetuates assumptions about their nature and 
the desirable conduct of policy which contributes,  albeit  differently,  to making 
‘some policies likely and others unlikely’”.229 There have been various studies that 
have  analysed  the  language  formations  in  historical  texts  and  conducted 
poststructuralist analysis with historical perspectives such as the works of Frank 
Castigliola, David Campbell and Jutta Weldes.230 
An example of these arguments and the manner in which analysis will proceed is 
provided in Jutta Weldes’ book Constructing National Interests: The US and the  
Cuban Missile Crisis231 where she demonstrates that the “Cuban Missile Crisis” is 
one possible way of characterizing the events – a characterization that is reflective 
of a certain narrative of events; the Western-centric narrative. But there are other 
ways to define and periodize it. The Soviets define it as the Caribbean Crisis and 
the  period  of  the  crisis  is  not  13  days  like  in  the  American  story but  longer 
including within it the economic blockade of Cuba and the Bay of Pigs. When the 
story  is  presented  not  in  13  days  but  starting  from  when  Cuba  became 
227 Andrew Hammond,  Cold War Literature: Writing the global conflict, ed., (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 1
228 Hugh Gusterson, “Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,” in Cultures of  
Insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger, eds., Jutta Weldes et al. (University 
of Minnesota Press, 1999), 327
229 Finney, “Still ‘marking time’?,” 304
230 Frank Castigliola, “Unceasing Pressure for Penetration : Gender, Pathology,  and Emotion in 
George Kennan’s  Formation of the Cold War,”  The Journal of  American History 83 :4 (Mar., 
1997): 163-183; Frank Castigliola, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the 
Western Alliance,”  Diplomatic History 21:2 (Spring 1997): 163-183; David Campbell,  National  
Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998) and Jutta Weldes,  Constructing National Interests: The US and the Cuban Missile  
Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)
231 Weldes, Contructing National Interests
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“communist” then the events take on a different meaning because U.S. attitudes 
towards Cuba become part of the factors to be considered as leading to the crisis. 
As such the “missile” crisis becomes a culmination of U.S. attitudes towards Cuba 
and the deployment of missiles becomes a strategy designed to protect Cuba from 
U.S. invasion rather than a Soviet ploy to invade the United States. There are two 
points to underline. Firstly, the interactions between the narrative of events and 
the theorites  extrapollated  from them.  Secondly,  the construction  of  the  linear 
story and the silencing of events that do not fit into that progressive tale. The Cold 
War and the specific example of the Cuban Missile crisis become tools used to 
explain, sustain, and reproduce a certain idea about the interaction of states and 
how to approach international crises. The Cuban Missile crisis is one of the main 
“case  studies”  employed  when  discussing  concepts  central  to  international 
relations  theory  such  as  deterrence  and  rational  decision-making.  Graham 
Allison’s study Essence of Decision considered to be one of the cornerstones of 
comprehending decision-making in international relations is based on a series of 
conclusions extrapolated from the Cuban Missile Crisis but those are conclusions 
that can only be drawn if that account is based on American experiences of the 
event.232 These accounts and the theories derived from them based on the agency 
of the great  powers create,  sustain and reproduce tropes,  lessons,  theories  and 
concepts that define the field. The possibility that there are other accounts that 
could present one with different tropes, lessons and concepts is overlooked.
The second point to underline is that the Cuban story characterizes the events as 
the October crisis. The narrative is placed in a longer time frame situating it as the 
continuation of U.S. imperialist actions starting with the Spanish-American War 
of 1898 and the Platt  Amendment.  Within that story it  is  the sovereignty and 
independence of Cuba that is constantly threatened by the United States. Hence, 
the missiles are a tool for Cuba to protect her sovereignty against an imperialist 
America that has attempted to invade her. Thus, as can be seen, the name given, 
the time frame,  the periodizations,  the events  included and excluded from the 
story  alter  the  message  of  the  story  considerably.  Yet,  today  it  is  the  Cuban 
Missile Crisis that we write of, speak of and even make movies of such as  13 
232 Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment,” 334-336.
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Days233 because it is part of the dominant narratives of the Cold War shaped by 
the American story. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the 13 days time frame fits into 
the general Cold War narrative perfectly.  It  comes right after  the Berlin crisis 
between Khruschev and Kennedy and is the forbearer of detente both superpowers 
having come “eyeball to eyeball”. But the other stories do not fit perfectly into the 
Cold War narrative. The October Crisis is not a Cold War story but a story of U.S. 
imperialism and it is in many ways continuing still. The Cuban Missile Crisis has 
become  this  thing  that  is  talked  about  and written  about,  why it  happened is 
widely discussed,  what  its  results  were but  its  not  questioned as  a  manner  of 
describing and understanding the events under scrutiny; it is the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and it lasted 13 days. The same manner of comprehending events is also 
true of the Cold War.
As Benedict Anderson states with respect to the French Revolution,
 “the  overwhelming  and  bewildering  concatenation  of  events 
experienced by its makers and its victims become a “thing” – and with 
its own name – The French Revolution. Like a vast shapeless rock worn 
to a rounded boulder by countless drops of water,  the experience was 
shaped by millions of printed words into a “concept” on the printed page, 
and, in due course into a model. Why “it” broke out, what “it” aimed for, 
why “it” succeeded or failed, became subjects for endless polemics on 
the part of friends and foes, but of its “it”ness, as it were, no one ever 
after had much doubt”.234
The Cold War is treated in the same manner. There are countless explanations as 
to why it occurred, why it ended but it is not questioned. The Cold War is taken as 
a  pregiven  concept  that  does  not  need  definition  because  its  definition, 
periodization  is  already  determined.  Hence  works  on  the  Cold  War  are  done 
within  these  pregiven  conditions.  These  supposedly  pregiven  conditions  are 
provided by the American story as the story on the origins of the Cold War has 
traditionally concentrated on American foreign policy conceptualizations  based 
upon a Eurocentric interpretation of World politics. 
The Cold War narrative is based upon a certain understanding of the international 
system which  is  embedded  within  power  relations.  IR discourse  in  general  is 
based on “abstraction” which Krishna explains “is never innocent of power: the 
233 Thirteen Days (2000) New Line Cinema
234 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism  
(London; New York: Verso, 1989)
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precise strategies and methids of abstraction in each instance decide what aspects 
of a limitless reality are brought into sharp focus and what aspects are, literally 
left out of the picture”.235 As such, the Cold War is one of the abstractions used 
within IR literature to simplify and explain international relations. It is a uniform 
story with the American choices, preferences and perceptions being the central 
actor. But the Cold War is not equal to American foreign policy and there are 
stories, perceptions and experiences left out that could add to the meaning. This is 
not to claim that no other story has ever been told other than the American one. 
The  “pericentric”  tradition  in  Cold  War  historiography  has  brought  forward 
alternate stories of the Cold War concentrating upon the Soviet story or the British 
story  among  others.  Nonetheless,  these  stories  have  all  followed  the  main 
dynamics  set  up  by  the  dominant  American  narrative.  International  relations 
narrative is based on the experiences of the “West” and as such its products are 
stories of their development. It is not that the other story does not exist but that the 
Western  experience  is  presented  as  the  template  to  be  followed.  Hence  the 
“alternative” British and Soviet stories do not in essence tell a different story but 
atempt to embed their stories into the American/dominant one. 
This section is concerned with the historiographical operation on two levels. The 
first level, which will be covered in Chapter 3, is the writing and making of the 
Cold War historiography.  What  are  the  main  sites  to  be  visited,  how are they 
accorded different priorities, characteristics and purposes? Thus, the focus is on 
the possible Cold War itineraries within the master event of the Cold War. The 
second level, which will be covered in Chapter 4, is how these historiographical 
operations are reproduced in the Turkish context. The sites to be visited, the actors 
to be mentioned, the ‘events’ constructed are configured and ‘grasped together’ in 
a  similar  fashion  to  that  of  the  Cold  War  historiographical  terrain.  That  this 
reproduction takes place also means editing out ‘events’, ‘actors’, and ‘sites’ that 
do  not  fit  into  the  narrative  terrain  preconfigured  by  the  historiographical 
operations on the Cold War. 
The next chapter entitled ‘Discussing the Origins’ focuses on the way in which the 
origins  story  has  been  narrated.  Furthermore,  the  chapter  aims  to  provide  an 
235 Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” 403
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overview of the main ‘historiographical schools’ on the origins of the Cold War 
and borders of the debate. The main questions to be asked when approaching Cold 
War historiography will be:
1) How was the Cold War defined, periodized, and narrated?
2) How the Soviet Union and United States were defined?
3) How was Turkey defined?
4) What was the degree of agency given to Turkey within the narrative?
5) How were the main events of the origins of the Cold War such as the 
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan characterized and narrated?
6) What events were omitted from the narrative?
It needs to be underlined that the next two chapters are not ‘literature reviews’ or a 
mapping out of the ‘state of the art’ but rather the mapping out of the narrative 
structures, historical terrains and dominant ways of narrating the Cold War. Thus, 
neither chapter  claims to provide an exclusive account of the literatures on the 
Cold War. As Munslow states, “all debates in history – who started the Cold War, 
how successful were the Chartists in achieving their aims to what extent was the 
recession of the American frontier culturally significant in American history? – are 
debates between competing narrative interpretations”.236 As such, it is not the past 
itself  that  is under discussion in the historiographical  debates but the historical 
discourse on the past.  The following chapters aim to demonstrate the ways in 
which the sites are constructed, the terrain is drawn and the borders of the debates 
established.
236 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 173
75
CHAPTER III: DISCUSSING THE 
ORIGINS
I. INTRODUCTION
This  chapter  aims  to  bring  forth  the  contours  of  the  historiographical  terrain, 
narrative  configurations,  and  the  way  ‘events’  were  constructed  and  ‘grasped 
together’. How were the actors characterized, which actors were prioritized over 
others and how was the story configured. As such, the focus of this chapter is not 
to discuss the ‘past’ events but rather the narratives of these events and rather than 
look at whether or not the narratives are representative of the past it aims to look 
at  the  historical  discourse  of  past  events.  The chapter  is  divided according  to 
traditional divisions of Cold War historiographical schools.237 Thus, “because the 
character  of historical  interpretation  resides in its  narrative structure,  historical 
knowledge is generated by constant debates between narratives (interpretations) 
rather than the primeval, uninscripted and uncontextualized traces of the past”.238 
237 It should be noted that the classical division of Cold War historiography like the division of IR 
theory is in many respects artificial and a tool in reproducing a certain narrative of the Cold War 
and the international system. It is employed here for reasons of simplification and with the aim to 
organize the works in a recognizable manner. Nevertheless, the constructed nature of the divisions 
and the manner  in which they themselves  are  a  part  of  the dominant  narrative  should not be 
overlooked.
238 Munslow, Deconstructing History, 173
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A review of Cold War literature presents certain obstacles mainly because of the 
question  of  how  to  periodize  the  literature.239 There  exists  a  conventional 
approach,  which  is;  traditionalists,  revisionists,  and  post-revisionists.  Yet  this 
classification obscures the differences that exist within the respective “schools”. 
Although  both  Louis  J.  Halle240 and  George  F.  Kennan241 are  classified  as 
traditionalists  and  identify  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  aggressive  actor,  their 
characterization of American policy differs. The “realist” tradition represented by 
Kennan argued that American foreign policy was naïve before and it was only 
with  the  Soviet  threat  and onset  of  containment  that  American  foreign  policy 
became cognizant of the realities of power politics. The other group within the 
traditionalist presented the Cold War within the dominant narrative of American 
foreign policy. The “revisionist” school is also far from being a unified school. 
The two best-known representatives of the school; Gabriel Kolko242 and William 
Appleman Williams243 differ on their evaluation of the roots of American foreign 
policy. Even though both authors concentrate on economic factors as the driving 
force behind American foreign policy Kolko defines economic factors based on 
the material needs of the domestic capitalist system whereas Williams defines it as 
an extension of ideology and culture. The post-revisionists school is even more 
varied than the previous schools because of their aim to bridge the gap between 
“traditionalists” and “revisionists”, and present a complex, multi-dimensional and 
multi-causal explanation to the origins of the Cold War. In doing so, the “school” 
represents  a  spectrum  of  interpretations  ranging  from  those  closer  to  the 
“traditionalists”  and  others  closer  to  the  “revisionists”  schools.  John  Lewis 
Gaddis244 and Melvyn P. Leffler245 represent these two ends of the spectrum.
239 For a more detailed discussion of the schools see; Anders Stephanson, “The United States,” in 
The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: international perspectives,  ed, David Reynolds (New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press 1994), 23-52. 240 Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967).241 George  F.  Kennan,  American Diplomacy:  1900-1950  (Chicago:  Chicago  University  Press, 
1950).242 Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) ; Gabriel 
Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954  (New York: 
Harper & Row 1972) and Gabriel Kolko,  Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign  
Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).243 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Delta, 1962).244 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972). 245 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration  
and the Cold War (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
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Towards the end of the 1980s246,  amidst  the discussions about how the Soviet 
Union collapsed, two new schools of interpretation appeared with respect to the 
origins of the Cold War.  The first, pericentrism, aims to bring in the different 
stories of the Cold War rather than just concentrate upon the American narrative. 
The  second  is  neo-traditionalism,  a  school  of  interpretation  that  is  in  many 
respects a continuance of the traditionalist school. These two “schools” are not 
easily divisible since authors such as Vojtech Mastny247 are usually classified as 
post-revisionist, can also be considered a pericentrist248 since he presents a Soviet 
narrative of the origins of the Cold War and a neo-traditionalist since his narrative 
of events ascribes more to the traditionalist characterization of the Cold War. The 
third is the post-structuralist249 and cultural interpretations250 that attempt to look at 
the  interactions  of  American  foreign  policy  from  a  completely  different 
perspective.  The  aim of  the  chapter  is  to  underline  how the  different  schools 
operate within the same great story of the Cold War even though they represent 
different trajectories of the Cold War.
These schools look at the same period but with differing perspectives they analyse 
different  actors,  forces,  and  events  leading  to  incongruence  among  them.  As 
Musnlow states, 
“Every  historical  interpretation  is  just  one  more  in  a  long  chain  of 
interpretations, each one usually claiming to be closer to the reality of 
the past, but each one merely another reinscription of the same events, 
with  each  successive  description  being  the  product  of  the  historian's 
imposition  at  the  levels  of  the  trope,  emplotment,  argument  and 
ideology”.251 
246 Steven  Hurst,  Cold  War  US  Foreign  Policy:  Key  Perspectives (Edinburgh,  Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), 26 247 Vojtech Mastny,  The Cold War and Soviet insecurity: the Stalin years (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).248 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold 
War,” Diplomatic History 24:4 (Fall 2000): 567-591.249 David Campbell,  Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(Manchester: Machester University Press, 1998)
250 Frank Castigliola, “ ‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in 
George  Kennan's  Formation  of  the  Cold  War,”  The  Journal  of  American  History,  83:4 
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As such, the differing schools all claim to represent the “truth” and the “past as it 
really happened”, yet all of them employ discourses, ideological characterizations 
and theoretical  generalities  on the stories they tell.  As such, the aim is  not to 
present an exhaustive literature review but discuss the ways of speaking about the 
Cold War prevalent  in the literature,  to underline the historical  interpretations, 
inscriptions  of  events,  privileging  of  actors  and  configuration  of  the  narrative 
terrain. As a result this chapter concentrates on the works generally considered to 
be central to Cold War historiography. 
II. TRADITIONALISTS – ORTHODOX
This  part  focuses  on  the  ‘traditionalist’  or  ‘orthodox’  school  within  the 
historiographical tradition of the Cold War. The school has two strands. The first 
is based on a classical narrative of history of American foreign relations and the 
second digressing from that narrative by inserting within it  realist  conceptions. 
The “traditionalist” school is based on common conceptions of history,  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  traditionalist  account  presents  a  normative 
account of events based on explicit delineations of good/evil, moral/immoral and 
right/wrong.  Secondly,  the  narrative  fits  into  the  general  understanding  of 
American foreign policy whereby the isolationist,  anti-imperialist  and idealistic 
United States is pulled into European affairs in order to protect the world against 
the Soviet menace. As Hurst states;
“traditionalism is better understood as an extension of the prevailing pre-
Second World War historiography of American foreign diplomacy. That 
historiography  was  remarkably  consensual  and  at  the  heat  of  that 
consensus  was  a  celebratory,  even  triumphalist,  interpretation  of 
American foreign policy to that point”.252
The  ‘traditionalist’  school  has  three  main  characteristics  that  need  to  be 
underlined. Firstly,  traditionalist  accounts  concentrate  mainly  on  the  decision-
makers of the time and their motivations specifically the executive branch. The 
social, economic, and cultural forces that defined the society, the institutions and 
the decision-makers is largely ignored as well as the structure of the international 
system. Secondly, United States foreign policy is narrated as being passive until it 
252 Hurst, Cold War US Foreign Policy, 26
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is  called upon to defend freedom and democracy.  Hence,  the United States  is 
presented as reacting to events that occur in Europe and Asia rather than being an 
integral player. This presentation absolves the United States from any agency in 
creating the situations and crises of the post-World War II period. This leads to 
the third characteristic; that the Soviet Union holds all responsibility for the onset 
of the Cold War. Once the United States is narrated into the story as a passive 
actor that does not play an active role in the shaping of events, the Soviet Union 
becomes the country all agency and active pursuit of goals is attributed to making 
it  responsible for igniting crises and conflicts  where more would have existed 
otherwise.
Herbert Feis253 in his work  From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War,  
1945-1950, published in 1970 is representative on the traditionalist school. His 
presentation  of  events  ascribes  to  the  conventional  American  foreign  policy 
interpretation. Feis concentrates on Poland as the evidence of Soviet intentions in 
a larger scale. He states;  “The future and fate of Poland were of genuine and deep 
concern to the British and American governments. Of all the ploys by which the 
Soviet Government brought its neighbours into subjection, Stalin’s distortion of 
promises given regarding Poland was to hurt the most”.254 This statement brings 
forward  many  of  the  assumptions  that  guide  Feis’s  study;  that  Britain  and 
America were guided by benign motivations based on moralistic ideals whereas 
the Soviet Union used “ploys” and “distortions” to bring Poland into “subjection”. 
This  narrative  presents  America  as  not  part  of  the  events  that  occur  but  a 
bystander as the Soviet Union acts to alter agreements and subjugate states. This 
is further evident when he states that “Truman and his advisers sought settlements 
which  corresponded  to  principles  and  aims  that  soared  beyond  the  ordinary 
satisfactions  and  rewards  of  victory.  They  wanted  to  transmute  the  wartime 
alliance  with  the  Russians  into  a  lasting  working  accord  for  peace”.255 This 
statement  describing the Potsdam conference presents the United States as the 
selfless country that only aimed to cooperate, no other purpose, interest or goal is 
attributed to the United States. Feis states that “while the United States ….was 
253 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: the onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1970).
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coming to the support of the Greek and Turkish governments, the Communists, 
Russian and local, expelled from power all political leaders in Hungary, Romania 
and  Bulgaria  whom  they  thought  unfriendly”.256 The  differences  in 
characterizations of action is evident in this statement whereby the United States 
“comes to the support” of Greek and Turkish governments whereas the Soviet 
Union “expels from power” unfriendly leaders. 
The  narrative  of  world  politics  as  an  extension  of  the  Western  experience  is 
further evident in Feis’s treatment of Turkey. His account of the events in Turkey 
is  entitled  “The  encounter  over  Turkey”  implying  an  encounter  of  the  great 
powers;  an arena  over  which  they clash  and Turkey itself  is  not  given much 
agency with respect to the ensuing events. He argues that, “the encounter between 
the West and the Soviet Union over Turkey had been looming since the end of the 
war”.257 With respect to the Potsdam meeting and the Soviet demands for access 
to the Straits, Feis presents the United States as attempting to placate the Soviets 
in  the  spirit  of  cooperation,  when he  states  that,  “the  American  Government, 
however, had tried to satisfy the reasonable element in Soviet aspirations – that it 
be  assured  of  unhindered  and  secure  access  through  the  Dardanelles  to  the 
Mediterranean and the seas and lands”.258 Thus, the United States tried to concede 
the  “reasonable  elements”  and  salvage  cooperation.  In  sum,  Feis’s  narrative 
presents a traditional story of American foreign relations and embeds the Cold 
War as the latest stage of the United States being called upon to restore peace in 
Europe. As a consequence, the United States is an actor that reacts to the situation 
rather than one who plays an active role in creating it.
Louis J. Halle’s book Cold War as History represents to the second strand in the 
traditionalist  school.  Halle argues that “the gigantic  power of Russia had been 
contained or balanced” but “what the situation of Europe represented, in the years 
from 1945 to 1947, was a crisis in the balance of power”.259 According to this 
narrative, the Cold War grew out of a vacuum in the balance of power after the 
Second World War. Halle presents an analysis  of European history by stating, 
256 Feis, From Trust to Terror, 173-174
257 Feis, From Trust to Terror, 178
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“since  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  four  great  wars  had  been  fought  to 
maintain or resolve the European balance of power. The fourth was the Cold War, 
which began almost immediately after World War II”.260 This narrative situates 
the Cold War at the center of the story whereby it is a culmination of a specific  
understanding of European history. This puts the Cold War in a continuous line 
going back to the eighteenth century, making it part of the linear story of power 
politics and balance of power. By locating the sources of the Cold War in balance 
of power, Halle proceeds to explain history of American foreign relations in a 
traditionalist manner by stating that “the American people, shaped by their long-
tradition, could not accept considerations of power politics as reasons for going to 
war”,  hence  they  always  looked  for  moral  justifications.  Even  though,  Halle 
characterizes American foreign relations as based upon isolationism and moralism 
in tandem with the traditionalist perspective, he categorizes this tendency as being 
naïve subscribing to the realist view. He states that “in 1917-1918, the United 
States, morally and psychologically unequipped to do so, came into the war at the 
eleventh hour, to restore the balance of power, while pretending that it was doing 
something  altogether  different  and  nobler”.261 Thus,  the  United  States  foreign 
policy actions were always reticent towards power politics whether after the First 
World War or during the Second World War and “the lesson would finally be 
learned only in  1947,  when at  last  the  United  States,  now grim and realistic, 
would abandon its  isolationist  policy and all  its  outworn traditions in order to 
meet the challenge of Stalin’s Russia”.262
According  to  Halle,  the  roots  of  the  Cold  War  could  also  be  found  in  the 
unrealistic policies of the United States. An example he provides is the policy of 
“unconditional surrender” whereby the trajectory of events could have differed if 
only America could have concluded a peace treaty with Germany under a new 
government and ensured the establishment of a balance of power but instead it 
had insisted on unconditional  surrender.  He argues,  “the decision to  eliminate 
German power from Europe,  rather  than  make such a  peace,  is  what  laid the 
foundations of the Cold War”.263 It was this naiveté of American foreign policy to 
260 Halle, The Cold War as History, 2
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expect that the Soviet Union could be integrated into the international system the 
United States envisioned. As Halle states, “it is really not conceivable that rulers 
in Moscow, with a thousand years of desperate struggle for survival behind them 
would  have  abandoned  power  politics  after  the  War  and  cooperated  in  the 
organization  of  a  post-war  world  that  represented  the  ideals  of  Anglo-Saxon 
political  philosophy”.264 This  characterization  of  events  assumed  that  the 
international system that was to be established by the United States and the Soviet 
Union had to act within the boundaries set for it. This narrative of the extent to 
which  Soviet  Union  could  “make  demands”  about  the  organization  of  the 
international  system  is  a  narrative  continuously  employed  in  the  literature 
designating the Soviet Union as the one who had to demonstrate restraint about 
the extent to which the boundaries of the international system could be altered. 
With respect to Eastern Europe, Halle presents a traditionalist perspective. Poland 
is again at the cornerstone of the narrative.  Halle describes Soviet attitude and 
policies  in  the  following  manner;  “Having  subscribed  to  the  “Declaration  on 
Liberated Europe”, but having his triumphant military forces in Poland, Rumania, 
Bulgaria  and  Hungary,  Stalin  proceeded  with  the  necessary  degree  of 
ruthlessness, to eliminate  from public life  of those countries the elements  that 
were  not  ‘friendly’”.265  His  narrative  of  Eastern  Europe  does  not  distinguish 
among the different states, the different policies applied there and furthermore, he 
does not ascribe any agency to the Eastern European states. A similar approach is 
present  with  respect  to  his  treatment  of  Turkey.  Although  no  substantive 
discussion of the crisis  exists Halle  does discuss Turkey in the context  of the 
general  European  condition.  He states,  “the  approaching  crisis  in  Greece  and 
Turkey  was,  then,  merely  the  symptom  of  a  far  wider  crisis  in  Britain  and 
throughout  Europe.  Britain  could  no  longer  continue  its  rescue  operation  in 
Greece and Turkey because it stood in need of rescue itself”.266 Thus, Turkey is 
presented as an actor in need of rescue but the details of what is being rescued 
from the domestic context of Turkey are not provided. 
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The division of Europe is attributed solely to the Soviet Union. Halle discusses 
the Marshall Plan as a vehicle to “rescue” Europe and states that “the Marshall 
proposal, and its eager acceptance in London and Paris, confronted Moscow with 
the  final  decision  whether  to  join  the  West  or  to  fight  it”.267 Soviet  Union’s 
negative response meant, “Europe was finally divided.268” The Marshall Plan, in 
itself, is not seen as an active foreign policy endeavour that prompted a response 
from  the  Soviet  Union  but  rather  the  Soviet  Union  becomes  the  actor  that 
“divides”  Europe  by  responding  to  the  Marshall  Plan.  On  the  question  of 
inevitability, Halle’s stance is that “the range of choice was small, the element of 
predetermination  large”.269 It  was  in  the  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union  to  act 
according to power politics especially since the balance of power was not restored 
immediately after the war. The only logical deduction within this narrative is for 
America to restore the balance of power and contain the Soviet Union. According 
to Halle, “the continuing expansion of Russia at the end of World War II alarmed 
the Western nations, impelling them to draw together for a common resistance. 
So, the retirement of the United States into its own hemisphere, which had just 
begun, was halted and reversed”.270 The United States was inclined to return to its 
isolationist ways after the war and only reversed that policy once it comprehended 
the expansionist  “designs” of the Soviet  Union. Thus,  “when the West rallied 
under  American  leadership  to  halt  that  expansion  it  was  acting  in  its  own 
legitimate defence rather than in a spirit of aggression”.271
To conclude, traditionalist accounts configure the events of the Cold War in such 
a way that situates Poland and Eastern Europe as the catalysis of the ‘origins’. 
Privileging the events in Eastern Europe ascribe agency to the Soviet Union as the 
actor that was offensive. Furthermore, the story of United States foreign policy is 
depicted in a traditionalist fashion.  United States foreign policy is configured to 
underline the naiveté and isolationism of the United States and it was in effort to 
restore the balance of power in Europe that US involves itself in European affairs. 
This narrative fits into a traditional  narrative of European history whereby the 
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developments starting from 18th century onwards can be told in a linear manner as 
progressing towards US hegemony in order to solve the issue of balance of power 
within  the  international  system.  The  next  section  focuses  on  the  ‘revisionist’ 
school which reverses many of the main arguments of the ‘traditionalist’ school 
especially with respect to the story of American foreign policy.
III. REVISIONISTS
Revisionist school appeared in the 1960s with the new left historians and their 
criticism of the Vietnam War. Revisionism is not only directed at interpretations 
about the origins of the Cold War but is also a re-interpretation of the traditional 
history of American foreign relations.  Revisionists are not a unified school but 
there are certain characteristics that are shared by its representatives. Firstly, these 
works  focus  on  the  centrality  of  economic  factors  in  determining  US foreign 
policy. Second, contrary to the traditional history of American foreign relations, 
US foreign  policy  is  not  characterized  as  isolationist  or  idealist  but  rather  as 
expansionist.  Thirdly,  whereas  traditionalists  presented  the  United  States  as  a 
passive actor, revisionists characterize it as playing an active role in shaping the 
circumstances  of  the  post-world  war  II  international  system.   Fourthly,  these 
works are united in their  criticism of United States foreign policy and fifthly, 
revisionism inverts the traditionalist argument as it locates the responsibility of 
the Cold War mainly with the United States. 
William A. Williams is one of the best-known revisionists and in his work  The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy he presents a narrative that challenges not only 
the  traditional  account  of  the  Cold  War  but  also  American  foreign  policy  in 
general. According to Williams, the origins of the Cold War can be found in the 
contradictions existing within American foreign policy that is the “conflict within 
and between America’s ideas and practice”.272 Thus, contrary to the traditionalists 
the reason for the onset of the Cold War can be found in America’s actions, which 
is not narrated as being passive but rather as an actor actively shaping events. 
Furthermore, he does not concentrate solely on the post-world war II period but 
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presents a linear  analysis  of American foreign policy locating the roots of the 
contradictions that led to the Cold War in the past. It was in the 1890s during the 
economic  crisis  “when  Americans  thought that  the  frontier  was  gone,  they 
advanced and accepted the argument that new expansion was the best, if not the 
only, way to sustain their freedom and prosperity”.273 Hence, “in response to the 
crisis  of  the  1890s,  Americans  developed  a  broad  consensus  in  favour  of  an 
expansionist foreign policy as a solution to their existing troubles and as a way to 
prevent future difficulties”.274 Williams argues that  Spanish-American war was 
mainly motivated by these considerations after which with the Open Door Policy 
the aim became “to establish the conditions under which America’s preponderant 
economic  power  would  extend  the  American  system  throughout  the  world 
without  the  embarrassment  and  inefficiency  of  traditional  colonialism”.275 
According  to  Williams,  “when  combined  with  the  ideology  of  an  industrial 
Manifest  Destiny,  the  history of  the  Open Door  Notes  became the  history  of 
American  foreign  relations  from  1900  to  1958”.276 This  narrative  present 
American foreign policy as a linear story of economic expansion and engulfs the 
Cold War into the story making it yet  another expression of American foreign 
policy objectives. As such, the revisionist perspective also presents a linear story 
much  like  the  traditionalists.  Thus,  even  though the  root  causes  of  American 
foreign policy making is inverted and an alternative interpretation is narrated, the 
narrative itself remains Western-centric in that the main catalyst  for explaining 
world politics remains the West. Contrary to the traditionalists who had presented 
a  passive  United  States,  the  revisionist  perspective  presents  a  passive  Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union becomes the actor who has to react to the dynamic and 
aggressive foreign policy pursued by the United States. The “Russian expansion” 
into  Eastern  Europe  is  narrated  within  this  perspective  of  ensuring  the 
continuance of Open Door policy whereby “such protests were not prompted by 
the fear that Russia was about to overwhelm Europe or the world in general, but 
rather by the traditional outlook of the open door and the specific desire to get the 
Russians out of Eastern Europe”.277 The narrative presented by Williams is the 
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story of the Open Door policy adopted by American policymakers coupled with 
their belief in Manifest Destiny induced them to act in a manner that limited the 
choices available to the Soviet Union. 
Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, though revisionists, part with Williams in locating the 
sources of the Cold War. Kolko defines American foreign policy objectives as “to 
sustain  and  to  reform world  capitalism,”  thus,  “in  the  name  of  future  peace, 
therefore,  the  United  States  committed  itself  to  the  reconstruction  of  pre-war 
world capitalism  - to the elimination of trade and financial barriers, exclusive 
trading blocs and restrictive policies of every sort”.278 According to this narrative, 
the existence of the Soviet Union and communism was not the primary concern of 
the United States.  As Kolko states, 
“the United States entered the post-war world circumscribed by itself, by 
the  heritage  of  the  depression,  the  limitations  and  logic  of  its 
domestically oriented capitalism, and the structural  conditions the war 
created and thrust upon it. These factors would have existed regardless 
of the status of the Left in the world, the problem of the Soviet Union,  
the disintegration of the colonial  systems,  and the like,  but  they only 
helped  to  color  the  specific  nature  of  America’s  response  to  a 
complicated world it was determined, in any event, to reform and guide 
in ways compatible with American requirements and interests. That the 
United States would have thrust outward after the war, with something 
like  its  poorly fitting  synthesis  of  moralism,  charity,  calculation,  and 
need, was certain”.279
This narrative presents structural conditions of the international system and the 
capitalist  system within  it  creating  the  circumstances  for  the  United  States  to 
intervene. Hence, the domestic capitalist system of the United States necessitated 
reforming the international capitalist system in order to survive. The Soviet Union 
and communism were not necessary conditions for United States intervention into 
the international system rather they were only influential in determining how the 
United  States  would  intervene.   These  assumptions  lead  Kolko  to  make  an 
unorthodox definition of the Cold War, which is “an egregious term that burdens 
one’s comprehension of the post war era with oversimplifications and evokes the 
wrong  questions  that  unfortunate  phrase  describes  United  States  –  Soviet 
diplomacy in the narrowest context”280 and causes one to overlook “the larger, 
more significant context for understanding post war history in the entire globe and 
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the  revolution,  the  counterrevolution,  and  the  great  often  violent,  interaction 
between the United States, its European allies, and the vast social and economic 
transformation in the Third World that is the defining fact of our world”.281 Thus, 
the boundaries of the ‘Cold War’ definition are not opened but rather subsumes it 
under a never-changing dynamic whose origins are the West.
In  the  post-World  War  II  period  America  intervened  to  restructure  the 
international economic system that ran into problems in Eastern Europe because 
“the security interests of the Soviet Union clashed with the restorative policies of 
the United States”.282 This is when the Soviet Union enters the story, not as the 
quintessential, antithetical enemy of freedom and democracy but as a state who 
had security interests in an area United States wanted the international economic 
system to encompass.  Hence,  the struggle was not  caused by Eastern Europe, 
Soviet  Union  or  communism  but  rather  it  was  the  requirements  of  the 
international system yet “American policy merely fitted the Soviet problem into 
much larger context, a framework which would have existed apart from anything 
Russia might have done”.283 Contrary to the traditionalists, within this narrative 
the active actor is the United States. It is the aims and objectives of American 
foreign policy that direct and structure the post-world war II international system 
and  as  a  result,  the  Cold  War,  and  the  American-Soviet  hostility  is  its  own 
making.  As  Kolko  states,  “the  so-called  Cold  War,  in  brief,  was  far  less  the 
confrontation of the United States with Russia than America’s expansion into the 
entire world – a world the Soviet Union neither controlled nor created”.284
With  respect  to  the  Turkish  episode,  Kolko  provides  a  historical  context 
discussing the nature of Turkey’s neutrality during World War II and states that 
“Turkey’s hostility long preceded the discussion of the future of the straits at the 
end  of  the  war”.285 In  reference  to  the  Potsdam  meeting  Kolko  discussed 
America’s  positive  attitude  toward  changing  the  Montreux  Convention  and 
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presents how events became more heated after the August 1946 Russian proposal 
when 
“Truman and his cabinet regarded it as a trial balloon warranting the 
strongest  response  for  fear  that  Russians  might  precipitate  armed 
conflict  with  Turkey.  The  sharp  American  reply  in  effect  made  it 
possible for the Turks to refuse  any changes in the  status quo  and 
concessions to Soviet interests. For now they insisted that both Britain 
and the United States, even the UN, share in any changes that might 
be effected. What the Americans once recognized as legitimate Soviet 
interests they now denied altogether”.286
Kolko differs from most accounts of the Cold War in designating Turkey some 
agency.  Although the extent  of is  limited,  it  is  nonetheless acknowledged that 
Turkey had policies,  aims and interests,  which it  was trying  to pursue in  this 
period. The Truman Doctrine is narrated in a manner that puts the general thrust 
of American expansion into the world whereby for Kolko it “involved not just the 
middle east but the future of Europe, the prospects for attaining American goals in 
the world economy, the best means of containing Russia and the Left and the very 
efficacy  of  American  diplomatic  strategy  since  the  end  of  World  War  II”.287 
Contrary, to traditional accounts of American foreign policy and the Cold War, 
the Truman Doctrine “represented not a departure from the preceding thrust of 
American foreign policy, but rather its logical conclusion”.288
To conclude, for Kolko, American aims, interests based on its capitalist system 
drove it to expand and reformulate the capitalist system. The Soviet Union was a 
passive and unwilling actor within this scenario because of its security interests 
that the United States could not accommodate. Thus, “even if the Soviet Union 
had not existed, the condition of the Third World and America’s response toward 
it  after  1945  would  scarcely  have  been  different  –  for  Washington’s  goals 
predated the war and even 1917 itself. It would be extremely difficult to identify 
areas in which greater Soviet collaboration would have altered the outcome of 
America’s fundamental problem”.289
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Both traditionalism and revisionism present the United States and Soviet Union as 
one-dimensional  actors  with  mono-causal  interests.  As  a  consequence,  the 
comprehension  of  the  Cold  War  becomes  confined  to  either/or  dichotomies 
influenced  by  ideological  interpretations  of  American  foreign  policy. 
Furthermore, they both work within the main contours defined by the Western-
centric narrative. The Cold War is about what it means for US foreign policy; is it 
economically  expansionists:  is  it  a  naïve  state  that  was  called  upon  a  moral 
mission.   The narrative  configurations  within the  story of  the  Cold War alter 
depending on which  interpretation  of  American  foreign  policy  is  adopted.  As 
such, the terrain of the Cold War does not alter but rather than events in Poland 
and Eastern Europe, the revisionists focus on the Marshall Plan. Moreover, the 
narrative schema privileges the ‘economy’  and economic interests  as the main 
driver of the interests  of the actors.  As such, the root cause of the Cold War 
becomes  the  economic  expansionism of  the  United  States.  This  privileging  is 
situated within a greater narrative of United States foreign policy and a retelling 
the story of its engagement with world politics.
IV. POST-REVISIONISM
Post  –  revisionism  became  influential  towards  the  end  of  the  1970s  and 
represented a conscious effort by its representatives to extract ideology from the 
narrative  and present  an  ‘objective’  analysis  of  the  period.  Furthermore,  they 
present a multi-causal, multi-dimensional explanations for the origins of the Cold 
War. They agree with the revisionists that economic interests play a role but they 
accuse the revisionists  of providing mono-causal,  reductionist  explanations.  As 
such,  they  insert  into  the  discussion  factors  other  than  economy  such  as  the 
domestic  political  process,  public  opinion  and  the  international  system 
constructing a story of many dimensions. Despite this intent, the post-revisionist 
school encompasses a wide range of perspectives within itself.  There are wide 
ranges of works whereby one end of the spectrum attempts to integrate certain 
aspects  of  revisionism in  a  manner  that  downplays  their  main  arguments  and 
justifies the assumptions of traditionalism. The other end of the spectrum accepts 
many of the assumptions of revisionism but also depassivizes the Soviet Union. 
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Hence,  an  amalgamation  of  traditionalist  and  revisionist  perspectives  can  be 
located in the post-revisionist school. 
The post-revisionist  school is generally brings a systemic  analysis  of the Cold 
War. These works emphasize the anarchic structure of the international system, 
balance of power and the security dilemma in the post-world war II period. There 
is a reversal of the traditionalist account in conceding that the Soviet Union acted 
based  on  national  security  perceptions  rather  than  being  directed  by  the  all-
encompassing  dictates  of  communism.  Despite  a  reversal  of  traditionalist 
precepts,  there also  exists  a  reversal  of  revisionist  approach by presenting  the 
Soviet  Union  as  an  active  actor  because  post-revisionists  concede  that  even 
though acting on national security concerns the Soviet Union was nonetheless a 
threat  and/or  was perceived to  be a  threat  by American  foreign policymakers. 
Thus, one end of the spectrum considers Soviet search for security a danger that 
needed to be dealt with. The other side of the post-revisionist spectrum considers 
that at certain moments within this time-frame there did exist opening that could 
have  led  to  alternative  outcomes  making  the  Cold  War  not  inevitable. 
Furthermore,  in contrast  to the traditionalists,  post revisionists  do not consider 
U.S. foreign policy makers to be idealist isolationists, but rather realist individuals 
who comprehended and tried to advance American interests. Still, there does exist 
different  levels  of  consciousness  that  is  attributed  to  American  foreign  policy 
makers.   Certain  post-revisionists  like  Melvyn  Leffler290 argue  that  a  clear-cut 
national security conception and definition of aims and interests had been mapped 
out  before  being  confronted  with  the  post-World  War  II  international  system 
whereas  others  such  as  Bruce  Kuniholm291 argue  that  American  foreign 
policymakers devised a strategy in response to Soviet actions. Hence, it was more 
filled with uncertainty and fear than a previously conceived and timely executed 
plan. 
The authors who best represent the two spectrums of the post-revisionist school 
and John Lewis Gaddis and Melvyn P. Leffler. John Lewis Gaddis in his seminal 
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work  The United  States  and the  Origins  of  the  Cold  War published in  1972. 
Although  as  stated  the  aim  was  to  balance  the  traditionalist  and  revisionist 
interpretations of the origins of the Cold War, his interpretations are closer to that 
of traditionalist than revisionists.  Gaddis refers, in traditionalist fashion, to Soviet 
ideology as “a hostile ideology”.292 He states further that;  “the Grand Alliance, 
like other conditions in world history was held together primarily by hatred for a 
common enemy”.293 With respect to US foreign policy plans, he does not present a 
uniform establishment, when he states that “the State Department’s briefing book 
papers  on  Germany,  prepared  for  the  President’s  use  at  Yalta,  stressed  the 
importance  of  prevailing  each  occupying  power  from  following  unilateral 
policies,” thus decisions were not made “by the time of Germany’s surrender, the 
United States still had not decided between repression and rehabilitation as the 
best way to prevent future aggression”.294 The duality within the policy-making is 
underlined  when  he  states  “Washington  officials  knew  what  they  wanted  in 
Eastern  Europe;  maximum  possible  self-determination  for  the  people  of  that 
region without impairing the unity of the Grand Alliance.  Unfortunately,  these 
two goals – both fundamental elements in the American programs for preventing 
future war – conflicted each other”.295  Furthermore, he states that “it seems likely 
that Washington policy-makers mistook Stalin’s determination to ensure Russian 
security through spheres of influence for a renewal effort to spread communism 
outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The Russians did not immediately impose 
communist regimes on all the countries they occupied after the war ………But the 
Soviet leader failed to make the limited nature of his objectives clear”?296 The 
narrative provided here is of a dynamic relationship, the Soviet Union is presented 
as  having  legitimate  security  concerns  and  the  United  States  is  presented  as 
eventually deciding on the policies to follow with respect to the Soviet Union. As 
such,  it  is  not  a one-dimensional  depiction  of actors  or  events.  Yet,  as  in  the 
traditionalist literature, the narrative about the ‘limits’ that the Soviet Union could 
not or rather should not alter is present.  As such, the narrative presents a western-
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centric narrative that remains within the same narrative terrain of the Cold War 
and understanding of world politics.
Turkey is inserted into the narrative as a demonstrative example of how American 
foreign policy makers determined and clarified their policies in reaction to Soviet 
actions.  According to  Gaddis,  the  Soviet  note  to  Turkey in  August  1946 was 
interpreted  “as the culmination  of  a  long effort  by Moscow to establish  naval 
bases in Turkey,  a development  which they feared might  make that  country a 
Soviet satellite”.297 As such, he states that; “the episode was significant, though, 
for  it  showed that  the  Truman Administration  was now willing  to  risk war  if 
necessary in order to block further Soviet expansion. Washington officials now 
agreed,  for  the  most  part,  on  the  need  for  a  firm policy”.298 On the  issue  of 
inevitability and the assigning of blame for the origins of the Cold War, Gaddis 
argues “the power vacuum in central Europe caused by Germany’s collapse made 
a Russian-American confrontation likely, it did not make it inevitable”.299 Gaddis 
puts the impending American-Russian rivalry in the context of the nature of the 
international system. The systemic analysis is present in this account whereby the 
power vacuum created after the Second World leaves the two great powers in a 
security dilemma and the story of the Cold War is one that is about the restoration 
of balance of power and solving the security dilemma. According to this narrative, 
“The Cold War grew out of a complicated interaction of external  and internal 
developments inside both the United States and the Soviet Union”.300 The external 
situation was the structural condition of the international system that left the two 
great powers Soviet Union and United States facing each other. This narrative 
configuration continues  in the trajectory of the ‘traditionalist’  and ‘revisionist’ 
analysis  in  the privileging of a  specific  understanding of European balance  of 
power story.
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Melvyn P. Leffler301 represents the other end of the spectrum in post-revisionist 
school.  His book  Preponderance of  Power  diverges  with Gaddis’s account  on 
several  points  as  will  be  discussed.  Leffler  concentrates  on  concepts  such  as 
correlations of power, national security and geopolitics to explain the actions of 
the United States. Thus, according to Leffler, 
“Neither  the  Americans,  nor the  Soviets  sought  to  harm the  other  in 
1945. But each side, in pursuit of its security interests, took steps that 
aroused  the  other’s  apprehensions.  Moreover,  the  protests  that  each 
country’s actions evoked from the other fuelled the cycle of distrust as 
neither  could  comprehend  the  fears  of  the  other,  perceiving  its  own 
actions as defensive. Herein rests the classic security dilemma”.302
For Leffler, the main roots of the Cold War can be located in the security dilemma 
created  by the  structure  of  the  international  system.  Within  that  system “U.S. 
officials  defined  their  national  security  in  terms  of  correlations  of  power. 
American officials  believed that they had to relieve the problems besetting the 
industrial democracies of Western Europe, integrate former enemies like Germany 
and Japan into the international economy ……… if they failed in these tasks, the 
correlation of power in the international system would be transformed. The Soviet 
Union would grow stronger, the United States weaker”.303 Further he states that; 
“their overriding priority was to prevent a totalitarian adversary from conquering 
or assimilating the resources of Europe and Asia and using them to wage war 
against the United States, as the Axis powers had done during World War II”.304 
Leffler further stressed that “the most important National Security Council (NSC) 
papers of the Truman administration incorporated a geostrategic vision. National 
security was interpreted in terms of correlations of power. Power was defined in 
terms of the control of resources, industrial infrastructure and overseas bases”.305
With respect to Turkey, Leffler presents an administration that had not taken a 
firm stand  immediately;  but  at  the  end  the  power  considerations  led  them to 
conclude that “if the Russians established themselves there, it was believed they 301 For a more recent analysis of the Cold War by Melvyn P. Leffler see: Melvyn P. Leffler, For 
the Soul of Mankind: The United States and the Soviet Union, and the Cold War  (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2008).302 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 99
303 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 10
304 Melvyn  P.  Leffler,  “The  emergence  of  an  American  grand  Strategy,  1945-1952,”  in  The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I, The Origins, ed, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 77
305 Leffler, “The emergence of an American grand strategy,” 77
94
would then seek additional bases in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas because 
the Dardanelles would not be protected from modern air power without them”.306 
Turkey  itself  and  the  domestic  conditions  of  the  country  and  its  specific 
relationship with the Soviet Union are not discussed. Leffler embeds the Turkish 
episode within the larger narrative of the security dilemma the great powers found 
themselves in; 
“if  at  the  end  of  the  war  the  Soviets  were  probing  to  enhance  their 
position in the Middle East, which they were, then the Americans, too, 
were marking off areas of vital interest and calculating their prospective 
enemy’s vulnerabilities as well as their own requirements. These actions 
did not mean that  Washington or Moscow or London sought or even 
expected  a  showdown.  Each  government  was  probably  acting 
defensively but the cumulative effect, was to trigger a spiralling crisis of 
misperception and mistrust”.307 
According to this narrative, “American fears did not stem from aggressive Soviet 
moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic 
note. The real problem was that there loomed gaping vacuums of power in this 
part of the world. In fact, Turkey’s geopolitical importance was directly related to 
the evolution of U.S. strategic concepts”.308 It is thus, geopolitical considerations 
and the security dilemma within which the United States and Soviet Union that 
constitutes  the  underlying  causes  of  the  Cold  War.  Despite  the  systemic 
determinants,  Leffler  does  ascribe  agency  to  the  actors  for  even  though  the 
security dilemma existed ever since the end of the Second World War, it  took 
time for the Cold War to get started. According to Leffler, Cold War begins in 
1946 “when U.S. officials defined the Soviet union as the enemy” rather “than 
focus on the popular desire for reform and recovery throughout Europe, rather 
than  emphasize  the  indigenous  source  of  civil  strife  in  Asia,  and  rather  than 
identifying with revolutionary nationalism in the Third World, they latched onto 
an  interpretation  of  international  developments  that  placed  blame  and 
responsibility on the Kremlin”.309
The  Truman  Doctrine  and  the  Marshall  Plan  are  present  in  the  narrative  as 
examples of  hardening the perspective towards the Soviet Union. The policies 
themselves were not directly about the Soviet Union, as Leffler states, 
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“no one feared Soviet military aggression. But the long-term balance of 
power seemed imperilled by the exchange crisis  in Europe,  imminent 
economic  disarray,  and  the  prospective  proliferation  autarkical 
arrangements,  and  the  anticipated  capacity  of  European  communist 
parties  to  capitalize on these  circumstances.  In  June 1947 the United 
States  launched the Marshall  Plan to arrest  an impending shift  in the 
correlation of power between the United States and the Soviet Union”.310
In  Leffler’s  analysis,  the  United  States  is  the  actor  that  acts  is  to  rectify  the 
correlations of power, and the Soviet Union, similar to the revisionist narrative, 
reacts  to  these  actions.  Unlike  the  revisionists,  Leffler  does  not  completely 
passivize the Soviet Union. He concedes that the Soviet Union gave reasons to 
American  policymakers  to  doubt  their  intentions  when  “Soviet  leaders  forced 
unpopular and repressive governments on Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria”, “that 
Soviet  commissars  imposed  unfair  economic  agreements  even  on  friendly 
governments  like  the  Lublin  Poles;  and that  Soviet  armies  lived  off  the  land, 
ravished the countryside, brutalised the people, and seized part of the industrial 
infrastructure  of  former  enemy states”.311 Yet,  Leffler  also concedes  that  there 
were also signs that alternatives were possible since “free elections were held in 
Budapest  and  then  throughout  Hungary;  Soviet  troops  were  withdrawn  from 
Czechoslovakia;  a  representative  government  was  installed  in  Austria”.312 As 
such, it was which side of the picture one wanted to concentrate upon that was 
influential  in  determining  the  course  of  events  and  American  policy-makers 
concerned with correlations of power and fearing the worst chose to concentrate 
on the latter. Even that was not a predetermined disposition according to Leffler’s 
narrative as he cites Bohlen, Robinson, Davies and Wallace and the alternative 
paths they proposed. As such according to Leffler, America’s Cold War strategy 
evolved in time based on past experiences and necessities of balance of power 
rather  than  being  predetermined  and  inevitable.  As  he  explains  “The  strategy 
evolved from vague talk about an open and international organization to more 
concrete ideas about the need to rebuild western Germany, reconstruct Western 
Europe, and rejuvenate Japan”.313 But once these priorities were set other concerns 
appeared since “West Germany, Western Europe, and Japan could not prosper and 
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could not be secure if  the periphery gravitated into the hands of revolutionary 
nationalists  and Communists”.314 In  order  to  realize  their  aim of  rehabilitating 
Western Europe and Japan American policy-makers had to ensure that areas their 
economies depended upon were not unstable either.
In conclusion, the alternative paths could not be taken, not because the United 
States  was  convinced  of  the  expansionist  inclinations  of  the  Soviet  Union  or 
consciously wanted to “pick a fight” but because “the Americans were caught in 
the classic security dilemma whereby the steps deemed essential to promote their 
own  security  clashed  with  the  security  imperatives  of  the  adversary”.315 The 
narrative configurations of the events altered and different priorities were ascribed 
to actors yet the main Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics remained. It 
was the story of a European balance of power that needed to be maintained and 
the  power  vacuum  that  appeared  after  the  Second  World  War  leaving  two 
superpowers face to face. As such,
“The Cold War was the legacy of World War II. That conflict deranged 
the  international  system,  altered  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe, 
shattered  colonial  empires,  restructured  economic  and  social 
arrangements  within  nations  and  bequeathed  a  legacy  of  fear  that 
preordained a period of unusual anxiety and tension”.316
V. THE “NEW” COLD WAR HISTORY?
The literature becomes harder to distinguish towards the late 1980s. There are 
three  main  reasons  for  this  complication.  Firstly,  the  “end”  of  the  Cold  War 
paved the way for a new “school” that is an offshoot of the traditionalist wing of 
the post-revisionists; neo-traditionalism. The act of writing about the “Cold War” 
after the fact has demonstrated certain common characteristics mainly because of 
the interpretations on how it ended. The destruction of an “ideology”, “system of 
government” and the end of the Soviet Union is taken as vindicating many of the 
arguments put forward by Kennan in his infamous Long Telegram. As Gaddis 
argues;
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“On February 22, 1946, sick in bed from the rigors of a Moscow winter 
and irritated as usual at the Department of States, Kennan summoned his 
secretary,  Dorothy Hessman, and dictated an unusually long telegram. 
That document has a better claim than any other to having laid out the 
path by which the international system found its way from the trajectory 
of self-destruction it was on during the first half of the twentieth-century 
to  a  trajectory  that  had,  by the  end  of  the  second half,  removed the 
danger  of  great  power  war,  revived  democracy  and  capitalism,  and 
thereby enhanced the prospects for human liberty beyond what they had 
ever been before”.317
The view that US foreign policy during the Cold War was a success is a prevalent 
one that is affected by the manner in which the conflict is perceived to have come 
to a conclusion which also affected the conceptualization of the international in 
the post-Cold War period. Hence, the analysis of this “new school” will attempt to 
demonstrate “how the narrativization of events into stories with moral purposes 
partake in the constitution of realities that have political  effects, even as those 
narratives claim the status of dispassionate and descriptive observer”.318 Secondly, 
towards the end of  the 1980s post-revisionist  school  led the way also for  the 
pericentrist school. Pericentrist school appeared towards the “end” inserting into 
the literature the British story.319  Deighton inserts Great Britain in to the narrative 
about the origins and underlines that ‘British decision-makers assessed early on 
that  they would  have  to  base postwar  foreign  policy both  on  the  threat  from 
Communist ideology and on the consequences of the arrival of the Soviet Union 
as the new great power on the world stage”.320 In line with the post-revisionist and 
systemic  explanations  Deighton  underlines  that  the  main  priority  was  not 
Communism or  the  Soviet  Union but  ‘to  maintain  Britain’s  place  as  a  major 
global and imperial power in a rapidly changing period of fresh ideological and 
power political  challenges”.321 Hence,  she argues ‘that  this  priority would still 
have  existed  in  Britain  even  if  the  soviet  Union  had  withdrawn  from active 
international politics”.322 Thus adding Britain into the narrative does not alter the 
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main assumptions of the story but adds another actor into the equation. The story 
of the origins remains the same. Since the end, the story has been extended to 
Africa,  Asia,  Middle  East  and  Eastern  Europe.  Yet  pericentrism  does  not 
constitute a separate school of the origins of the Cold War because even though 
the focus shifts the central parameters of the narrative schema are reproduced for 
other stories.  There are many Cold War(s) within the Cold War schema but the 
structure of the story and the configurations, prioritizations and what counts as 
‘events’  does  not  alter. That  is  why,  Vojtech  Mastny,  though  presenting  a 
pericentrist  account  of  the  Cold  War  focusing  on  Russia  also  reproduces  the 
traditionalist assumptions on the origins of the Cold War. 
The end has created a separation of intent between the previous schools and the 
present literature.  Knowing how the “conflict” ended affects our perceptions of 
what  it  meant.  Yet with respect  to the origins these three factors even though 
complicating the literature do not actually constitute a “New Cold War History” 
since  the  main  narratives  and  characterizations  of  the  previous  schools  are 
reproduced. 
This part of the chapter will proceed not in clear cut order of the schools since as 
mentioned even though new approached have come forth, the parameters of the 
discussion have not altered. As such the three tendencies are interrelated not only 
with each other but also with the schools elaborated upon in the first section of the 
chapter. The pericentric tendency made its appearance primarily with respect to 
the role of Great Britain. In that sense, the appearance of pericentrism should not 
be clustered into the end of the Cold War movement, since it started towards the 
end  of  1970s  and  early  1980s,  as  an  offshoot  of  the  post-revisionist  aim  to 
complicate the understanding of the Cold War. Hence, in 1981, Terry Anderson, 
argued,  what  would  become  the  main  basis  of  pericentrism  that  “in  the 
examination of the cold war, however, most historians have promoted what could 
be called the superpower thesis. They have scrutinized Soviet-American relations 
but have tended to reflect the third member of the wartime Grand Alliance”.323 
Despite an attempt to insert another actor into the story contra pericentrists after 
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the end, the justification lies in Great Britain’s status as a great power. Anderson 
states that “many historians have either forgotten or neglected that during the war 
and until the Truman Doctrine of 1947 there was not just two nations fighting for 
control and influence in the post-war world, but three, and until the second half of 
1946, Britain – not the United States – was Russia’s primary adversary”.324 As 
such, the main questions he asks does not alter from established schools like “how 
much responsibility – whether credit or blame – should the British bear for this 
change in American  policy”.325 In that  sense,  as  he states:  “my thesis  is  most 
similar to post-revisionism”.326 Furthermore, as will be seen, he is closer to the 
post-revisionism  that  shares  more  assumptions  with  traditionalism  than 
revisionism. 
According  to  Anderson,  British  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union  was  a 
continuation of century long policies towards the continent and Russia, therefore, 
differed from that of the United States. British policy blended Churchill’s intense 
anti-communism with his nation’s traditional plans for dealing with the Continent. 
British  policy  also  reflected  the  efforts  of  nineteenth-century  leaders  from 
Castlereagh to Salisbury to ensure that no nation dominated the Continent. After 
the defeat of the Third Reich – as in 1815 after the collapse of Napoleonic France 
– Russia must be prevented from ruling Europe”.327 Thus, Britain’s relations with 
Russia  are  inserted  into  the  narrative  of  European  history  where  great-power 
politics  is  based on maintaining  the balance  of  power.  This  narrative presents 
Great Britain and United States as being in disagreement on how to approach the 
Soviet Union. It was only with time that American attitude changed and became 
more  in  line  with  British  policies.  This  change  according  to  Anderson  was 
induced by the actions of the Soviet Union; whereby “Russian behaviour appalled 
American diplomats in Eastern Europe, Iran and Korea and outraged a public that 
had hoped for a world based on Wilsonian ideals”.328 Yet, Anderson also argues 
that Britain played an important role in convincing the Americans. He states that; 
“British diplomacy, during the first three months of 1946 was a catalyst – Bevin’s 
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stand  in  the  U.N.O  and  Churchill’s  address  accelerated  the  evolution  of  the 
administration’s  new attitude  toward  Russia”.329 Even though,  Russian  actions 
convinced  U.S.  policymakers  that  “Wilsonian  ideals”  could  not  be  sustained, 
Britain was also a factor in convincing the Americans on how to approach the 
Soviets. 
The  underlying  assumptions  presented  by  Anderson  displays  similarities  with 
“traditionalist”  accounts  whereby America  pursuing  “Wilsonian  ideals”  has  to 
react to external factors. The main difference in this narrative is that the United 
States does not only react to Soviet actions but also to British ones. Hence, the 
general American foreign policy conception of a United States inclined towards 
cooperation and idealism also exists within this narrative when Anderson states; 
“the Truman administration had accepted old-world tactics for the new atomic age 
and now was supporting a balance  of  power between East  and West.  In  both 
diplomatic  and military strategy the United States  was cooperating  with Great 
Britain to form a policy that would later be labelled containment”.330 Within this 
narrative  America  becomes  an  unwilling  actor  that  had  to  be  convinced  to 
abandon  its  Wilsonian  ideals  and play  the  game  of  balance  of  power  by  the 
quintessential  player  of the game that had maintained the balance of power in 
Europe for over a century. Discussion of the Truman Doctrine is discussed under 
the heading “Shifting the Burden” embedding the narrative of balance of power 
and  America  replacing  Britain  as  the  country  responsible  for  maintaining  it. 
Anderson argues,  “the Truman Doctrine  set  forth a  policy advanced by Great 
Britain.  The United States adopted an approach in Greece that the British had 
employed since 1944. The administration also accepted Churchill’s  conviction, 
first expressed in 1943, that the post-war menace was Russia”.331  Thus, Britain 
had  commenced  policies  later  adopted  by  the  Americans  and  was  influential 
players at the onset of the Cold War. 
The main works representing the onset of the pericentrism by bringing in Great 
Britain  into  the  narrative  of  the  Cold  War  also  demonstrated  that  the  main 
contours of “traditional” Cold War historiography are not abandoned. As such, 
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along with the pericentrist tendency neo-traditionalism also appeared. Britain is 
narrated as the representative of old Europe that aids America in realising the 
realities of balance of power politics. As Anderson stated,  
“the  United  States  tried  to  ignore  ideological  differences,  pre-war 
relations, the Katyn Forest massacre, the Warsaw uprising, the constant 
warnings from American and British diplomats and looked forward to a 
universal organization that would maintain one world – an impossibility. 
The Soviets were different – a fact too often ignored in Washington”.332
The  traditional  interpretation  of  American  foreign  policy  as  being  based  on 
Wilsonian ideals is reproduced in these narratives. Furthermore, this narrative fits 
into the traditionalist perspective of Cold War historiography whereby America is 
a  passive  actor  that  has  to  react  to  Soviet  expansionism.  Great  Britain  is 
incorporated to the story as an active actor that assists the United States in her 
transformation  from a passive  actor  to  an  active  actor  to  redress  the  issue  of 
balance of power.  Secondly,  in attempting to bring in agency to other actors, 
these works actually reify the “Cold War” as an entity and establishes the time 
period in a manner that subsumes other possible narratives.  Even though bringing 
in other states into the story of the Cold War extends the landscape of the story, 
the time frame and characterizations themselves are not questioned resulting in a 
process whereby other stories such as Britain and her Empire become part of the 
Cold War storyline. As such, bringing Great Britain into the story reproduces the 
boundaries  of  the  ‘state  of  the  art’.  Furthermore,  it  continues  the  tradition  of 
presenting  a  certain  understanding of  European history.  Thirdly,  this  narrative 
presents  European history as  a  linear  story that  can  be reduced to  balance  of 
power politics and Russia as a continuous entity whose “aims” have not altered. 
Within this European history stretching back to the 19th century Great Britain is 
presented  as  the  balancer  of  continental  Europe  ensuring  that  no  one  power 
dominates the continent. As a consequence relations with the Soviet Union and 
the  Cold  War  become  another  stage  in  the  balance  of  power  politics  of  the 
European state system. 
Another  actor  whose existence  has become more central  within the Cold War 
story  was  the  Soviet  Union.  Even  though  traditionalists  had  given  the  Soviet 
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Union an active role in the making of the Cold War, it was a one-dimensional role 
that  did  not  attempt  to  grasp  the  political  system of  the  Soviet  Union  or  the 
decision-making  process.  Furthermore,  the  revisionists  had  presented  a  multi-
dimensional Soviet Union with multiple interests but as a passive actor. Hence 
works  by  Vojtech  Mastny  and  Vladislav  Zubok  and  Constantine  Pelshavok 
represented important breaking points with respect to understanding the Soviet 
perspective of the Cold War.
Vojtech Mastny’s book The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity is a book that is both 
neo-traditionalist  and  pericentrist.  He  focuses  on  the  Russian  story  and  the 
reasons  behind  the  policies  they  pursued  and  adopted.  According  to  Mastny, 
Stalin’s motivation was the attainment  of security and “he tried to accomplish 
what  he  wanted  with  rather  than  against  his  powerful  Western  allies,  whose 
support, or at least acquiescence, he deemed indispensable for achieving the kind 
of security he craved”.333 Mastny argued that “what went wrong at Yalta was the 
way  how  the  participants  badly  misjudged  each  other’s  intentions.334”  In  the 
chapter entitled “the Unwanted Cold War” he states that “the forthcoming Cold 
War was both unintended and unexpected; it was predetermined all the same”.335 
Though as the title suggests Stalin is not portrayed as wanting a Cold War, the 
Cold War is an inevitable event nonetheless because even though Stalin showed 
restraint at times “in other places the post-victory euphoria made the Soviet ruler 
less  resistant  to  the  imperialistic  temptations  he  had  earlier  not  allowed  his 
subordinates.  He attempted  to  intimidate  Turkey to  cede  to  the  Soviet  Union 
territory in the Caucasus and military bases on the Balkan Sea straits”.336 Even 
though the “crisis” with Turkey is mentioned as an example of how Stalin lost the 
trust of the West, the events are not elaborated upon and Turkey is narrated into 
the story as a passive actor without any agency. 
With respect to the Marshall Plan, Mastny states that it left Stalin in a quandary 
because “the project was deeply subversive of Stalin’s hegemonical concept of 
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international order, aimed at ensuring his country’s security at the expense of all 
others”.337 As such, “he had the unenviable choice of either risking the intrusion 
of Western influences within his sphere of power, or close insulating the sphere, 
thus  precipitating  against  his  will  the  division  of  the  Continent  into  hostile 
blocs”.338 Soviet Union’s response to the Marshall Plan is determined by domestic 
politics. As such, in postrevisionist fashion, Mastny does not only focus upon the 
international system or the balance of power but the decision-making process and 
the domestic forces within the Soviet Union. As he states 
“in  the  course  of  the  forty  year  contest,  domestic  considerations 
determined  Soviet  international  behaviour  far  more  than  most 
contemporaries,  misled by the Kremlin’s not having to account for its 
action to anyone,  were  prepared to believe.  As long as Stalin was in 
charge, those considerations were more general than specific – his need 
to  maintain his  autocratic  power  and  an  economy that  would  sustain 
it”.339
Mastny locates the origins of the Cold War within the Soviet Union and argues 
that “the roots of the conflict were domestic and ideological. Rather than sharing 
with his people relief at the end of their wartime suffering, Stalin saw a threat to 
his  tyranny  in  their  expectations  of  a  better  life.  He  needed  to  justify  it  by 
convincing  them  that  they  remained  surrounded  by  enemies”.340 Despite  the 
restraints showed at times in an effort to maintain the alliance the Cold War was 
still  inevitable  because  the  Soviet  Union  necessitated  an  enemy.  Mastny’s 
narrative  presents  a  story  whereby  the  Cold  War  grows  out  of  the  sense  of 
insecurity felt  by Soviet leaders as a consequence of which they took “greater 
risks  whenever  they  saw  the  correlation  of  forces  turning  in  their  favour.  In 
estimating their own strengths and the weaknesses of their adversaries, they were 
prone to miscalculation.  They were enhanced by their ideological preconceptions, 
which postulated the ultimate victory of their system”.341 In addition to arguing 
that the Soviet search for security was rooted in domestic factors, Mastny also 
stresses that it was the changing balance of power in the international system that 
caused the Soviet system to attempt to expand into areas such as Turkey and Iran. 
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Mastny, as opposed to traditionalists, does not present a one-dimensional Soviet 
Union intent on conquering the world, and brings forth domestic politics and the 
decision-making  process  within  the  Soviet  Union  that  was  generally  ignored. 
Nonetheless, the narrative does present some of the assumptions of traditionalism, 
when  Mastny  states  that  “the  inside  evidence  of  Moscow’s  capabilities  and 
intentions no longer leaves a doubt that its leaders never wanted to overstep its 
limits.342” But he continues by stating, “this is not to say that the threat the West 
perceived was an empty one”.343  Since, Stalin would attempt to expand when he 
saw an opportunity,  it  was Stalin  and the Soviet  Union that  was expansionist 
“attempting to overstep its limits” that jeopardized cooperation. This statement is 
a demonstration that the Soviet Union had acted too aggressively based on the 
“limits”  established  by  the  West.  This  is  a  theme  that  is  present  both  in 
traditionalist  and  post-revisionist  schools.  The  underlying  assumption  of  this 
assertion is that the international system was to be set up by the United States as 
the new hegemon and the Soviet Union could act only within the boundaries set 
forth by the hegemon. As such, the Soviet Union had to know the “limits” within 
which it had to act. This narrative elevates the United States to the status of the 
rightful party by virtue of being the designer of the international system and the 
Soviet Union becomes the actor that threatens the international system.
To conclude he states that “if the empire Stalin created was in fact every bit as 
evil as suspected, and much more, than those who waged the Cold War against it  
need not apologize for the effort”.344 Such a perspective is prevalent, as will be 
seen,  within  the  neo-traditionalists  who wrote  after  the  “end” and knowing it 
justify the actions of the United States. Within this narrative Cold War becomes 
necessary to counter the Soviets and the only question to be asked is “whether 
they did the best they could”.345 Hence, the villain and the hero of the story are 
clearly delineated and the only question remaining is how successful were the 
hero’s actions.
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So far the discussion on pericentrism has been with respect to the works focusing 
on great powers. An important development in this tendency was the increasing 
works on Central and Eastern European states that attempted to recount the story 
of  the  region  and  countries  narrated  as  the  main  contention  of  great  power 
politics.  Vessellin  Dimitrov,  in  Stalin’s  Cold  War:  Soviet  Foreign  Policy,  
Democracy  and  Communism  in  Bulgaria  1941-1948 criticizes  how  “Eastern 
Europe has tended to be perceived as a hapless victim of great power politics and 
the destruction of democracy in the region had therefore been seen as a product of 
Soviet policy”.346 Dimitrov argues, “there was no  single  Soviet foreign policy. 
Soviet policy was driven by contradictory impulses and was often uncoordinated, 
in both conceptual and institutional terms. It aimed both at promoting the interests 
of the Soviet Union, sometimes defined rather broadly, and the minimization of 
the possibility of conflict with the capitalist powers”.347 Thus, according to this 
narrative Stalin did not have an established, planned road map on how to proceed 
with respect to Eastern Europe and “allowed various options to be played out and 
whilst  retaining  ultimate  and  discretionary  control,  did  not  wish  to  commit 
himself to any particular blueprint”.348 These assumptions create an area whereby 
the actions of domestic actors can also have a determining influence on the course 
of events.  Thus, there were also choices made by Eastern European countries, 
domestic rivalries, ideological conflicts that played themselves out. As such, “for 
the Eastern European countries, the onset of the Cold War meant not only that 
they found themselves in the zone of influence of one of the great powers, but 
also  that  they  experienced  a  revolutionary  transformation  of  their  national 
political,  social  and economic  systems.  It  was  in  Eastern Europe that  the link 
between  the  international  and the  domestic  aspects  of  the  Cold  War,  and  the 
underlying  ideological  nature  of  the  clash  between  liberal  democracy  and 
communism become most  apparent”.349 It  was  all  not  about  Stalin’s  aims  and 
Western efforts to counter them, as opposed to traditionalists, or Western efforts 
to  expand  economically  contra  revisionists.  It  was  also  about  the  historical 
conditions of Eastern European states, their social and economic fabric and the 
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manner in which their domestic issues played out. Gunter Bischof in  Austria in 
the First Cold War, 1945-55, The League of the Weak also argued in support of 
bringing into the account of the Cold War the domestic conditions of Austria to 
comprehend how superpower relations played out in the country. He argues that 
the new Cold War history has “started to look at the Cold War as more complex 
international arena in which the superpowers organized imperial structures ….. in 
which  the  metropoles  frequently  had  a  difficult  time  keeping  their 
charges/puppets in line”.350 Bischof concentrates on the role Austria played as a 
weak power in manipulating the superpower game. Bischof defines the Cold War 
as “a high stakes gamble across the globe for geostrategic advantages based on 
exaggerated security demands. The US and USSR held mirror “enemy images” of 
each other”.351 Washington’s struggle for “preponderance of power” was mirrored 
by the Kremlin’s “revolutionary-imperialist paradigm”.352 Bischof’s definition is 
rooted  in  Melvyn  Leffler  and  Vladislav  Zubok  and  Constantine  Pleshakov’s 
respective analysis of American and Soviet perceptions and definition of interests. 
His focus on geostrategy demonstrates a commonality with post-revisionism in its 
reliance on neo-realism to explain international system of the period based on an 
understanding of security dilemma and geostrategic considerations. Bischof also 
draws from earlier pericentrist works by periodizing 1945-46 as the Anglo-Soviet 
Cold War over Austria.  As Bischof states “the official British mindset perceived 
Soviet  expansionism  into  Central  Europe  as  a  continuation  of  its  unilateral  
actions in Eastern Europe which needed to be contained. For the British, Austria 
became a crucial threat and stopping communist expansion”.353 According to this 
narrative,  “London’s Cold War with Moscow was sparked before the hot war 
ended”.354 Hence, Americans were presented as actors that need to be convinced 
of  Austria’s  worth  in  countering  the  Soviet  threat.  With  respect  to  this 
assumption, Bischof is in line with the pericentrists that tell the British story by 
adhering  to  certain  traditionalist  assumptions  about  American  foreign  policy 
making.
350 Gunter  Bischof,  Austria  in  the  First  Cold  War,  1945-55:  the  leverage  of  the  weak 
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Bischof includes Austria within the narrative as an active actor who aided Britain 
in convincing the Americans. As he argues, “the Austrians were astute in utilizing 
superpower ideological antagonisms to their advantage by frequently raising the 
spectre of imminent communist takeover in Vienna. It brought Western political 
and economic support”.355 Austria created a narrative about itself as a victim, as a 
country  who resisted  the  Nazis  and Austrian  statesman  “pleaded  for  financial 
relief for Austria, again coupled with the threat that, unless help was forthcoming, 
Austria might be driven into the hands of the Soviets,” whereby “perfecting …. 
[the] game of playing off East against West”.356 As such, he brings into the story 
domestic  factors  of  Austria  and  how  they  were  a  factor  in  convincing  the 
“isolationist”  Americans  to  give  more  attention  to  Austria.  This  narrative 
reinforces the traditional perspective on American foreign policy.  Furthermore, 
the reasons behind why Austria chose to be aided by America are not discussed. 
In an attempt to break the dominant, one-dimensional analysis of the Cold War as 
a  great  power  conflict,  Bischoff  reproduces  a  one-dimensional  analysis  of 
Austrian  history  embedding  it  into  a  Cold  War  narrative  of  attempting  to 
cooperate with America and not pondering whether or not alternative narratives 
existed at the time. 
Amidst  the  plethora  of  works  embedding  national  stories  into  the  Cold  War 
narrative,  the  end of  the  cold  war  also  paved the  way for  a  neo-traditionalist 
perspective. The most renowned neo-traditionalist is John Lewis Gaddis. His book 
entitled the Cold War: A New History starts with a moral judgement on the era 
that demonstrates the manner in which neo-traditionalists view the Cold War. He 
states that “the world, I am quite sure, is a better place for that conflict having 
been fought in the way that it was and won by the side that won it”.357 Hence, the 
determining factor of how it ended or is perceived to have come to a closure is an 
important part of what Gaddis perceives to be the Cold War. He argues that “for 
all  its  dangers, atrocities,  costs, distractions,  and moral  compromises,  the Cold 
War  –  like  the  American  Civil  War  –  was  a  necessary  contest  that  settled 
fundamental issues once and for all. We have no reason to miss it. But given the 
355 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 3
356 Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War,73
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alternatives, we have little reason either to regret its having occurred”.358Defining 
the results of the Cold War in such a manner predetermines the manner in which 
the origins of the Cold War will be identified. If the world is a better place for it 
having occurred and fought in the manner that it was and especially because of the 
way it ended then the world is by default a better place because the United States 
decided to contain Soviet expansionism. The core arguments of the traditionalist 
school  are  present  in  the  narrative  provided by Gaddis.  According to  Gaddis, 
“Stalin’s goal … was not to restore a balance of power in Europe, but rather to 
dominate that continent as thoroughly as Hitler had sought to do. Unlike Hitler, 
however,  Stalin  followed  no  fixed  timetable.  He  had  welcomed  the  D-Day 
landings, despite the fact that they would preclude the Red Army from reaching 
western  Europe  anytime  soon”.359 Furthermore,  he  argues  that  “Stalin’s  was, 
therefore, a grand vision, the peacefully accomplished but historically determined 
domination of Eastern Europe. It was also a flawed vision, for it failed to take into 
account the evolving post-war objectives of the United States”.360
A similar narrative is presented in his previous book We Now Know where he asks 
the question “did Stalin therefore seek a Cold War?” and answers by stating that 
‘the question is a little like asking ‘does a fish seek water?’ Suspicion, distrust, 
and  cynicism  were  not  only  his  preferred  but  his  necessary  environment”.361 
According  to  this  narrative,  the  question  of  inevitability  is  answered  in  the 
positive whereby Stalin himself is found culpable for the origins of the conflict. 
As such for Gaddis;
 ‘one has to wonder whether the Cold War really began in 1945. For it  
was Stalin’s disposition to wage cold wars: he had done so in one form 
or  another  throughout  his  life,  against  members  of  his  own  family, 
against his closest advisers and their families, against old revolutionary 
comrades, against foreign communists, even against returning Red Army 
war veterans who, for whatever reason, had contacts of any kind with the 
West in the course of defeating Nazi Germany”.362
As a consequence, it was in the nature of Stalin to wage cold wars and it was 
inevitable that he would do so with respect to the West as well. This perspective 
358 Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, xi
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brings back the basic assumptions of traditionalism and reproduces the Cold War 
having had the hindsight of the end of the Cold War. The pericentric and neo-
traditionalist approaches to explaining the Cold War are both different tellings of 
the revisionist and traditionalist schools. The actors are increased within the story 
but the story itself does not alter.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has attempted to present a bird’s eye view of the main currents and 
discussions in Cold War historiography. It is not an exhaustive coverage of the 
literature nor does it aim to be. The works discussed constitute the main pillars of 
the historiographical discourse on the Cold War and are also constitutive of Cold 
War  narrative  configurations.  The  double  movement  of  the  historiographical 
operation on the Cold War moves to create the ‘Cold War’ but is also constituted 
and limited by the borders established during that operation. The aim as such is 
not to discuss all the works in Cold war historiography or to present a classical 
literature  review but  to  identify  the  narratives  about  the  United  States,  Soviet 
Union, foreign policy and the international system prevalent in the literature. 
The origins of the Cold War as shown in this chapter have been interpreted in a 
myriad  of ways.   The schools diverge on which actor  has none agency hence 
responsibility (was the Soviet Union the sole responsible or the United States), 
which events were more defining (was the Marshall Plan the trigger or the coup in 
Czechoslovakia), which factors played an important role (were the Soviet Union 
and/or United states motivated by economy, ideology or national interests). These 
schools  approach  the  fact  of  the  “Cold  War”  with  its  established  perimeters, 
characterizations and periodizations and attempt to analyse why it  came about. 
The differences are in the way they define the international system, the state, how 
national interests are formed and to what degree individuals played a role but all 
of these schools accept  and reproduce the “Cold War” as unquestionable.  The 
schools ascribe to the main Western characterizations and periodizations. Even if 
the revisionists and post-revisionist accounts treat the Soviet Union as a multi-
dimensional  actor  the  story  is  predominantly  told  from the  perspective  of  the 
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United States, through concepts prioritized by the West, and periodizations that 
are embedded into the Western historiography. The differences in the narratives 
between  the  traditionalist  and  revisionist  schools  is  based  primarily  on  their 
differing interpretations of American foreign policy.  Their understanding of the 
Cold War is directly linked to their  understanding of American foreign policy. 
Thus,  the  narrative  configuration  of  the  Cold  War  are  directly  linked  to 
Eurocentric conception of world politics. It fits within the narrative of European 
balance  of  power  political  history. The  pericentric  school  attempts  to  break 
through this dominance by telling the stories of the other countries involved such 
as  the  Soviet  Union,  Great  Britain,  and  France  exploring  their  histories  and 
ascribing  them  much  more  agency.  These  narratives  are  embedded  into  the 
Western narrative rather than question it. Furthermore, in pericentrist accounts the 
idea of an already defined international system is present. There is a eurocentrist 
international  system  that  is  taken  as  a  given  and  Soviet  Union’s  actions  are 
analysed  within  it.  Hence,  the  recurring  theme  that  the  Soviet  Union  acted 
compulsively with Turkey and pushed the limits that had been established by the 
Anglo-American narrative of the international system. 
This  chapter  has  provided  the  main  boundaries  of  the  narrative  terrain  when 
discussing the ‘Cold War’. The next chapter will analyse the main narratives that 
permeate the Turkish story of the Cold War and how they enable Turkish stories 
embedded into the main Cold War narrative.
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CHAPTER IV: RE/PRODUCING THE 
‘COLD WAR’
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the ways in which the narrative configuration 
of  the  Cold  War  was  reproduced  in  the  non-Western  context.  The  previous 
chapter outlined the historical operations over the Cold War. Three points need to 
be  underlined  with  respect  to  the  narrative  configurations.  Firstly,  that  the 
narrative schema of the Cold War is based on a Eurocentric conception of world 
politics. Secondly, the different interpretations on the Cold War still tell the story 
of American foreign policy. It is the different interpretations of American foreign 
policy that are reflected in the different schools of ‘Cold War’ historiography. 
Thirdly,  even though the “pericentric” tradition concentrating on the stories of 
other actors has been able to bring forth their experiences but only at the expense 
of embedding these stories into the Cold War narrative. These studies as discussed 
in the previous chapter narrate how these states played a role in the coming about 
of the Cold War and do not use these stories to challenge the main narrative of the 
Cold War. As it gives agency to the actors it also takes it away from them. These 
states become crucial  actors in  the Western-centric  story but  unable to have a 
meta-narrative  story  of  their  own.  These  points  demonstrate  the  necessity  for 
decentering history and historiography in order to decenter the field of IR. These 
understandings and narrative configurations are not only reproduced and become 
defining features at the center but are reproduced in the non-western context as 
well.  Thus, an important part of decentering the manner in which knowledge is 
produced and disseminated is to focus on the non-Western context and ask how 
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are the narrative configurations and historiographical operations reproduced in the 
non-Western context. 
This chapter will focus upon Turkey’s historiography on the Cold War and how it 
has  reproduced  the  historiographical  operation  on  the  Cold  War.  This 
historiographical operation is not only reproduced as a result of imposition of the 
West but was also a result of the way in which these operations were part of the  
westernization  and  democratization  narrative  that  were  embedded  into  the 
Western-centric story. Thus, it needs to be underlined that this editing out was not 
forced but was readily accepted as it fit the ‘western’ and ‘democratizing’ idea of 
Turkey that was being re/produced. This chapter is divided into five parts. The 
first part will provide an outline that will help contextualize the idea of Turkey 
that was being re/defined and re/produced. The next section will proceed to the 
historiographical analysis. This section is divided into four parts; Turkish foreign 
policy,  relations  with  the  United  States,  Straits  Issue,  and the  Cold  War.  The 
Turkish  foreign  policy  section  will  analyze  the  literature  on  general  Turkish 
foreign policy in order to ascertain the dominant understanding of Turkish foreign 
policy. How is Turkish foreign policy conceptualized, how are its “interests” and 
“threats” to it defined within the literature. The second section concentrating on 
relations with the United States and on the manner in which the United States and 
Turkey’s relations with it have been narrated in the literature. The third section 
discusses the way in which the Straits Issue has been narrated. Straits issue is an 
integral part of the “Cold War” narrative of the Turkish story and as such how it is 
defined and understood is a central part of the manner in which Turkish foreign 
policy was narrated.  The last  section  focuses  on how the Cold  War has  been 
narrated. This section demonstrates how the narratives of the previous sections 
come together to embed Turkey’s story into the American narrative.  The Cold 
War narrative,  the U.S. alliance narrative and Straits  narrative reifies Turkey’s 
dominant narrative of westernization, democratization and modernization. 
II. CONTEXTUALIZING ‘TURKEY’
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In  order  to  comprehend  the  discussion  on  Turkish  foreign  policy  a  brief 
introductory discussion on Turkish domestic context is necessary. Most accounts 
of Turkish historiography take the year 1923, the establishment of the Republic, 
as a demarcation line that underlines the advent of a new era. As a consequence, 
the pre-1923 is  an era  of  corruption,  backwardness  and decadence  that  is  left 
behind with the establishment  of the Republic.  This insistence on a break has 
come under increasing criticism and continuities with the Ottoman Empire are 
being underlined. As Poulton states;
‘this transformation can be seen as having occurred over a longer period 
than the Kemalists claim, and there were fairly solid antecedents to many 
of  Kemal’s  sweeping  reforms.  Additionally,  despite  Kemal’s  version, 
there  were  strong  links  between  him  and  the  previous  Young  Turk 
regime  since  he  had  been  a  trusted  CUP member.  This  continuity is 
further illustrated by the fact that 85 percent of the Ottoman Empire’s 
civil servants and 93 per cent of its staff officers retained their positions 
in the new republic”.363
Nonetheless,  1923 is  still  a  demarcation  line  for  any analysis  of  continuity or 
change. As Aykut Kansu states; 
‘Ignoring  the  first  two  decades  of  the  twentieth  century  helps  the 
conventional  historiography  to  maintain  the  myth  of  the  creation  of 
modern Turkey in the 1920s. [This] perpetuated the belief that it was the 
First  World  War  that  finally  terminated  the  centuries-old  Ottoman 
Empire. Thus, the end of the First World War, which for reasons specific 
to  Turkey  came  not  in  1918  but  in  1923....  because,  for  'objective'  
reasons  as  well,  a  convenient  demarcation  line  for  the  current 
periodization of Turkish history.  In this 'normal' division of periods in 
Turkish history, 1923, thus, easily becomes an accepted date for both the 
pro and con arguments for the continuity versus discontinuity thesis”.364
Hence,  even  though  discussion  has  begun  on  the  issue  of  to  what  extent  the 
establishment of the Republic can be considered a clean break the literature is still 
determined by classifications, categorizations and characterizations that form the 
dominant narrative of the development of the Turkish state. How this narrative 
formed and established itself is an important point because it also influences the 
narratives  of  foreign  policy  and  the  embeddedness  into  a  Eurocentric 
conceptualization of foreign policy.
The  road  that  would  be  taken  was  far  from  being  certain  when  the  War  of 
363  Hugh  Poulton,  Top  Hat,  Grey  Wolf  and  crescent:  Turkish  nationalism  and  the  Turkish  
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Independence ended and the decisions; political battles and the ensuing clashes 
were decisive in formulating the nature of the state and definition of the nation.365 
Hence, the declaration of the Republic on 29 October 1923 was taken when the 
more  ‘conservative’  elements  of  the  Independence  War  such  as  Ali  Fuat 
(Cebesoy),  Adnan (Adivar)  and Kazim (Karabekir)  were  not  in  Ankara.  Even 
though they protested afterwards mainly arguing that establishment of a Republic 
and a democracy were not essentially the same,366 they had been left with a  fait  
accompli. There were different opinions and views for the future of the newly 
established state that competed. One of these factions established the Progressive 
Republican  Party  in  1924.  Even  though  there  was  no  difference  between  the 
Progressive Republican Party and the Republican People's Party with respect to 
secularism  and  nationalism  they  did  differ  in  their  endorsement  for  more 
‘decentralization, separation of powers and evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change.367 The life-span of the opposition party was short due to the manner in 
which the government reacted to the rebellions.368 As a response to the rebellions, 
the government passed the Law on the Maintenance of Order establishing martial 
law but the measures taken went beyond suppressing the rebellions and extended 
to other areas such as closing down periodicals and newspapers. These events also 
led to the closing down of the Progressive Republican Party.  The situation got 
more complicated when a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal was discovered and 
although their direct involvement could not be proven, members of the PRP were 
arrested.369 The suppression of the Kurds, the elimination of the opposition and the 
establishment  of  the  radical  and  revolutionary  laws  paved  the  way  for  the 
establishment of a reactionary, highly authoritarian government with an extremely 
censored definition of secularism and nationalism that established the dominant 
narrative for decades  to come.  Mustafa Kemal provided the main story of the 
Turkish republic in his 36 hours speech Nutuk where he presented a narrative of 
events from 1919 to 1927. More importantly,  Nutuk  was “a vindication of the 
365 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis’te Muhalefet (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1994); Ilk Meclis’in  
Vekilleri: Milli Mucadele Doneminde Secimler (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2010); Tek Parti’nin  
Yukselisi (Istanbul:  Iletisim  Yayinlari,  2012);  Tek  Parti’nin  Iktidari:  Turkiye’de  Secimler  ve  
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purges  of  1925-26 and  criticizing  the  former  leaders  of  the  PRP is  the  main 
theme’ where the narrative ‘presents them throughout as doubters, incompetent 
and  traitors,  and  depicts  himself  as  the  one  who  led  the  movement  from the 
outset”.370 The periodizations used in the narrative demonstrate this point more 
clearly.  Mustafa  Kemal  takes  May  1919  when  he  arrived  in  Anatolia  as  the 
starting  date  for  the  commencement  of  the  Independence  Struggle  which 
integrates him as the central character to the story leaving out the important roles 
played  by  personalities  such  as  Kazim  Karabekir  before  and  after.  Hence, 
according  to  this  presentation  of  events  the  Independence  struggle  starts  with 
Mustafa Kemal in 1919 and the events, resistances and policies beforehand are 
ignored. Furthermore, the congress of 1927 where Mustafa Kemal delivered his 
speech was called the ‘Second congress of the RPP’ even though it was not. It was 
called the second because the RPP adopted the Sivas Congress in 1919 as its first 
congress embedding the Party within the independence struggle and associating 
itself with that period completely.  
The  1927  Congress  established  the  dominant  narrative  of  the  history  of  the 
Independence  and  establishment  of  the  Republic.  Furthermore,  in  the  1931 
Congress  the  main  ideological  components  were  outlined  as:  republicanism, 
secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism. The one-party state 
was officially declared.  Secularism was not only interpreted as a separation of 
state and religion but as the complete control of religion by the state. With respect 
to nationalism, a series of national myths were created in the 1930s in an attempt 
to construct a national identity.371 Statism was a policy that aimed to establish the 
predominance of the state in the economy.  Revolutionarism aimed to continue 
change in an evolutionary manner.  Populism was a concept that stressed national 
unity  and  solidarity  that  “entailed  a  denial  of  class  interests  (according  to 
Kemalism, Turkey did not have classes in the European sense) and a prohibition 
of  political  activity  based on class.372” These  determining precepts  formed  the 
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basis of Kemalism and even though it  does not form a coherent,  well  defined 
ideology; it does form the basis of the identity upon which the Turkish state and 
Turkish  statesmen  acted.  As  Poulton  states;  “In  this  ideology  “Turkish 
nationalism” as defined by the Kemalists was seen as a monolithic solution to all 
social,  political,  economic  and  cultural  problems.  Competing  variants  of 
“nationalism”  -  whether  pan-Turkist  or  Islamic  in  inspiration  -  were 
proscribed”.373 It should be underlined that this identity is constantly reproduced 
and redefined and does not remain stable across time and space.
This narrative provides an important understanding of the state and the nation that 
was defined in the early years of the Republic. The historiography has embedded 
these principles of Kemalism within the narrative making the Independence War 
as always being about the establishment of a Turkish nation state and Mustafa 
Kemal and his entourage aiming to establish a modern, western and secular state. 
As Kansu states;
“In Kemalist  ideology,  Ataturk and the Republican People's  Party are 
portrayed  as  modernizers  and  'revolutionaries'  who  provided  for  the 
political, social and economic development - or, even, transformation - 
of Turkey'. Furthermore, 'all political struggle between the Kemalists and 
their opponents in the 1920s is portrayed as a struggle between the forces 
of modernity as against those of religious reaction”.374’
Although these narratives and principles have increasingly been challenged in the 
past  years,375 during  the  period  1945-50  their  dominance  was  unquestionable. 
Hence,  the  first  point  to  underline  about  the  period  1945-50  with  respect  to 
domestic politics is the fact that the state and government was governed by many 
of  the  same  leaders  that  were  present  in  the  establishment  of  the  dominant 
narrative and Kemalism such as President Ismet Inonu.  Despite this, the period 
also witnessed drastic changes in the political system of Turkey. The period with 
respect  to  domestic  politics  is  generally  characterized  as  ‘Transition  to 
Democracy’.376 Even though the notion of democracy can be questioned it was a 
period  of  change  where  there  was a  transition  to  multi-party  politics.  Yet  the 
periodization  of  1945-1950  overlooks  that  criticism  with  the  policies  of  the 
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government  and state  reforms had existed beforehand-  Influential  personalities 
such as  Celal  Bayar,  Tevfik  Rustu Aras,  Riza  Soyak  had started  meeting  and 
discussing their criticisms of the government. The criticisms became more overt 
after the end of the war when on the 7th of June (1945) a list of demands were 
presented by Celal  Bayar,  Adnan Menderes,  Refik Koraltan  and Fuat Koprulu 
called the “Statement of Four”. The demands were mainly the democratization of 
the system. This statement was followed by a debate in the press that was started 
by Fuat Koprulu and Adnan Menderes who were criticizing the policies of the 
government. When the People’s Party to which they were apart of asked them to 
retract their statements, Koprulu and Menderes refused and were expelled from 
the Party.  Celal  Bayar  handed his resignation not long after and on 7 January 
1946, Bayar,  Menderes, Koprulu and Koraltan announced the formation of the 
Democrat  Party.  Even though this  move  and the process  of  liberalization  that 
started  after  the  war  signalled  the  emergence  of  a  democracy  it  should  be 
underlined that Celal Bayar announced the formation of the new Party only after 
getting  the  approval  of  Inonu  and  the  programme  of  the  new  party  did  not 
demonstrate considerable differences from that of the People’s Party especially 
with  respects  to  the  main  tenets  of  Kemalism.  The programme  demanded  the 
achievement of ‘democracy’ but “it was not widely different from the platform of 
the  People’s  Party,  offering  more  a  difference  of  emphasis  than  a  complete 
alternative”.377 
The 1946 elections witnessed a myriad of political parties not just the Democrat 
Party and People’s Party. The Turkish Socialist Party and the Socialist Workers 
and Peasant Party of Turkey also participated in the elections but did not win any 
seats in the Parliament. The People’s Party won 395 seats and the Democrat Party 
won 66 seats. The ensuing debates centered on whether or not the People’s Party 
had tampered with the election process and the Democrat Party and the People’s 
Party started to argue bitterly in and outside the Parliament each side accusing the 
other  of  ‘leftist  sympathies’  and  ‘treacherous  intentions’  which  resulted  in  a 
deadlock of the political system. Inonu intervened with the 12 July Declaration 
where he stated that;
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‘The opposition will be secure and accept that the ruling party does not 
have  intentions  of  stifling  it.  The  ruling  party  will  accept  that  the 
opposition is not thinking of anything but its legal rights….To overcome 
problems  I  want  the  sincere  assistance  of  the  administration  and 
opposition leaders directing our political life. In my opinion the one and 
a  half  year  experiment  we  have  passed  was  difficult  and  sometimes 
disappointing; but it  also has assured the success  of all  hopes for the 
future. It  is the obligation of both the ruling and opposition parties to 
protect  and  develop  these  conditions….An  opposition  party  working 
with a legal  political  party’s  methods must be assured that  the ruling 
party will work under the same conditions”.378
The  July  Declaration  calmed  down  the  political  scene  and  brought  forth  the 
differences within the Democrat Party.  Kenan Oner, Fevzi Cakmak and Hikmet 
Baydur left  the Democrat  Party and set  up the Nation Party in July 1948. The 
programme of the Nation Party demonstrated a greater difference with the People’s 
Party and “advocated the replacement of statism with economic liberalism, better 
relations  with  Muslim  countries  and  the  end  of  government  interference  in 
religious  affairs”.379 The discussions surrounding Turkey receiving aid from the 
Marshall  Plan demonstrate the manner in which the parties situated themselves. 
The main issue of contention between the People’s Party and Democrat Party was 
not whether or not Turkey should receive the aid but that the People’s Party was 
not being convincing enough. Hence, no real difference existed with respect to the 
assumption that a closer relation with the West and especially the United States 
was necessary.380
The  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Economic  Assistance  created  criticisms  mainly 
because the Treaty established guidelines about how the aid should be spent. The 
Nation  Party  protested  to  the  close  relationship  with  America  on  nationalist 
grounds  and  argued  that  national  sovereignty  was  being  threatened  and 
capitulations  were  being  brought  back.  The  most  ardent  criticisms  came  from 
intellectuals such as Sabahattin Ali who stated, “the major powers are intriguing to 
divide up the small nations. This is the way to a third world war. Against this the 
small  nations  must  unite  to  create  a  balance  against  the  major  states”.381 The 
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Socialist  Parties  had already been closed  down in  1946 and those  intellectuals 
branded as ‘leftists’ and who openly criticized the foreign policy decisions of the 
government  came under increasing pressure.  In March 1947 students at  Ankara 
University  burned  copies  of  MarkoPasa  and  in  1948  Professors  Pertev  Naili 
Boratav,  Niyazi  Berkez  and  Behice  Boran  were  tried  for  threatening  national 
security and spreading communist ideas. The intellectuals mostly left the country 
or were pushed to the fringes of the political arena.382 
As a consequence,  the political  space and the opinions voiced within it became 
increasingly limited and the difference among the parties was nearly impossible to 
find.  The  main  narratives  and  ideological  tenets  continue  to  dominate  Turkish 
politics. One exception was the manner in which the issue of religion had become 
part of the political debate. One reason for it was the demand coming from the 
populace  and the  parties  used  this  demand  as  a  tool  to  acquire  votes  but  also 
religion was seen as a way to counter godless communism. Despite this the issue of 
secularism was unchallenged; it was rather the extent of the control that was being 
discussed rather than the underlying assumptions of the Kemalist ideology. Hence, 
the main tenets of Kemalist ideology were being discussed and modified such as 
statism (a more liberal economic stance was being adopted) and secularism (the 
state would still control religion but there would be more options such as religious 
education in schools) but no other alternative narrative or worldview was allowed.
III. NARRATIONS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
This  section  will  provide  an  overview  of  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  literature 
concentrating on how it deals with the Cold War, what the dominant narratives, 
ways of talking about, characterising and comprehending the period of 1945-1950 
is. The aim is to establish the general narratives about Turkish foreign policy; 
what are the dominant ways of explaining it, which motivations are attached to it. 
This  will  demonstrate  how  the  Cold  War  story  could  be  embedded  into  the 
narrative of Turkish foreign policy. The agency of Turkey is overlooked and it is 
382 For more information on these events see: Mete Cetik, Universitede Cadi Kazani: 1948 DTCF 
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narrated  as  a  tool  in  the  great  power  game  as  the  Cold  War  explanation  of 
bipolarity  is  entrenched  reifying  Turkey’s  quest  for  democratization  and 
westernization. There is no Cold War literature per se within the Turkish foreign 
policy literature.  The literature  can  be  classified  into  three.  First ;  the  general 
Turkish foreign policy works that deal with the period in passing embedding the 
events within the general narrative of Turkish foreign policy concentrating mainly 
on the continuity of the process of westernization and modernization. Hence, the 
period  1945-50  becomes  a  road  towards  completing  Turkey’s  ‘inevitable’ 
modernization  that  had  commenced  on  1923  with  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic. Second, the regional or bilateral works that concentrates on relations 
with the United States, Soviet Union, the Middle East or Europe. These works 
touch upon the period as demonstrating the nature of the relations with the state or 
region under  scrutiny.  As  such the  period  becomes  an  example  of  how close 
relations were established or why relations could not be maintained. The third is 
the  Cold  War  related  books  that  concentrate  on  specific  events  within  the 
mentioned time-frame. Although these works do manage to avoid generalizations 
that  exist  in  the  prior  two  ‘schools’,  they  nonetheless  reinforce  the  general 
narratives about Turkish foreign policy and the Cold War.
This section will  not analyse  all  the works on Turkish foreign policy but  will 
rather provide an overview of the main characteristics and narratives prevalent in 
the  literature.  The  dominant  narratives  of  this  literature  as  will  be  underlined 
below are the ‘realistic’  nature of Turkish foreign policy;  the continuity of the 
Russian threat dating back to the 19th century, the westernization/modernization 
narrative whereby Turkey’s alliance with the ‘West’ is portrayed as a fulfillment 
of its destiny and fundamental aims; and the lack of choice available to Turkey 
given the bipolar  structure of the Cold War.  These are  the main narratives  of 
Turkish foreign policy as will be seen in the next section.  Furthermore,  these 
narratives reify the dominant Cold War explanation that was embedded into the 
Turkish foreign policy. As such, the Eurocentric conception of world politics and 
the international is reproduced in these narratives.
Yasemin Celik’s book Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy is representative of 
general foreign policy works that also discuss the period. Celik argues that “in the 
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aftermath of World War II and the formation of a bipolar international system, 
foreign policy decision-making in Turkey became largely defined by the role that 
Ankara played in the international system”.383 She presents a systemic analysis 
whereby the actions, foreign policy decisions of the actor are determined by the 
nature  of  the  international  system  and  she  argues  that  “the  structure  of  the 
international system was such an important factor in determining Turkish foreign 
policy,  changes in this structure were bound to alter  the way in which Turkey 
interacted with other states”.384 Conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy decision-
making in a manner directly linking it to the nature of the international system 
prescribes  a  certain  degree  of  inevitability.  Actions  were  determined  by  the 
international system hence no room for manoeuvre existed. Furthermore,  Celik 
defines  the  international  system  in  such  a  way  that  precludes  any  choice  on 
Turkey’s part when she states that “The United States had emerged from World 
War II as the strongest major power, and the Soviet Union soon became its ardent 
enemy. It was becoming clear to many nations in the world that they could not 
maintain cordial relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union now 
that the world had been divided into two opposing camps”.385 The Cold War is 
presented as a fact of life that does not require much debate in and of itself. It 
happened,  it  started  and  Turkey  found  herself  in  it.  No  further  discussion  is 
presented  on  how  it  occurred  or  commenced,  rather  the  bipolar  structure 
presenting no choice to any nation in the world becomes established. According to 
this definition “Turkey did not have a great deal of choice as to which side it 
should  ally  with  because  Joseph  Stalin’s  desire  to  establish  control  over  the 
Turkish Straits as well as his claims to the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan 
soon after the end of the war convinced Turkish politicians that their neighbor to 
the northwest was not only hostile but expansionist as well”.386 
The narrative of the Turkish predicament is one of inevitability for according to 
the manner in which events are presented Turkey did not have a choice but to 
align with the United States and the West. This becomes an inevitable deduction 
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once the only definition provided for the Cold War is of a bipolar structure that 
one had to choose sides in, and the Soviet Union is defined as having expansionist 
aims towards Turkey, the obvious choice became the United States. According to 
this  narrative,  “Turkey  would  only  be  able  to  avert  Moscow’s  demands  if  it 
formed in close alliance with the only other superpower, the United States”.387 
Celik defines foreign policy in Turkey as being based on realism and continuity 
and argues that “decision-making in Turkey had been defined by continuity and 
consensus:  despite  bitter  partisan  fights  among  politicians  on  domestic  issues, 
there  had  been  an  implicit  agreement  that  international  commitments  extend 
beyond change in party government”.388 The conclusions that can be drawn from 
the above arguments is that the Cold War started and Turkey acted in a ‘realistic’ 
fashion in concluding an alliance with the West.
William  Hale  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy,  1774-2000  discusses  the  main 
characteristics  of Turkish foreign policy starting from the Ottoman period.  He 
argues that “Ottoman statesmen had evidently recognized that the empire could 
not  win  a  war  for  territory  with  the  major  European  powers  unless  it  was 
supported by one or more of the others” and “had to consider how to exploit the 
international  situation  to  their  advantage”.389 As  a  consequence,  Ottoman 
statesmen either had “to avoid both conflicts and form alliances …… relying on 
the workings of the balance of power to pressure the status quo” or “could try to 
negotiate  a  reasonably  stable  alliance  with  one  or  more  of  the  European 
powers”.390 Ottoman statesman decided to enter into an alliance and “Russia was 
identified  as  the  most  serious  foe,  since  it  was  best  placed  to  launch  a  land 
invasion of Ottoman territory, had an assured interest in gaining control of or at 
least  free  passage  through  the  straits,  and  presented  itself  as  the  patron  and 
protector of the Sultan’s Orthodox Christian subjects”.391 Hence, starting in the 
19th century Russia is located as the enemy and one against whom alliance will be 
formed.
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With respect to the Second World War, Hale argues that “Turkey remained  de 
facto  neutral power throughout the war, resisting pressure from both the Allies 
and Germany to join the war on their  side”.392 According to  this  narrative,  “a 
crucial concern for Turkey was the policy of the Soviet Union and its relations 
with  the  belligerents”393 which  was  exasperated  with  Operation  Barborossa 
whereby Britain and the Soviet Union became allies. Hale discusses the “Straits 
question”  and  provides  examples  from  the  Yalta  and  Potsdam  conferences 
whereby Britain had agreed to Soviet suggestions on the necessity to change the 
Montreux Convention.394  He states  that  “Western opposition to  Stalin  on this 
issue did not explode at the first post-war meeting of the “Big Three”, held at 
Potsdam”.395 Yet, he does not discuss how policymakers in the United States and 
Britain changed their minds. According to this narrative, Turkey “was virtually 
bound  to  seek  a  place  in  the  Western  alliance”396 because  “it  was  directly 
threatened by the Soviet Union”.397  Turkey’s actions are given inevitability within 
this narrative whereby “for the Turks, the most important feature of the post-war 
world, was its bipolarity,  and the fact that the United States and Soviet Union 
were the only two players who really mattered. Hence, Turkey was unable to play 
one European power off against another in a fluid and usually temporary pattern 
of alliances and rivalries. In effect, the range of Turkey’s options was far more 
limited than it had been during the early period. It could not opt out of the Cold 
War”.398 Hale’s narrative ascribes inevitability to Turkey’s positioning within the 
Cold War because of the bipolar structure of the conflict  as a consequence of 
which Turkey’s  manoeuvring was limited.  Furthermore,  the narrative does not 
base itself on a theoretical explanation but a general narrative of events. 
Bozdaglioglu in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish identity adopts a constructivist 
approach to analysing Turkish foreign policy. He argues that Turkey “constitutes 
a unique case study to assess the validity of the constructivist perspective” since 
“Turkey holds a special place in the international system because “it is on the very 
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borderlines between “North versus South” and “East versus West” and among 
different civilizations: the Muslim, Middle Eastern and the Western”.399 Such a 
narrative reinforces Turkey’s exceptionalism narrative because of its geopolitical 
location.400 The aim of the work as stated is to uncover why Turkey “throughout 
its  history,  fully  identified  itself  with  the  West”.401 This  approach  attempts  to 
question the basis of the Turkish identity that was constructed after the Turkish 
War of Independence  based on a specific  understanding of modernization  that 
“was a  project  of  embracing and internalizing  all  the  cultural  dimensions  that 
made Europe modern”.402 The definition of the national identity in that manner 
manifested in the foreign policy aims of the new state as the aim to become part of 
the European civilization. As a consequence, “for Turkish political leaders, being 
accepted as European had an utmost  importance because it  would confirm the 
success  of Kemalist  reforms”.403 It  is  within this  framework that  Bozdaglioglu 
discusses relations  with the United States  and the Cold War by stating,  “after 
Ataturk’s  death  in  1939,  his  successors  took further  steps  to  make  Turkey an 
actual ally of the West. This process began in 1939 with the tripartite agreement 
between Turkey, Britain and France, developed further after World War II when 
Turkey joined NATO, the Council of Europe and other Western organizations”.404 
Hence, the events that led to the onset of the Cold War and Turkey’s alliances are 
seen to be the natural expressions of the Westernization project that Turkey had 
embarked upon at its inception.  Furthermore, he argues that Turkey’s “alliance” 
continued even when Turkey’s “national interests” were perceived to be at stake 
and “uncompromising  devotion to  the West  and Western  institutions  persisted 
even when the  advantages  and disadvantages  of  these  institutions  to  Turkey’s 
national interest were seriously questioned in the country”.405 Even though “the 
strong anti-West campaign in Turkey in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis and the 
Johnson  letter  was  soon  followed  by  demands  that  Turkey  should  revise  its 
foreign  policy”  and “that  Turkey should  withdraw from NATO and  pursue  a 
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“neutral” foreign policy”,406 she did not completely abandon the “alliance” but 
“tried to diversify her foreign policy only within the Western camp. As a result, 
Turkey intensified her relations with the European Union. There was consensus 
among  the  major  Turkish  political  parties  that  while  in  power,  none  of  them 
would consider to cut off Turkey’s relations with the United States and NATO”.407
According  to  this  narrative,  Turkey’s  national  identity  is  predicated  on  an 
understanding of modernization interchangeably linked to Westernization and its 
foreign policy is a manifestation of this will  to emulate  and integrate  with the 
“West.” Hence, the choices available to Turkish statesmen had been defined and 
limited by the manner in which the Turkish nation had been conceptualized as a 
result  of  which  Turkey’s  alliance  with  the  “West” was inevitable  because  the 
over-arching guiding principle of Westernization was a determining factor. Such a 
narrative ascribes continuity to Turkish foreign policy making whereby the aims 
and motivations have not altered and rather than explain how such an identity has 
been maintained for over half a century, it is taken as a constant that can not be 
challenged.   Were  there  alternatives  to  these  dominant  conceptualizations? 
Bozdaglioglu argues that aspirations to establish a “Western” identity had been 
adopted by the policy-making elite of the newly established Turkish republic. Yet, 
he does not discuss whether at the origins of this process alternative identities and 
conceptualizations of the nation existed and why and how they lost the battle to 
establish dominance.
What this narrative edits  out is the competing Westernizations,  modernizations 
and  democratizations  and  the  continuing  debate  within  the  domestic  context 
defines the international. Within Bozdaglioglu’s narrative the story of the origins 
is  a  one-dimensional  tale  of  Westernization,  which  he  starts  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire “when European started to defeat the Ottoman army, Ottoman statesmen 
sent  missions  to  Europe and opened embassies  in  various  Western  capitals  in 
order to understand the West’s military superiority”.408 This engagement with the 
West “increased in the second half of the nineteenth century and by the end of the 
century,  many  Western  laws  and  practices  had  been  adopted  and  a  basically 
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secular education system was established”.409 As such, “The Kemalist revolution 
that  began  in  the  1920s  was  the  radical  and  inevitable  result  of  these 
modernization  and  Westernization  efforts  that  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  been 
undergoing for almost a century”.410 Yet, the Kemalist project differed from the 
Ottoman one because “the Kemalist reforms sought to completely abolish the old 
ones. It was not confined to only science and technology; it aimed at creating a 
new state, a new society, and an individual in line with those of the ‘West’”.411 To 
sum up;
“For the Kemalist elite there existed only one civilization, and it meant 
European civilization. If Turkish society was to modernize, it would do 
so  in  every  aspect  of  social,  political  and  cultural  life.  The  most 
important implication of this thinking was the exclusion of Islam from 
the definition of the state. In the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the basis of 
state  legitimacy  and  the  source  of  individual  identification.  The 
republican elite – in their efforts to create a national and secular state, 
sought to cut the ties linking the society and individual to the Ottoman 
past and the Islamic Eastern civilization by completely discarding Islam 
from the  public  sphere.  There  was  only  one  civilization,  which  was 
superior to Eastern civilization, and Turkey had to be a part of it in order 
to survive. This policy in turn led to the suppression of other identities, 
mainly ethnic and religious, and exclusion from the political process”.412
Yet this exclusionary process is not discussed, and the narrative proceeds on the 
assumption  that  westernization  became  the  dominant  agent  of  identification. 
According to this narrative,  challenges to the dominant  identity in the form of 
Islamism appear in the 1960s, which rise to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s in 
tandem with the disintegration of the Soviet Union creating divisions within the 
society  that  manifested  itself  with  debates  about  national  identity  and foreign 
policy.  Bozdaglioglu  states  “the  debate  revolved  around  national  identity,  the 
definition  of  national  interest,  and  the  kind  of  political,  economic,  and  social 
system that Turkey should adopt. In the course of these debates, basic decision 
regarding  Turkey’s  foreign  policy  (defense  and  national  security)  became 
inextricably intertwined with the national identity of Turkey”.413 According to this 
narrative, alternative conceptions of Turkish identity and foreign policy making 
appeared whereby
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 “the Kemalist elite, Turkey should stay with the West and try to gain 
recognition as a European state. For Islamists, Turkey cannot be a part of 
Europe because it  belongs to a different  civilization.  Instead,  Turkey 
should ally with other Muslim countries in the Middle East. Nationalists, 
on the other hand, argue that Turkey, without a radical departure from its 
West-oriented foreign policy,  should pay more attention to the Turkic 
republics and play a leadership role in the region”.414
Bozdaglioglu presents these “alternatives” as self-exclusionary and diametrically 
opposed to each other. Furthermore, he does not provide an explanation as to how 
various  alternatives  might  have  existed in  the 1930s,  1940s and 1950s.  These 
periods are, in this narrative,  unquestionably defined by the westernization and 
modernization project. The Cold War itself becomes a manifestation of a foreign 
policy orientation rooted in modernization. Furthermore, the Cold War becomes a 
vehicle for Turkey’s acceptance by the West whereby “it was in the context of the 
Cold War that Turkey was able to establish close relations with the West”.415 As a 
consequence, Turkey’s role as a ‘Western’ state is questioned once the Cold War 
ends  both  internally  and  externally.  Bozdaglioglu  ascribes  to  a  traditionalist 
narrative  of  Cold War periodization  whereby the period of  the  ‘Cold War’  as 
accepted, 1945- 1990, is a period where the main assumptions of westernization, 
modernization and alliance with the United States are not radically questioned. 
The period is taken to be unproblematic with respect to identity of Turkey as a 
nation-state and as an actor in the international  system. This changes with the 
‘end’  when the  balance  of  power  alterations  in  the  international  system force 
Turkey to enter into a process where it has to redefine its national identity and 
foreign policy aims to reflect  the realities of the newly emerging international 
order. 
Bozdaglioglu’s  analysis  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  can  be  characterized  as  a 
“genealogy  of  continuity”  whereby  he  brings  forward  the  discourse  of 
westernization,  modernization  and  Turkey’s  ‘exceptional’  status  in  the 
international  system  as  a  country  who  inhabits  a  space  at  the  intersection  of 
North/South  and  East/West  divisions.  This  narrative  obscures  the  ruptures, 
divisions and alternatives that existed within the time-frame under consideration 
and presents a linear story of Turkey’s alliance with the West. The ‘Cold War’ is 
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presented as a period where Westernization, Turkey’s orientations, its motivations 
are  hardly criticized.  The same is  valid  for  when Bozdaglioglu  discusses  how 
westernization became the dominant identifier for Turkey, he does not discuss the 
alternatives of this identifier  and whether or not the alternatives being silenced 
meant their non-existence or them being pushed to the fringes.
Bostanoglu  presents  an  analysis  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  and  Turkey-  U.S. 
relations  based  on  critical  international  theory  mainly  based  on  the  works  of 
Robert Cox in The Politics of Turkey-US Relations.  She adopts Cox’s definition 
of hegemony as “ a value system that permeates the entire international system” 
and  is  maintained  by  “legitimating  practices  and  ideologies”.416 According  to 
Bostanoglu,  post-Second  World  War  period  can  be  best  comprehended  as 
America’s  establishment  of  hegemony  whereby  the  “administration  had 
determined that American aims for a global role were threatened and declared the 
Soviets  and  communist  parties  who  started  expansionist  policies  in  Eastern 
Europe as enemies of humanity”.417  It was not communism per se that was their 
concern but “they made war with communism the centre of U.S. policies in order 
to get what  they wanted from Congress and the allies”.418 With respect  to  the 
Truman  Doctrine,  Bostanoglu  states,  “even  though  the  Truman  Doctrine  was 
about containing the Soviet Union, economic considerations also played a role”.419 
Bostanoglu’s  arguments  about  the Cold War and policies  such as the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are based on a revisionist, specifically the Kolko 
variation, analysis of the Cold War. Hence, for Bostanoglu, “Yalta, is where U.S. 
and Soviet Union divided the world into their hegemonic zones”.420
With  respect  to  Turkey,  Bostanoglu  states  “in  this  period,  Turkey  assumed  a 
pivotal role in US policy to contain the Soviet Union, and assumed her role in US 
hegemonic  system with  the  Truman  doctrine  and the  Marshall  Plan”.421 Thus, 
within the hegemonic system that America was establishing Turkey was a willing 
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participant because “Turkey identified her interests with the Cold war and with 
being on the US camp. The basis of her diplomacy from the Truman Doctrine to 
participating in the Korean War, from recognizing Israel to entering NATO, was a 
willingness to demonstrate her loyalty to the US alliance system”.422 One of the 
main reasons for this compulsion to side with the West was “the internal desire 
Turkey had for development and the need for American aid to realize this played a 
pivotal role in Ankara willingly entering the international system the US created 
and  led”.423 As  such,  Bostanoglu  argues  “Turkey  being  situated  within  the 
American hegemony was due to Turkish foreign policy being guided by a Realist 
search for security”424 yet  unlike the literature in general she narrates this as a 
negative  attribute  that  caused  “[Turkish  foreign  policy]  into  a  predicament 
whereby  it  had  or  perceived  had  no  alternative”.425  Bostanoglu  provides  the 
example of the Bandung Conference, where she states that Turkey’s attitude “had 
alienated the Third World who was attempting to convert non-alignment into a 
political movement” by “defending the Western bloc, NATO and had argued that 
non-alignment meant being swallowed like Czechoslovakia”.426 With respect to 
the Korean War, she argues “they saw participation in the Korean War as “the 
only  alternative”  to  getting  accepted  into  the  NATO”.427 As  such  the  “realist 
perspective was dominant in Turkey’s evaluation of the Korean issue. Turkey’s 
decision reflected  considerations  of the balance  of  power and how they could 
counter  the  Soviet  threat  by  joining  the  US  security  system”.428 Bostanoglu 
considers the post-Second World War alignment of Turkey inevitable because of 
the  manner  in  which  Turkey  in  analyzing  the  international  system  in  realist 
fashion defined the Cold War and its national interests in a certain manner. Yet 
Bostanoglu does not discuss how this definition took place and why the “realist” 
perspective  became  dominant  rather  than  other  ways  of  perceiving  the 
international system at the time or whether or not there were alternatives.
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Vanderlippe  in  The  Politics  of  Turkish  Democracy  argues  that  “since  the 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the scope of political debate had been 
narrowly defined and participation in the political  arena restricted to a limited 
group of participants, who shared similar backgrounds, experiences, and views of 
the Turkish nations, its needs and its future”.429 Vanderlippe attempts to assess “in 
what ways did Inonu pursue the Kemalist agenda, and in what ways did he move 
away from it, … to pursue his own “Inonu-ist” program”.430 The main political 
discourses  of  the  period;  “defining  and achieving  development  and programs; 
expanding  or  limiting  the  influence  of  central  bureaucracy  and  the  military; 
defining  nation  and  community,  and  establishing  beneficial  relations  with  the 
Western powers, particularly Britain, Germany and Russia, and later the United 
States”.431 Vanderlippe argues that Inonu redefined “Kemalism to suit new needs, 
and minimizes the new international and domestic challenges that arose during 
world War II and the early Cold War, and the innovation devised to deal with new 
realities”.432 As  such,  “Inonu’s  presidency  can  be  seen  as  an  intersection  in 
modern Turkish history, from which two roads could be followed. Following one 
road  would  mean  shifting  dissent  and  the  possibilities  of  any  democratic 
development,  while  the other would mean opening the system to all  voices of 
dissent and alternative views of the Turkish future”.433 At the end “the road chosen 
was  neither  the  route  to  complete  suppression  of  dissent  nor  to  truly  open, 
representative democracy. Rather it was a path of multi-party politics, a truncated 
form of democracy”434 that was formed within the 1938-1950 period. 
Turkish foreign policy is narrated as being ‘realist’ and Turkey is presented as 
acting according to its national interests. These national interests are presented as 
being  based  on  the  narrative  of  the  Republican  ideals;  a  specific  idea  of 
Westernization  and  modernization.  Furthermore,  a  continuing  theme  in  these 
accounts is the ‘inevitability’ of Turkey’s choice because of its natural inclination 
to ally with the West. The international system is presented as being ‘bipolar’ and 
the Soviet ‘threat’ leading Turkey to its natural ally;  the United States and the 
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Western security system established by it. The international order that is defined 
in  these  works  is  based  on  a  Western-centric  conception  of  the  international 
system focusing on great power politics and balance of power conceptualizations. 
The centre of the narrative is American foreign policy and Turkey’s inevitable 
need to align with the West. It presents a limited account of the international and 
reduced it to the priorities of the great powers and European state system. The 
next section will  focus on the literature dealing with relations  with the United 
States  since  within  the  period  being  discussed  United  States  became  what 
represented the West to Turkey. 
IV. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
This  section  will  focus  on  works  that  narrate  Turkey’s  relationship  with  the 
United  States.  During  the  time-period  under  question  the  West  became 
synonymous  with  the  United  States  and as  such  the  ‘international’.  Thus,  the 
narrations of the West and the international can also be discerned from the way in 
which the United States is configured into the story of Turkish foreign policy. 
George  Harris’s  book  Troubled  Alliance:  Turkish-American  problems  in  
historical  perspective,  1945-1971,435 places  the  story within the perspective  of 
bilateral  relations  between  Turkey  and  the  United  States  and  argues  that 
“conclusion  of  the  Nazi-Soviet  pact  of  1939  gave  concrete  evidence  that  the 
Kremlin had not abandoned the traditional Russian ambition to control the Black 
Sea  straits”.436 In  this  narrative  Soviet  intentions  are  presented  within  the 
continuity  of  Russian  expansionism.  Hence,  the  cause  of  the  problem  in  the 
narratives  of  Turkish  foreign  policy  is  the  age-long  Russian  expansionism. 
Furthermore,  a ‘traditionalist’  Cold War perspective is presented as the United 
States is characterised as being reactive towards Soviet actions. Harris states “In 
Washington, hopes of meaningful cooperation with the USSR had collapsed in the 
wake  of  the  unsuccessful  conference  of  foreign  ministers  in  December  1945, 
especially  as  a  result  of  Soviet  intransigence  over Iran”.437 The process  of  the 
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emerging Cold War is not given in detail and the United States is presented as an 
actor  that  attempts  to  cooperate  but  realises  that  it  is  in  vain.  Although  the 
narrative  is  one  that  pertains  to  traditional  Cold  War  historiography,  Harris 
diverges from the ‘traditionalist’ storyline when he accords Turkey much more 
agency than is done in Cold War literature. America is presented as attempting to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union and as such not realizing the danger posed by the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  concerns  presented  by  Turkey.  As  Harris  states; 
“Washington  did  not  immediately  signal  to  Moscow  American  interest  in 
Turkey’s  territorial  integrity,  lest  such  a  move  disturb  the  atmosphere  of  the 
Potsdam conference  scheduled  to  convene  in  July  1945”.438 According to  this 
narrative, the United States does not comprehend the nature of Russian actions 
and needed to be convinced. The aim of Turkey was “to bring the U.S. position on 
the  Straits  into  harmony  with  the  minimum Turkish  view and  …. to  involve 
America in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union”.439 The narrative portrays 
Turkey as an actor that actively seeks to change the mind of American decision-
makers according to which Turkey “stepped up its consultations with the United 
states, attempting to dramatize the Soviet threat, arguing that Kremlin would be 
deterred not by concessions but by firmness”.440 The traditional American foreign 
policy is adopted in discussing the way in which the United States acted within 
the  international  system.  Furthermore,  a  pericentrist  perspective  is  adopted  in 
trying to give Turkey more agency with respect to altering traditional American 
foreign policy.  Yet, even though more agency is being given the center of the 
story is still the United States and the international order it was setting up. 
George  McGhee  in  The-US-Turkish-NATO-Middle  East  Connection:  how  the  
Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s  NATO entry contained the Soviets,  as  the title 
suggests, concentrates on the regional aspects and portrays Turkey’s alliance with 
the  United  States  as  a  successful  policy  by  the  United  States  foreign  policy 
decision-makers.  He  states  that  “when  the  United  States  decided  in  1947  to 
provide Turkey with massive military assistance under the Truman Doctrine and 
in the early 1950s to help Turkey gain admission to the NATO alliance, the door 
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to a Soviet invasion of the Middle East was slammed shut”.441 Hence, the Truman 
Doctrine  is  not  only  characterized  as  aiding  Turkey  in  the  face  of  Soviet 
expansionism but also preventing Soviet expansion into the Near and Middle East. 
Furthermore, McGhee argues that “Turkey’s decision to join NATO and the West 
was not; I believe, the result of a temporary convenience or opportunism. It can 
best be described as the meeting of historical trends that were operating in both 
Turkey and the West”.442 The narrative of westernization/modernization is present 
in McGhee’s account whereby the actions and choices made by Turkey were also 
about fulfilling the project of westernization which the alliance with the ‘West’ 
was an important part of.
McGhee presents a traditionalist Cold War explanation whereby he states that “the 
West, particularly the United States, recognized after the last war the aggressive 
and  expansionist  nature  of  Soviet  communism  and  determined  to  protect 
themselves  and  the  free  world  against  it”.443 Hence,  the  United  States  reacts 
towards Soviet aggressiveness and expansionism in order to protect itself and the 
free  world.  Within  this  narrative  the  Cold  War  is  caused  by  Soviet  actions 
whereby  the  Truman  Doctrine  was  a  policy  that  succeeded  in  preventing  it. 
Furthermore, according to this narrative Turkey was included within the Truman 
Doctrine because “failure to aid Greece could convince the Turks that it would be 
less dangerous to yield to Soviet pressures, even without a direct military threat, 
than  to  try  to  resist”.444 McGhee  ascribes  to  the  traditional  American  foreign 
policy narrative and attempts to situate Turkey within that story. As such it is a 
reproduction of the Western-centric narratives of the international system.
Oral Sander’s Turkish-American relation 1947-1964, concentrates on the bilateral 
relations. Sander argues that the “Truman Doctrine was the first indicator after the 
Second World War between Western countries who wanted to continue a system 
that was destroyed 25 years ago and the Soviet Union that had no allegiance to the 
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system and interpreted it as being against themselves”.445 Hence, the definition of 
the Cold War presents a perspective more akin to the revisionist school in Cold 
War  historiography.  Rather  than  defining  America  as  reacting  to  Soviet 
aggressiveness the conflict is narrated as emanating from attempts and differences 
in defining the post-WWII international  system. He argues that the aim of the 
United States was to “contain Soviet expansionism where ever in the world and to 
ensure American economic and political expansion” hence “the Truman Doctrine 
and Marshall Plan ended the transitory phase of the ‘Cold War’”.446 The Cold War 
is presented as having been caused by American actions and policies such as the 
Truman Doctrine and Marshall  Plan that aimed to expand American economic 
interests.  The reasons for  Turkish foreign  policy decision-making  and alliance 
with the United States is listed as “Soviet threat against Turkey after the Second 
World War, the economic aid necessary for Turkey to realize development and 
westernization efforts that started with Ataturk”.447 Hence, according to Sander, 
“Moscow’s  threat  continued  in  1947 and Turkish  policy-makers  believed  that 
safety against the Soviet Union could only be maintained by Western alliance”.448
Furthermore, Sander argues that “Turkey voted in line with American policies in 
international institutions and was viewed as a speaker for the West”.449 Thus, “as a 
result  of this,  it  can be observed that  a period of coolness started in Turkey’s 
relations with Asian-African states”.450 Sander stresses the importance of Turkey’s 
relations with Asian-African states and argues that “Turkey turned her back to 
Asia not after having entered NATO during the Bandung conference in 1955 but 
much before in 1949, by not attending the Asian States Meeting held that year. 
Turkey  answered  the  invitation  by  stating  that  although  interested  in  the 
Indonesian issue, it felt it did not have the right to attend a Asian conference as a 
European state”.451 Sander’s comments have to be considered within the political 
context  in  which  he  was  writing.  From  the  end  of  the  1960s  onwards  and 
especially at the start of the 1970s, Turkish-American relations were in a state of 
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constant crisis specifically because of the Cyprus issue. Turkey’s attempts to find 
support at the United Nations were not producing any results mainly because it 
could  not  get  the  support  of  Third  World  countries.  Against  this  background, 
Sander’s  insistence  on  the  manner  in  which  Turkey  rebuffed  Asian-African 
relations becomes more meaningful. This narrative ascribes to a revisionist school 
of interpretation and in that sense is predicated on an understanding of American 
foreign policy that reverses the traditionalist  assumptions but still  pertains to a 
Eurocentric perception of world politics.
Ataov Turkaya in NATO and Turkey argues “under the cover of the “Cold War” 
epitaph, the United States is endeavouring to subdue all  her allies  and present 
them from pursuing an independent foreign and domestic foreign policy. The sine 
qua non  of  this  subordination  is  the  acceptance  of  the  main  cold  war  issues, 
notably the ‘communist menace’”.452 Turkkaya presents a narrative in revisionist 
fashion by arguing that; 
“the U.S. pretended that the world’s difficulties were due to the Soviet 
Union,  and  its  “agents”  or  “fellow-travellers”.  It  seldom  considered 
whether or not most of it was its own Open Door Policy. A cardinal truth 
of  our  century  is  that  American  leadership  is  still  enhancing  the 
traditional objective of the 1890s. For decades nothing satisfied the U.S. 
but free access to foreign markets. Expansion overseas was thought of as 
the solution to the recurring economic crisis. Production had increased so 
enormously that new markers were needed to dispose of the surplus. The 
Open Door Policy has enabled the U.S. to “stabilize” the world in favour 
of the American metropolis and establish a new empire”.453
With respect to Turkey, Turkkaya argues, “the ruling circles of Turkey, having 
failed to develop the country, tied their hopes to the capitalist classes in the West. 
From the point of view of the existing social classes in Turkey, the Second world 
War stimulated the Turkish bourgeoisie and helped it to be stronger”454 whereby 
“it was under these circumstances that the two leftist parties were brought to the 
court, the newly-formed unions were closed down, a leftwing printing press was 
smashed  after  mob  attack  encouraged  and  directed  by  the  government”.455 
According to Turkkaya’s narrative Turkey’s  alliance had already been decided 
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because of the capitalist leanings of the state and the rising bourgeois class. As 
such, “even before the famous Soviet notes were submitted to Turkey, the country 
was ripe …. to  take part  in the Western world”.456 The Soviet  Union and the 
Soviet threat were used to make the alliance easier rather than being the reasons 
for it.  As a  consequence,  “a widespread geopolitical  thesis,  which supposedly 
explains  Russian expansion in  terms of a  conscious  urge to the warm waters, 
gained ground in importance, the Soviet notes on the Straits was interpreted as 
expressions  of  a  centuries-old  national  longing”.457 Such  a  perspective  “was 
presented to the public that the Russians would not be content unless they reached 
warm ports”.458 Yet, 
“the recurring appearance of such a generalization, however, stems from 
a  desire  to  justify  the  appearance  of  the  United States,  another  great 
power in this part of the world. What seems to be behind such arguments 
is to veil the concessions of the Turkish ruling circles. It  is the merge 
with  the  Western  capital  and  the  granting  of  privileges  that  needed 
cover”.459
Within this narrative Turkey is not left without alternative but rather willingly 
chooses to ally with the West and not because of any external threat but because 
of the domestic alignment of forces that favor capitalism. Turkey’s relations with 
the United States and narratives of it were conditioned by the manner in which the 
Turkish state identified itself. This section has attempted demonstrate the way in 
which bilateral relations with the United States dealt US dealt with the story of the 
Cold War. The next section focuses on the narratives about the Straits issue since 
it  is  one of the central  ‘events’ of any account  of the Cold War that includes 
Turkey within it. 
V. STRAITS “ISSUE”
In  Bridge  Across  the  Bosporus,  Ferenc  A.  Vali  like  Harris  ascribes  to  a 
traditionalist narrative of the origins of the Cold War. Vali states that “the attitude 
of the West and especially of the United States had changed; the Cold War was 
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already a fact of life …. Washington realized that Soviet designs were clearly 
directed towards subverting Turkish resistance and that their ulterior aim was to 
extend Communist control over the Near and Middle East”.460 According to Vali, 
the foreign policy of Turkey was based on “how to avoid the embrace  of the 
Muscovite giant,  whose victims in Eastern and Central  Europe provided tragic 
precedents, was rightly as a question of life and death. The threatening shadow of 
Moscow determined Turkey’s basic policy lines during the decade following 1946 
and,  with  a  reduced  emphasis,  still  determines  it  in  present”.461 The 
characterization of the Soviet Union in this narrative is one of an expansionist 
power  infringing  upon  the  sovereignty  of  Turkey  after  having  put  under  its 
dominion  Eastern  and  Central  Europe.  In  accordance  with  the  traditionalist 
explanations of the Cold War, Turkey and the United States are reacting to Soviet 
actions.
Vali  portrays  Turkish foreign policy as  ‘realistic’  and ‘pragmatic’  whereby he 
states that “foreign affairs were conducted in Ankara in a spirit of realism”.462 As 
such, Turkey determined its choices realistically and decided to cooperate with the 
United States. Furthermore, the Cold War is presented as a Manichean conflict 
comprised of two completely opposing sides with no room for maneuver.  Vali 
states that “in the late 1940s, it appeared to all observers that as a consequence of 
the  Cold  War  the  globe  was  being  split  into  Communist  and  anti-communist 
spheres. In such a dichotomous world, Turkey could not hesitate about where to 
place her destiny”.463 The Cold War and how it came about is not analyzed in 
detail,  nor  is  a  definition  provided.  The  characterizations  in  the  narrative 
demonstrate a traditionalist view of the Cold War dynamics. Moreover, Turkish 
foreign policy aims are embedded within the Westernization discourse when he 
states that “we must understand that Turkey’s nearly unique urge to become a 
member of the European family of nations and to be recognized as such provided 
an additional impulse to her desire to be tried by every available device, to the 
West”.464 As such, Turkey’s alliance with the ‘West’ was inevitable because the 
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Cold War meant a world divided into two and since Turkey had to protect her 
sovereignty  against  an  expansionist  Soviet  Union.  Adding  to  that  narrative 
Turkey’s quest for Westernization and modernization Turkey’s alliance with the 
United States is presented as being inevitable.
Feridun Cemal Erkin’s book Turk-Sovyet iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi (Turkish-
Soviet  Relations and the Issue of the Straits),  specifically concentrating on the 
Straits issue presents Soviet demands as a continuance of Russian expansionism 
and desire to acquire the Straits. As such he states that “it was evident that the 
[straits] that had dominated the thoughts of Tsars from Grand Peter onwards had 
also engulfed the Soviet Union”.465 Hence, the narrative is taken back to the 1900s 
to prove that the Straits issue was a continuing concern for the Russian empire. 
Furthermore, Erkin argues that “the unfounded ideas put forward by Stalin, were 
accepted  by the other  two Allies  without  even a  mere  refusal,  because  of the 
importance  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  gave  to  preserving  the  Soviet 
Union within the Allied Coalition rather than the reasonableness of the ideas”.466 
The narrative Erkin presents is one of Soviet expansionism, intractableness and 
unwarranted  demands  and the  appeasement  attempts  by the  United  States  and 
Great Britain in order not to disrupt the Grand Alliance. Hence, a traditionalist 
outlook is presented in the narrative whereby the United States and Great Britain 
want to sustain cooperation but cannot preserve it because of Soviet policies. 
The story of the ‘Straits’ is central in the accounts of Turkey’s experience of the 
Cold War. As presented, narratives that focus on the  “Straits Issue” is narrated 
based on a  traditionalist  perspective  of the causes  of the Cold War.  The next 
section takes a closer look at the manner in which the Cold War and Turkey’s role 
in it was written. 
VI. “COLD WAR”
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This section will focus on works that deal specifically with the ‘Cold War’ as the 
focus of the story. Aysegul  Sever’s book  Soguk Savas Kusatmasinda Turkiye,  
Bati ve Orta Dogu (Turkey, the West and the Middle East within the Cold War  
encirclement) is one of the few books that deals exclusively with the ‘Cold War’. 
Sever argues for adopting a post-revisionist  posture by stating that  “Cold War 
years are no longer just focusing on the United States-Soviet Union struggle and 
as a consequence Great Britain’s role in the birth and development of the Cold 
War is being stressed in many works”.467 As such, Sever concentrates on the role 
of Great Britain specifically with respect to Turkey.  Sever’s narrative takes the 
story  of  Russian-Turkish  relations  back  to  the  19th  century  stressing  the 
continuity in Russian motivations when she argues that “in the past the Russians, 
especially in the 19th century, would pressure the Ottomans whenever they felt 
powerful  to  establish  control  of  the  Straits”.468 The  narrative  is  based  on 
continuing  Russian  aggressiveness  and  Turkish  efforts  to  prevent  Russian 
expansion towards Turkey and convince the allies of the urgency of the threat. 
She argues that “the Turkish government had urged Washington to take a firm 
stance towards the Soviet Union by sending a series of reports ever since the end 
of the war”.469 Furthermore, according to Sever’s story Great Britain realizes the 
threat and with Turkey attempts  to persuade the United States of its  existence 
whereby  “England  already  had  doubts  after  the  war  as  it  had  during,  about 
whether cooperation with the Soviets could be continued”.470 Thus, “in parallel 
with  the  Inonu  administration  the  English  government  believed  that  Soviet 
demands  towards  Turkey  could  not  be  accepted  and  would  violate  post-war 
international  peace  efforts”.  According  to  this  the  United  States  realized  the 
danger posed by the Soviet Union, of which Turkey and Great Britain had been 
aware, with time. She argues that “by 1946, United States had realized that Soviet 
demands towards Turkey was an example of its expansionist policies and joined 
Great Britain”.471 As such, despite claims of post-revisionism, the argument does 
resemble the traditionalist historiography whereby the United States realizes the 
Soviet expansionist aims and reacts to them. 
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Sever’s book presents the process of the evolving Cold War, analyzing the people, 
policies  and  the  process  involved  but  her  narrative  also  perpetuates  some 
dominant narratives about Soviet relations with Turkey. Sever states that “Turkey 
when  faced  with  Soviet  demands  decided  that  they  could  no  longer  follow a 
policy of neutrality and that their future was with the West”.472 Furthermore, the 
narrative ascribes to a ‘traditional’ interpretation of American foreign policy. The 
story presented can be considered as being pericentrist in that it aims to bring in 
Turkey to the story of the Cold War and underline Turkey as one of the actors to 
convince the United States of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Ekavi  Athanassopoulou’s  book  concentrates  on  the  origins  of  the  Cold  War 
specifically the process of Turkey joining NATO. The narrative is more based 
upon the events leading up to Turkey’s membership of NATO and brings forth 
analysis  of  the  main  characters  and  events  of  the  period  under  analysis  but 
Athanassopoulou like Sever does perpetuate dominant narratives about Turkish 
foreign policy.  The account  is  one of  a ‘realistic’  foreign policy whereby she 
argues that “Turkish foreign policy remained consistent in what had always been a 
pragmatic  orientation”.473 Furthermore,  she  states  that  “the  pragmatic  Turkish 
leaders never concealed their distrust of Moscow and their preference, should the 
question arise to side with the powers which were interested in guaranteeing the 
regional status quo and represented the western world into which Turkey wished 
to be integrated”.474 This statement has two assumptions in line with the dominant 
narratives about Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, that the distrust towards Moscow 
had always existed establishing continuity between 19th century Russia and the 
Soviet  Union  whereby  the  period  of  cooperation  that  started  with  the 
establishment  of the Republic becomes a ‘pragmatic’ and ‘realistic’  policy.  As 
such Turkish alliance with the Soviet Union becomes one of convenience rather 
than one  of  genuine trust.  This  leads  to  the  second assumption,  which  is  that 
genuine trust existed towards the Western powers with whom Turkey wished to 
integrate.  The  narrative  of  westernization/modernization  and  the  aim  of  the 
472 Sever, Soguk Savas kusatmasinda Turkiye, 57
473 Ekavi  Athanassopoulou,  Turkey:  Anglo-American  Security  Interests  1945-1952:  The  First  
Enlargement of NATO (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 76
474 Athanassopoulou, Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 76
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Republic to become integrated with the West are present in the account. Turkey’s 
aim from its establishment onwards was westernization/modernization, thus her 
‘natural allies’ were the Western states and not the Soviet Union. 
Athanassopoulou’s account presents a traditionalist account of the Cold War when 
she  argues  that  “Washington’s  decision  to  resist  any  Soviet  expansion  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean  by  building  up  Turkey’s  military  strength,”  hence 
Washington  becomes  a  passive  actor  realising  Soviet  ‘designs’  after  which  it 
decides to prevent them. As a consequence, “after its notes of 1946 Moscow did 
not resume its diplomatic pressure on Ankara. Thanks to the combined British-
American  support,  the  Turkish  government  found  itself  in  a  strong  position 
regarding Stalin’s designs”.475 Thus, as with Sever, Athanassopoulou’s narrative is 
a pericentrist account of the Cold War and the agency given to Turkey is one of an 
actor that demonstrates  to the United States the importance of maintaining the 
balance of power.
Bruce Kuniholm in  The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East  “argues that 
Great Power relations in the Near East cast significant light on the origins of the 
Cold War and that the historical struggle for power along the northern tier was an 
important factor in the development of the post-war conflict between the United 
States and Soviet Union”476 and attempts to “show how traditional interests along 
the Northern Tier evolve into the postwar conflict between the United States and 
the Soviet  Union and to  follow the process by which American-Soviet  rivalry 
gradually supersedes the earlier Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region”.477 Kuniholm 
locates the issues experienced in the Near East within the narrative of great power 
rivalry that had existed in the region ever since the 19th century and in accordance 
starts  the  story  with  the  Eastern  Question.  Kuniholm argues  that  the  Eastern 
Question was “the question of what should take the Ottoman Empire’s place” and 
“as  the  nineteenth  century  drew  to  a  close,  the  Eastern  Question  became 
increasingly central to the rivalry of the Great Powers, whose interests clashed in 
the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean”.478 Furthermore,  Kuniholm argues, 
475Athanassopoulou, Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 51476 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, xvi
477 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, xvi
478 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 6
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“great Britain and Russia – especially from the 1830s onward – were the powers 
chiefly concerned with the crumbling  Ottoman  Empire.  Because Britain  faced 
Russian  expansion into  the  Balkans,  the  Straits  Convention  of  1841 has  been 
interpreted as representing “the early application of a policy of containment”, a 
policy  not  unlike  that  of  the  Truman  Doctrine  a  century  later”.479 Kuniholm 
embeds  the Truman  Doctrine  within the dynamics  of  great  power rivalry that 
existed for a century. As such for Kuniholm the Cold War in the Near East was 
the “resurrection of the Eastern Question”480 which began when “on 19 March, 
when  Molotov  handed  Selim  Sarper,  the  Turkish  ambassador  in  Moscow,  a 
statement denouncing the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 
17 December 1925”.481 Kuniholm’s narrative presents the United States as coming 
to realize the Soviet  threat  and argues,   “Soviet  attitudes  toward Turkey were 
gradually seen in the context of larger issues which the United States was slowly 
coming to appreciate”.482 As such, the balance of power dynamics that involved 
Turkey slowly became apparent to the United States that then assumed the role of 
Great Britain in this centuries’ rivalry.
Accounts of the Cold War have adhered to traditionalist Cold War narrative with 
respect to the origins. The Soviet Union is narrated as being expansionist whereas 
the United is on the defensive. Furthermore, embedding Turkey into this narrative 
has been done in a way that  reinforces  the dominant  narratives  about  Turkish 
foreign  policy.  The  “realist”  and  “rational”  choice  of  a  westernizing  and 
modernizing Turkish state was to ally itself against an expansionist Soviet Union.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has aimed to discuss the main narratives that permeate the Turkish 
historiography about its own foreign policy tradition and the Cold War. The aim 
has not been to present an exhaustive literature review of Turkish foreign policy, 
the Straits issue or Turkey’s relations with the United States. The aim has been to 
479 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 7
480 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 255
481 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 255
482 Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 269
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highlight  through  the  main  works  dealing  with  those  issues  the  dominant 
characterizations, narratives and periodisations prevalent in the literature. 
This overview demonstrates the manner in which narratives and characterizations 
dominate  the  comprehension  of  a  time  frame.  For  example,  the  continuity 
narrative does not leave room for the cooperation between the Soviet Union and 
Turkey in the inter-war period. Such a perspective blurs the understanding of the 
conditions  of  Soviet-Turkish  relations  and diminishes  its  dynamics  to  Russian 
aims  towards  the  Straits.  In  a  similar  fashion  the  westernization  narrative 
subsumes  the  trends,  views  and  perspectives  of  the  Turkish  populace  to  the 
attainment of a goal (westernization) and embeds it into a linear and progressive 
story line. The story of Turkey progressing toward westernization silences other 
stories that were available in other aspects of society and this affects Turkey’s 
self-conception  of  herself  even  in  the  present  with  the  discussion  of  ‘secular 
elites’ versus ‘resurgent Islamist views’ whereby the ‘secular elite’ is confronted 
with  a  Turkey  they  have  for  so  long  silenced.  The  ‘realistic’  foreign  policy 
assertion  is  present  with  respect  to  every  aspect  of  Turkish  foreign  policy 
literature even if what is meant by the notion is hardly ever elaborated upon. Even 
a non-theoretical claim of realism being Turkey pursuing its national interests is 
not adequately discussed under the supposition that those interests  are evident. 
This  posture  again  delimits  the  scope  of  the  story  for  the  ‘interests’  are  not 
identical for every group or class in a society and how they are constructed and 
one interest becomes dominant over another is also a process of silencing that 
needs to be considered.
As such, the stories of Turkey and concepts are fixed in order to fit the central  
story of the Cold War.   Furthermore,  the Western-centric  conceptualization of 
world  politics  is  reproduced.  It  needs  to  be  underlined  that  this  reproduction 
should not be seen as the result of imposition. The Western-centric narratives of 
history  fit  into  a  certain  conceptualization  of  Turkey  and  reproducing  those 
Western-centric  narratives  also reproduce that  conceptualization  of Turkey.  As 
such, the works in this chapter need to be evaluated not only as reproducing the 
historiographical operations in the Cold War but also through that as privileging 
and reproducing a specific idea of Turkey.  The next section focuses on the way in 
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which the linear narrative of the Cold War and the historiographical operations 
discussed in this section can be disrupted and problematized.
SECTION II: STORIES OF SILENCES
“We can agree,  I  think, that invisible things are not necessarily “not-
there”;  that  a  void  may be  empty but  not  be  a  vacuum.  In  addition, 
certain absences are so stressed, so ornate, so planned, they call attention 
to  themselves;  arrest  us  with  intentionality  and  purpose,  like 
neighborhoods that are defined by the population held away from them. 
Looking at the scope of American literature, I can't help thinking that the 
question should never have been “Why am I, an Afro-American, absent 
from  it?”  It  is  not  a  particularly  interesting  query  anyway.  The 
spectacularly interesting question is “What intellectual  feats had to be 
performed by the author or his critic to erase me from a society seething 
with  my presence,  and  what  effect  has  that  performance  had  on  the 
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work?” What are the strategies of escape from knowledge? Of willful 
oblivion? I am not recommending an inquiry into the obvious impulse 
that  overtakes  a  soldier  sitting  in  a  World  War  I  trench  to  think  of 
salmon fishing. That kind of pointed "turning from," deliberate escapism, 
or  transcendence  may  be  lifesaving  in  a  circumstance  of  immediate 
duress.  The  exploration  I  am suggesting  is,  how does  one  sit  in  the 
audience observing, watching the performance of Young America, say, 
in the nineteenth century, say, and reconstruct the play, its director, its 
plot, and its cast in such a manner that its very point never surfaces? Not 
why.  How?  [..]In  1850  at  the  height  of  slavery  and  burgeoning 
abolitionism,  American  writers  chose  romance.  Where,  I  wonder,  in 
these romances is the shadow of the presence from which the text has 
fled?  Where  does  it  heighten,  where  does  it  dislocate,  where  does it 
necessitate  novelistic  invention;  what  does  it  release;  what  does  it 
hobble?”483
Silences are inevitable. It is in the nature of every story, every periodization, every 
characterization and every definition. No event, issue, concept or period can have 
a perfect closure. There is no perfect starting point, development or end. There are 
always  choices  involved  in  drawing  the  boundaries  of  ‘events’,  ‘issues’  and 
‘concepts’. As such, every story, every periodization, every characterization and 
every  definition  has  its  silences  and  absences  that  are  constitutive  of  their 
production. As Morrison in the above quote so aptly puts it “a void may be empty, 
but it is not a vacuum”.484 That there is a silence and absence does not mean there 
is  a  vacuum  but  that  there  is  a  reason  for  the  silence  and  the  absence.  The 
overarching  narratives  of  the  past  (such  as  the  Cold  War)  based  upon  a 
Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics come to constitute ‘the past’ and 
are reproduced as the only way of representing the past. These narratives silence 
‘local’ histories and fix concepts in order to provide closures and linearity to the 
stories being told. This process ‘edits’ out events and issues and uncomplicates 
concepts in order to ‘fit’ these stories within parameters and periodizations of the 
general story.
The previous section outlined the historiographical operations on the Cold War. 
Two points were underlined in the chapters analyzing the historical discourse on 
the Cold War. Firstly, the various ‘interpretations’ of the Cold War are premised 
upon  a  Eurocentric  conception  of  world  politics.  Furthermore,  the  different 
interpretations are rooted in alternative conceptualizations  of American foreign 
policy. Secondly, the overarching narrative of the ‘Cold War’ operated in a way 
483 Toni Morrison, ‘Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Anglo-American Presence in American 
Literature’, Michigan Quarterly Review, XXVII :I (1989) : 11-12
484 Ibid.
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that edited out other possible stories that might disrupt the linearity and trajectory 
of the ‘main’ story. The aim of this section is to disrupt the linearity of the story 
and problematize the fixed concepts used within the explanatory frameworks. As 
such,  it  is  an  attempt  to  tell  the  stories  of  the  silences,  absences  and  the 
complicated nature of the negotiations of identities and processes. The following 
chapters aim to open up for discussion and question the linearity of concepts and 
events and identities that are accepted as being fixed and static throughout the 
historiographical  operations.  Three  points  will  be  underlined  in  the  following 
chapters.  Firstly,  the  concepts  of  westernization,  modernization  and 
democratization are and were contested concepts. Yet the overarching narrative of 
the Cold War unproblematizes these concepts and presents them as closed boxes 
that cannot be questioned. These concepts become redacted through the narrative 
configurations that constitute the Cold War. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the main themes that exist within Turkish historiography about the Cold War and 
Turkish  history  are  modernization,  Westernization,  national  security  and  the 
international. In the orthodox narrative of the Cold War and orthodox narrative of 
Turkish history that becomes embedded within the historiographical discourse on 
the  Cold  War,  the  story  is  based  on  dichotomies  of  good/evil,  right/wrong, 
inside/outside  and  these  were  dichotomies  that  were  already  existent  in  the 
understanding of the Turkish nation. such, the historiographical operations and the 
editing out and fixing of concepts constructs objects of analysis as static. Which 
brings forth the second point to be underlined which is that along with concepts 
such as westernization, democratization and the international, a homogenous and 
fixed  ‘Turkey’  is  also  constructed  within  these  narratives.  As  a  consequence, 
Turkey becomes an object to be narrated rather than a subject to be questioned. 
What the following chapters aim to ask is who is represented in this homogenous 
and fixed ‘Turkey’,  whose voice becomes concominant  to that  of Turkey and 
which voices are forgotten and silences. As Campbell states,
 “national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities that do not possess 
prediscursive, stable entities. In other words, states are never finished as 
entities, the tension between the demands of identity and the practices 
that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative 
nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to 
their being renders  states in permanent  need of reproduction; with no 
ontological  status  apart  from  the  many  and  varied  practices  that 
constitute theirreality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of 
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becoming. For a state to end the practices of representation would be to 
expose the lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death”.485
In  that  sense  the  writing  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  narrative  configurations  it 
reproduces also reproduce a specific idea and story of Turkey, democratization 
and  westernization.  What  this  section  aims  to  underline  is  the  process  of  the 
re/formulation  and  re/production  of  these  identities  and  concepts  Thirdly,  the 
category of ‘events’ need to be problematized. As discussed, the story of the Cold 
War includes acts of editing out. What is edited out, what constitutes an ‘event’ as 
an  event,  can  that  event  be  understood  and  narrated  differently,  were  the 
alternative views on the ‘event’ as it transpired? These are all questions that need 
to be directed at the period under question in order to disrupt the linearity imposed 
upon ‘the past’  and the construction  of an unproblematized  ‘Cold War’  as  an 
event. 
The following chapters were organized in order to bring forth these points. The 
chapters are divided according to three time frames that are in general employed 
in the periodizations within the Cold War historiography; 1945-1947, 1947-1949, 
1949-1951.  This  division  is  done  in  order  to  underline  the  ‘process’  of  the 
re/formulation and re/definition of concepts, identities and events. The chapters 
themselves are divided in similar fashions. The introductory parts of the chapters 
aim to provide an overview of the main debates of the period. The second parts 
concentrate on the definitions of democracy and the third parts on definitions of 
national  security and the international.  The last  part  of the chapters is entitled 
‘Silencing, Co-opting, Redefining’ and aims to further underline the process of 
re/defining . 
The events of the period are widely accepted as paving the way for “the Cold War 
order”  and  determining  Turkey’s  role  in  it.  As  argued  in  Chapter  3,  Turkish 
narratives  of  these  events  have  been  based  on  a  set  of  discourses.  These 
discourses were the inevitability of the Cold War, the continuity in foreign policy 
and of westernization. The next section demonstrates the manner in which these 
discourses were produced/reproduced and how they were countered at the time. 
The aim is to demonstrate that the dominant narratives themselves evolved over 
485 Campbell, Writing Security, 12
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time  in  response  to  the  alternative  narratives  and  changing  international  and 
domestic  circumstances.  It  is  not  a  case  of  imposing  the  template  of  a  never 
changing dominant narrative on to existing conditions. It is an ongoing process of 
negotiation between the dominant and alternative narratives and responses to the 
changing conditions. It needs to be underlined that the aim of this section is not a 
historical narrative of the period between 1945-1950.486 The focus is on bringing 
forth ‘events’ and discussing the negotiations and mediations of concepts during 
the period. Thus, it includes more and less than the historical narrative of the Cold 
War  and  as  such  it  has  its  own  inherent  silences  and  absences  and  its  own 
boundaries.
CHAPTER V: TRANSITIONING - 1945-1947
I. INTRODUCTION
The  period  from 1945-1947  is  narrated  as  the  transition  period  both  for  the 
international system and Turkish domestic politics. In the international front, the 
Second  World  War  had  ended  and  the  international  system  was  being 
transformed. The victorious powers were designing the future of the international 
system through conferences such as Yalta and Potsdam. As these conferences and 
486 For a detailed narrative of the period see the three volumes by Cemil Kocak.  Ikinci Parti:  
Turkiye’de Iki  Partili  Siyasi  Sistemin Kurulus Yillari (1945-1950) (Istanbul:  Iletisim Yayinlari, 
2010); Iktidar ve Demokratlar: Turkiye’de Iki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kurulus Yillari (1945-1950) 
(Istanbul:  Iletisim Yayinlari,  2012);  Rejim Krizi: Turkiye’de Iki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kurulus  
Yillari (1945-1950) (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2013). 
149
the peace negotiations progressed it became clear that the Soviet Union and the 
United States did not share the same vision for the future of the international 
system.  United  States’  vision  consisted  of  an  international  liberal  economic 
system that would serve its interests and ensure that a conflict like the Second 
World War was not repeated. The Soviet Union’s vision did not see free trade as 
the solution but the source of the conflict and wanted territorial securities so as to 
not be attacked again. Both powers were driven by a search for security based on 
their differing perceptions of threat and definitions of security.487  
Soviet Union’s search for security affected Turkey directly because one of the 
territorial securities the Soviet Union seeked was related to the Bhosphorus. On 
June  1945  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Molotov  and  Turkish  Ambassador  Selim 
Sarper held a meeting to discuss the renewal of the Turkish-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty. In that meeting Molotov presented a series of demands as a condition for 
renewing the Friendship Treaty.  These demands were;  changing the Montreux 
agreement;  the right to establish bases in the Bhosphorus and the secession of 
Kars and Ardahan.  Turkish government  rejected these demands.488 The United 
States’ interest  in Turkey developed in relation to Turkey’s  increasingly tense 
relations  with the Soviet  Union.  The United States  sending the funeral  of the 
deceased  Turkish  ambassador  Munir  Ertegun  in  1946  with  USS  Missouri  is 
accepted as one the first signals of America’s growing interest in Turkey. 
Domestically,  this  period is  characterized  as “transition to democracy”  mainly 
because in 1946 Turkey’s first multi-party elections were held. The Land Reform 
debates  paved  the  way  for  the  solidification  of  an  opposition  within  the 
Republican Party. The Declaration of the Four, a proposal presented on 12 June 
1945, by Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan, called 
for changes in the political system such as multi-party elections and freedom of 
the  press.  This  faction  would  become  the  founders  of  the  Democrat  Party 
487 For further information about this period and conflicting interest of the United States and Soviet  
Union see David S. Painter,  The Cold War: An International History (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999); Melvyn Leffler and David S. Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International  
History (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, The 
Cambridge History of  The Cold War,  Vol.1:  Origins,  eds.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press, 2010)
488 More detailed discussion of these events will follow in this section
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established in January 1946. The first multi-party elections were held in 21 July 
1946. The creation of a second party and the elections created a tense political 
atmosphere  but  was  intercepted  with  the  12  July  Declaration  by  Ismet  Inonu 
where he stressed his intention  to be neutral  between the government  and the 
opposition. 
This section aims to discuss the nature of the ‘transition’ by problematizing the 
concepts that the Cold War historiography fixes and disrupting the linearity of the 
story. This will be done through underlining the negotiation and dialogue in the 
process  of  ‘transition’.  There  was  not  one  definition  and  understanding  of 
democracy,  westernization,  national security or the international.  There was an 
ongoing  debate  about  the  nature  of  the  ‘transition’  and  how  democracy  and 
national security should be defined. The historiographical operations on the Cold 
War privileges one definition and understanding of democracy, national security 
and the international and presents them as uncontested facts. The definitions and 
conceptualizations that are privileged are the dominant narratives of the period 
representing the views of the Republican regime. The criticism directed towards 
this regime, how these alternative narratives were comprehended and represented 
are edited out of the stories of the Cold War. Furthermore, the debates and how 
these narratives were redefined, reframed and reformulated during this period also 
get silences. Thus, the aim is to demonstrate the process and the debate and the 
way  in  which  a  redefining  and  reformulation  of  the  concepts  of  democracy, 
national  security  and  international  underwent  not  in  a  unilinear  manner  but 
because of the interactions with the alternative narratives. The dominant narrative 
was  based  upon  a  very  specific  understanding  of  the  Republican  regime,  its 
history  and  its  aims.  In  a  discussion  with  journalists  Prime  Minister  Sukru 
Saracoglu presented the orthodox narrative of the Turkish nation and state;
“In order to strengthen the Turkish nation, the Asian institutions had to 
be destroyed and replaced by European ones. The great men and their 
friends who did not hesitate against the immense difficulties they faced 
decided  this.  According  to  the  decisions  the  aim  was  to  speedily 
Westernize,  Europenize,  strengthen  and  civilize  Turkey.  As  such  an 
unyielding Turkey replaced submissive Turkey”.489
The main dichotomy in this definition is the Western/non-Western, modern/pre-489 Meeting with Journalists, Sukru Saracoglu, 5 September 1945 in Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri,  
Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.64.6.
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modern  one.490 Destroying  “Asian”  institutions  is  a  step  to  “Westernize  and 
civilize” the Turkish nation. The main dichotomy is of what Turkey had been; 
Asian, uncivilized and what it is and constantly aspires to be; strong, European 
and  civlized.  Furthermore,  the  narrative  assumes  a  clear  break  from the  past 
institutions  that  did  not  necessarily  exist.  The  unacceptable,  illegitimate  are 
branded as “reactionary”  politics that endanger the principles of the revolution 
such as the Caliphate and Arabic letters. Anything associated with the Ottoman, 
the “Asian”, the “uncivilized” past is constructed as a threat to the future of the 
Turkish state. This clear dichotomy constructed with the past classifies everything 
associated with it as dangerous and harmful as such leading to further divisions of 
acceptable/unacceptable,  legitimate/illegitimate,  good/evil.  This  exclusion  was 
also extended to ideologies deemed not compatible with the main characteristics 
of the Turkish state. Within the contours of these definitions there is no room for 
communism since national unity assumed the non-existence of classes and class 
conflict. 
The changing conditions both domestically and internationally necessitated that 
this narrative be reframed and redefined. The process of debating the contours of 
the Turkish regime was a continuing process; it did not start with the end of the 
Second World War. The alternative narrative led by Vatan and Tan newspapers 
had been advocating for reforms since the 1940s. The narrative reframings of this 
period  were  not  triggered  by  the  end  of  Second  World  War  but  were  eased 
because of it.  These narrative reframings did not occur in response to just one 
single  event.  Rather  it  was  an  ongoing  process  of  debating  and  redefining. 
Identities are not fixed in time and space and are constantly renegotiated. This 
renegotiation  intensifies  during  times  of  flux  when  there  are  important 
international and domestic changes occurring. Hence, there was a renegotiation of 
Turkey’s identity, foreign policy and political regime, of ‘Turkey’ itself and the 
categories such as westernization and modernization that were considered to be 
constitutive of it.  As Campbell states; “no state possesses a pre-discursive, stable 
identity and no state is free from the tension between the various domains that 
490 This binary opposition is one that permeates Turkish (and Ottoman) history and also Turkey’s 
present.  A closer  look  at  the  European  Union  debates  within  Turkey  demonstrates  that  these 
dichotomies  have  not  been  resolved  and  continue  to  condition  the  elite’s  perception  of  the 
international system.
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need to be aligned for a political community to come into being, an alignment that 
is in response to, rather than constitutive of a prior and stable identity”.491  This 
section  will  juxtapose  the  dominant  and alternative  narratives  with  an  aim to 
demonstrate how they communicated with each other, reacted to each other while 
debating the main events. 
The debate during this period was framed around the redefinition, reproduction 
and  reification  of  two  main  narratives.  The  first  narrative  aimed  to 
redefine/reproduce the dominant understanding of democracy and communism. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  this  period  is  characterized  as  “Turkey’s  transition  to 
democracy” and the debates were central in defining and establishing the nature 
of the transition and the democracy to be established. Hence, the main contours of 
the political were redefined, reproduced through the discussions revolving around 
events such as the establishment of the Democrat Party and the Soviet demands. 
Even though the Soviet demands are a matter of foreign policy, the discussion of 
the issue and the manner in which the debates were framed had a direct relation to 
the “renegotiations” on the meaning of democracy. The threat of the Soviet Union 
was presented as an unquestionable fact492 and as a consequence the alternative 
views were connected to national security.  The second narrative redefined and 
reproduced  Turkey’s  main  foreign  policy  goals  specifically  defining  their 
relations with the United States. As discussed earlier, this period is defined by the 
transitional nature of the international system and Turkish political regime. The 
debates during this period forced upon reframing and redefining Turkish foreign 
policy aims in accordance with the emerging Western and specifically US-led 
definition of the international system. This chapter is divided into three parts. The 
first part will focus on the definition of democracy that was being debated and 
negotiated. The second part will discuss the reframings of the international system 
and the ‘transition’  it  was  undergoing.  The third part  will  discuss the way in 
which the ‘debate’ resulted in a silencing and co-opting of the critical narratives.
491 Campbell, Writing Security, 91
492 For an analysis of how representations of the Soviet Union produced it as a ‘threat’ and an 
‘other’ see; Kivanc Cos and Pinar Bilgin, ‘Stalin’s Demands: Constructions of the ‘Soviet Other’ 
in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1919-1945’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 6 (2010): 43-60.
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II. ‘TRANSITION’ TO DEMOCRACY
The renegotiation and redefinition of the nature of the political regime centered 
around two main reframings. The primary focus was defining what democracy 
was while the second was juxtaposing any possible regime change with national 
security. This section will discuss the ways in which the discussions surrounding 
the future of the political regime 
The focus of the alternative narrative with respect to redefining identities  was 
improvements  that  needed to be made to  the political  regime.  Zekeriya  Sertel 
wrote a series of articles in Tan questioning the nature of democracy in Turkey 
and discussing possible reforms. In one of these articles he stated that; “Turkish 
revolution is at an important crossroads. We need to change the laws that have 
pacified the community. We need a parliament that reflects the will of the people 
and is based on free elections. Turkey can enter this route easier than other since 
it has not experienced war”.493 The main focus of the alternative narrative was 
directed towards the lack of democratic reforms and the authoritarian attitude of 
the government towards the opposition.  As argued by Sertel;
 “government newspapers argue that “there are no Fascists in turkey” … 
there  are  no  fascists  in  Turkey  because  the  name  of  fascism  is 
democracy. Democracy is such a universal mask that once you wear it 
you can defend racist and totalitarian elements. Especially if you have a 
defender  like  People’s  Party,  do  not  be  afraid,  your  independence  is 
safe”.494
The main argument was that the authoritarian elements in the Turkish government 
were  being  masked  as  part  of  democracy  and  the  democratization  was  being 
halted in order to keep the old system intact. As Sertel stated “I am of the opinion 
that neither socialism nor communism can develop in a country that has not yet 
established … [democracy]. All I want is a genuine Western democracy”.495 As 
such their main concern was the one-party system and the restrictions imposed by 
them. Furthermore, these critics felt that the government was not achieving the 
Republican ideals themselves. An anti-government poster at the university stated; 
493 Zekeriya  Sertel,  ‘Can We Expect Anything from the Government and Parliament’,  Tan,  22 
August 1945
494 “There are no fascists in Turkey”, Tan, 20 October 1945
495 “Is Miss Sertel Sunni or Shia?”, Tan, 1 September 1945
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“which communism are you talking about? Is it communism to tell the 
people about your indiscretions, wealth and robberies, while they suffer. 
NO!! It  is nothing but stating the truth. Is this democracy? A nation’s 
independence  cannot  be  protected  and  defended  in  this  manner.  You 
fascists do not know what democracy means”.496
The  focus  of  the  criticism  was  how  to  improve  the  living  conditions  of  the 
Turkish population and democratization. The purpose of their criticisms did not 
directly concern the foreign policy choices of the government but did indirectly 
threaten them since such changes meant the questioning of the authority of the 
state and the Republican ideal. As a consequence, the articles that criticised the 
nature of democracy were perceived as direct threats to the Republican regime. In 
an article they present different definitions of democracy by stating that;
“According to the American President Abraham Lincoln, democracy is:
rule of the people by the people for the people
According to England democracy is;
Rule of the world by England for England
Democracy according to Greece is;
Rule of the Greek people by the Greek king, and rule of the Greek king 
by England for England,
The definition of democracy according to America today;
Rule of the world by the atom bomb for the United States,
Democracy according to Turkey is,
Rule of the people by the People’s Party”497
As can be seen in the above quotation, the criticism centered around the People’s 
Party’s domination over the definition and application of democracy. The main 
concern of these criticisms was the state of democracy and more so the economic 
condition of the country after the Second World War. 
The  dominant  narrative  framed  the  debate  primarily  based  on  perceptions  of 
national threat. The first step was questioning the necessity of reforms, “our laws, 
procedures, approaches have been based on the principles of the People’s Party … 
to change this situation there needs to be a reason, is there such a reason”?498 
Furthermore,  it  was  stated  that;  “the  government  considers  the  support  of 
Republican institutions as the basis of democracy”.499 The question of democracy 
and the nature of the political regime were framed in such a way as to prioritize 
Republican institutions and principles. Hence any reform that was demanded was 496 “Anti-government poster at university,” 4.1.1946 in Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet  
Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 210 428 9,
497 Markopasa
498 Ethem Izzet Benice, In Light of Free Elections, Son Telgraf, 9 June 1945
499 5 September 1945, Meeting with Journalists, Sukru Saracoglu, in  Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivi,  
Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File A6, Code: 30.1.11, Place: 68 6 
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considered  within  the  sphere  of  whether  or  not  it  was  in  accordance  with 
Republican principles, and national security both of which were defined by the 
dominant narrative. As a consequence, any view that did not conform to these 
definitions  or  any  reform  proposal  that  envisioned  a  different  trajectory  for 
Turkey’s  transition  to  democracy  was  branded  as  communist  and  as  ‘foreign 
agents’.  As  Sukru  Saracoglu  stated  in  a  speech;  “in  recent  weeks  Istanbul 
newspapers have “attacked”. They have started giving advice to the government 
and nation. They can not stop talking about the sins committed by People’s Party 
and the Republican government for the last 20 years in foreign policy”.500 Thus, 
the criticism was framed as something that endangered national unity and as a 
tool used by foreign agents to instigate internal trouble. As stated in Vakit; “we 
can see that a new phase of trials are beginning. People talk of the benefits of 
party opposition even of its necessity. If those that defend the necessity of party 
conflicts  in  the  name of  democracy have  not  lost  their  minds  then  they must 
definitely be enemies of Turkish national unity”.501 
The Declaration of the Four was perceived as an attack on the authority of the 
Republican Regime and questioning of its legitimacy.  According to the dominant 
narrative, Declaration of the Four meant, “a new phase of trials are beginning. 
People who talk of the benefits of party opposition, even of its necessity; if those 
that  defend the necessity of party conflicts  in  the name of democracy are not 
delusional then they must definitely be enemies of Turkish national unity”.502 The 
main  assumption  was  that  more  parties  meant  more  disagreement  and  more 
infighting causing instability in the governance process. The dominant narrative 
prioritized stability over democratization. As argued in an article in Ulus; “those 
who complain about a lack of freedom have started their attacks, what happened 
to there being no freedoms. As fascism is being eradicated in Europe there were 
those that want to brand some Turkish citizens as fascists. There are no fascists in 
Turkey. There are Turks in Turkey”.503 This stance is in line with the narratives of 
national unity. Within this narrative the Turkish nation acted in unison and any 
threat had to be ‘foreign’. As with discussions of democracy, discussions about 
5005 September 1945, Meeting with Journalists, Sukru Saracoglu
501 Enemies of National Unity, Vakit, 25 June 1945
502 Enemies of National Unity, Vakit, 25 June 1945
503 Mumtaz Faik Ferih, “Number 1 Patriot”, Ulus, 11 July 1945
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foreign  policy  were  also  limited  by  an  understanding  of  maintaining  national 
unity. As argued by the Prime Minister; “When the issue is defense of foreign 
policy,  the  revolution  and  its  products  whatever  its  colours  all  Turkish 
newspapers are on the same side with the government”.504 The focus was on unity 
rather  than democratization  and criticisms  towards the government  demanding 
more reforms were taken as attempts to destabilize the government and threaten 
national unity; “Democracy, freedom are good things. But which kind and until 
where?  Is  Turkey searching  for  the  most  appropriate  way for  itself  or  is  this 
country  who  survived  foreign  change  being  threatened  from  inside”.505 The 
question for the government was to what extent reforms would threaten their hold 
on  to  power  and  their  vision  of  Turkey  from  being  realized  and  hence 
democratization was interpreted as a danger from within that could open the way 
for questioning the basic principles of the Republican regime. 
As can be observed discussions about  the nature  of the democratic  regime in 
Turkey were seen as direct threats to national unity and demanding reforms was 
interpreted as an attack on the government. The dominant elite perceived these 
criticisms as questioning their authority and the main principles upon which the 
Republican regime was built.  The framing of the debate pitted democratization 
against national unity whereby the narrative told a story of Turkey sacrificing its 
Republican ideals in order to democratize hence weakening unity and threatening 
its accomplishments. Such a construction limited the possibility of an open debate 
on the subject. Once democratization and debating it was linked to the survival of 
the unity of the state, any discussion could be branded as a threat. As Republican 
ideals and upholding them was used to frame the definition of domestic politics it 
also influenced the perceptions of outside. 
As discussed the framing of democracy centered on understandings of national 
security and the international. As such the next section will focus on the debates 
surrounding national security and the competing definitions of the international.
504Prime  Minister’s  Meeting  with  Journalists,  6  March  in  Basbakanlik  Devlet  Arsivleri,  
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III. REDEFINING THREATS TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY
The second narrative focused upon redefining Turkey’s definition of “threat” and 
“national  security”.  These  redefinitions  and  reframings  occurred  in  two  main 
ways. First, was to align Turkey’s foreign policy with that of the international 
system  and  juxtapose  Turkey  and  its  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  on  the 
international Cold War narrative. The second was to reframe Turkey’s general 
role in international relations and role in the Second World War.
Sukru Saracoglu stated in a speech that the “aim is to establish deep and genuine 
friendship bonds, we hope that in order to achieve positive results these efforts are 
reciprocated.  We do not  want  anything  from anyone  and we have  nothing to 
give”.506 This line of argumentation aimed to establish Turkey’s role in the new 
international  system as  an  ally  of  the  “peace-loving”  nations.  As  Nihat  Erim 
argued; “if any change in the status of the Straits is going to be considered, any 
new  proposal  should  be  in  accordance  with  the  new  direction  and  new 
mentality”…507 The  United  Nations  and its  principles  were  established  as  the 
basis  of  the  new international  system  and  Turkey’s  actions  were  narrated  as 
aiming to ascribe by these principles. Furthermore, the relations with the Soviet 
Union were included  within  the  general  structure  of  the  United  Nations;  “the 
principles established with the UN are more than enough to satisfy the worries 
Soviet  Union  Soviet  Union  has  with  respect  to  the  defense  of  the  Straits”.508 
According to this perspective; “it is the duty of every state including Russia to 
improve inter-state relations in order to establish world peace”.509 As such Soviet 
actions were not only framed as being a threat to Turkey’s national sovereignty 
but also a threat to the new international system being set up by the United States 
within which Turkey situated itself. The Soviet demands were narrated into the 
general Soviet actions as proof that they threatened the peace and stability of the 
international system. In an article criticizing Soviet actions Nihat Erim stated that; 
506 0 30 01 11 64 6, 5 September 1945, Meeting with Journalists
507 Nihat Erim, ‘The Straits Issue Again’, Ulus, 17 August 1946
508 Manchester Guardian 30 11 1946, Turkish PM’s views on the Straits Issue, M. Philips Price) in 
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“Soviets have demonstrated lack of trust in the UN system with the administration 
styles it created in Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and in 
Iran, and in their policy of intimidation and attrition”.510 Thus the Soviet note to 
Turkey became  part  of  Soviet  Union’s  pattern  of  challenging  the  UN system 
being  set  up  by  the  United  States.  It  was  embedded  into  the  narrative  of  an 
expanding Soviet Union that threatened and infiltrated governments with which it 
shared a border. Furthermore, it was argued that, “it is only Turkey that has stood 
against all the pressures”.511 As such Turkey was situated on the side of the United 
states  resisting  Soviet  pressures  and  upholding  the  principles  of  the  United 
Nations. According to this narrative, Soviet Union was threatening the territorial 
integrity of Turkey and by not giving into its demands Turkey was aiding the 
international  efforts  against  aggression.  Hence,  Nihat  Erim stated in  an article 
that, “in no era was the Turkish straits a private matter between Russia and the 
Turkish  nation”.512  The  Soviet  note  was  narrated  as  a  threat  to  Turkey, 
international peace and a possible cause for a Third World War. As such, reacting 
and criticizing Turkey’s policies in this sphere were considered as endangering 
the national security of the state. 
Zekeriya  Sertel  questioned the actions of the government  by stating that;  “the 
noteworthy part is that, this news has so far only been given by English sources 
and created by Huseyin  Cahit  … It  is  not right  to leave the nation under  the 
influence of foreign sources”.513 He further stated that “we do not know to what 
extent these rumours are true. It is inconceivable that Russia would make such a 
mistake”.514 Huseyin  Cahit  Yalcin  responded  to  their  article  by  stating  that 
“Zekeriya  Sertel  sees  the  world  as  a  fairytale,  I  envy him,  … San Francisco 
conference has guaranteed world peace. As such there is nothing to worry about! 
Our friendship with another state is not only dependent on our wishes. The other 
side  has  to  want  the  same friendship.  Zekeriya  Sertel  is  a  victim of  his  nice 
dreams”.515 
510 Nihat Erim, ‘The only missing link’, Ulus, 18 August 1946, 
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Unity in foreign policy, adherence to the main threats of the Republican ideals as 
classified  by  the  dichotomies  was  a  precondition  to  taking  part  in  the  main 
discursive  spaces.  Any  mention  of  communism,  improving  relations  with  the 
Soviet Union, criticism of the United States was branded as being unacceptable, 
illegitimate  and  threatening  the  unity  of  the  state,  hence  automatically 
marginalizing those viewpoints. As argued by a leading newspaper; “The damage 
done by the red fascists has gone beyond a case of ideas and ideologies, and has 
started to incite the populace against each other and small magazines are trying to 
systematically  create  anarchy  in  the  country  through  their  publications”.516 
Furthermore,  any attempt  to  negotiate  with  the  Soviet  Union was  branded  as 
being a futile exercise of appeasement since “words, promises, signatures mean 
nothing to the red fascists. There is only opportunity for them”.517 Soviet foreign 
policy aims was regarded with suspicion and any attempt to enter talks was seen 
as appeasement. As argued by Abidin Diner ;
“History has shown that a loose and cowardly appeasement policy gave 
Germany and Japan courage and caused the Second World War. Soviet 
Russia aims to fill the void left by Germany and Japan. Since Moscow 
worships power, it interprets lenient policies as a sign of weakness and 
attempts to realize its  own ambitions at  every juncture.  Either  Soviet 
Russia  will  continue  to  expand  or  there  will  be  war.  Since  lenient 
policies have failed, United States and Great Britain have no choice but 
to apply a policy based on power and resilience”.518
The interpretation of the Second War World, the international system and Soviet 
foreign policy aims in this article is in accordance with the traditional American 
Cold War interpretations that questioned appeasement as a viable policy option, 
that regarded Soviet Union as an expansionist power that could not be reasoned 
with and that concluded that this expansion had to be met with resolution. Such an 
approach not only vilifies the Soviet Union to an extent where their every action 
is reduced to the seeking for more power for the sake of it but also closed any 
possibility  of  approaching  the  issues  experienced  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  a 
diplomatic manner. 
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The second important focus was on the role of Turkey in the international system 
and during the Second World War.  The Soviet  attacks  on Turkey’s  neutrality 
during the Second World War was one of the issues mentioned by the articles 
discussing the Soviet note. As Nihat Erim argued “a base means surrendering our 
sovereign rights. In order to suffer such a punishment one (a state) needs to be a 
defeated nation. That is why, the day the Russians gave the note the newspapers 
started publications attempting to make Turkey look guilty in the Second World 
War”.519 According to Saracoglu, “Turkey sided with the allies at the first sign of 
a war as soon as the war started it mobilized a million soldiers and prepared itself 
for any possibilities. Germans must have understood the high cost of doing things 
the hard way ….We stood with guns until the end of the war, sure of the opinion 
that we had a role in the war fought in the name of humanity”.520 The reframing 
was  primarily  a  reaction  to  Soviet  attacks  about  Turkey’s  role  in  the  Second 
World  War  but  also  part  of  a  general  reframing  of  Turkey’s  place  in  the 
international system. The reframing of the narrative focused upon Turkey aligning 
itself with the “West” from the start and this was supported by the reframing of 
Turkey’s westernization narrative whereby the West referred to the United States 
rather than Europe.
These reframings were opposed by focusing upon imperialism and highlighting 
the anti-imperialist root of the War of Independence and the Republican regime. 
Sabahattin  Ali’s  writings  focused  on  imperialism  and  references  to  the 
Independence War. 
“Foreign investment will return to our country. While giving this news 
newspapers  are  rejoicing.  Official  authorities  are  aiding  the  entry  of 
foreign money into the nation. 
Once this investment comes, motorways will run thought the cities will 
be filled with airplanes, the nation will be filled with goods.
Then  what  was  the  purpose  of  the  struggle  to  eradicate  foreign 
investment in the last forty years.
Now I remember. I was just a five or six year old child. Mobilization had 
begun. The adventurist government of the time tried to sugar coat this 
bloody adventure by shouting;
“Capitulations are removed”
During the four years mobilization and three year Independence War we 
were told to be fighting in order to rid ourselves of the semi-colonization 
foreign investment had caused.
519 Nihat Erim, ‘With Respect to Russian Demands’, Ulus, 15 August 1946
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If we were going to invite them with open arms, why did we throw them 
out with celebrations”?521
The main stance of the alternative narrative was underlying the anti-imperialist 
nature of the Turkish revolution. Hence, there was not a rejection of Republican 
ideals but a different interpretation of it. According to the alternative narrative, 
Turkish foreign policy had to be based on neutrality and siding with either the 
soviet Union or the United States meant opening Turkey for foreign influence.
In another article he argued that;
“Henry Wallace, who is the Secretary of Agriculture is heroicly fighting 
against  America’s  imperialist  policies  used  to  be  America’s  Vice 
President …
Wallace  is  in  struggle  with  his  own  government  for  the  sake  of 
independence and freedom of small nations. He argues that Truman is 
destroying what President Roosevelt tried to establish. 
Similar  to  our  situation,  just  as  we  get  cursed  for  saying  Ataturk’s 
creation is crumbling, they curse Wallace. Here are a few headlines from 
our newspapers:
“Our number one enemy Moscow Wallace”
“Informer, talkative Wallace”
“Wallace has lost it again” ..
“What is Wallace saying”
Big nations are scheming to share small nations. This creates the road for 
third world war. Against this small nations need to unite and establish 
balance between the big nations. What about this is Moscovism? On the 
contrary it is imperialist …. 
This is what we think”.522
The main argument was that Turkey’s independence, an independence that had 
been fought for should not be jeopardized with the foreign policy choices of the 
government and that an alliance with the United States and aid being received 
from them would  be  another  way to  colonize  Turkey  and  bring  it  under  the 
tutelage of a western power. The criticism toward the government, the demand for 
further  democratization  and  the  questioning  of  the  foreign  policy  led  the 
authorities to label Markopasa and the people who worked there as communists 
and Muscovites.
IV. SILENCING, CO-OPTING, REDEFINING
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This  section  will  discuss  the  manner  in  which  the  alternative  narratives  were 
silenced,  co-opted  and/or  redefined  by  the  dominant  narratives.  The  previous 
section demonstrated how the dominant and alternative narratives redefined the 
issues of democracy, foreign policy and national security. The dominant narrative 
adopted itself to the changing international and domestic condition. The manner 
in which issues were framed, as mentioned, limited the range of discussions on 
the subject  but  also marginalized and villanized the alternative narrative.  This 
section will discuss how the alternative narratives and the people advocating them 
were targeted as enemies of Turkey. 
Tan newspaper mainly discussed the nature of democracy in Turkey and was a 
center for opposition to the government. The opposition toward the government at 
first was a coalition of liberals, socialists and communists. Once RPP chose to use 
communism as a tool to attack Democrat Party, the main opposition party severed 
its ties with the leftists. The Tan incident and the events that led to it fractured this 
coalition leading the Democrat Party to align itself with the dominant discourse of 
the  ruling  party.  As  the  debates  about  the  future  of  the  political  regime  and 
foreign policy intensified so did the accusations  of communism and threats to 
national security.  As a consequence, the liberal  front started to crumble as the 
attacks on Tan made it clear to members of the Democrat Party that they needed 
to ascribe to the definitions of democracy and national security propagated by the 
dominant narrative and challenged the Republican system within that narrative. 
The next section will discuss the events revolving around the Tan Incident.
The series of events that led to the destruction of this coalition started with the 
establishment  of  Gorusler  Magazine.  Tevfik  Rustu  Aras,  Zekeriya  Sertel  and 
Cami Baykurt had been meeting in Aras’s house along with Adnan Menderes and 
Celal Bayar where the programme of the future party was discussed. Once the 
party  had been established  they  decided  to  launch  a  newspaper  to  act  as  the 
official  newspaper  of  the  Party523.  It  was  to  be  run  by  Sabiha  Sertel  named 
Gorusler after  her  column  in  Tan  Newspaper.  Sabiha  Sertel,  Zekeriya  Sertel, 
Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Koprulu, Tevfik Rustu Aras, Cami Baykurt, 
Halide  Edip  Adivar,  Behice  Boran,  Pertev  Naili  Boratav,  Niyazi  Berkes  and 
523 Sertel, Hatirladiklarim, 224
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Adnan Cemgil had promised articles and this was advertised on the cover of the 
first issue. 
Gorusler was published on 1 December 1945 and by noon a second print had been 
ordered. The magazine was met with a lot of criticism. Cumhuriyet Newspaper 
compared the “G” to a sickle and described the magazine as “red”.524  Sabiha 
Sertel  and  Huseyin  Cahit  Yalcin  had  been  having  arguments  through  their 
columns since the end of the Second World War and Huseyin Cahit Yalcin used 
Gorusler Magazine as a tool to brand the Sertel’s as “communist”. Discussions 
about democratic reforms had become central after Inonu’s speech. Ahmet Emin 
Yalman joined the Sertel’s  in their  demand for democratization.  The “liberal” 
front had been formed. Zekeriya Sertel  wrote a series of three articles entitled 
“This  Parliament,  this  government  and  this  party  can  not  bring  change 
[Degismeyi  Bu Meclis  Yapamaz,  Bu Hukumet  Yapamaz,  Bu Parti  Yapamaz” 
starting on 27 August 1945.
Huseyin Cahit Yalcin responded with an article entitled “Realities that Stand Out 
[Goze Carpan Hakikatler]” on 27 August 1945 where he stated that “Sabiha Sertel 
wants  the  government  even  the  head  of  government  to  change,  and  for  the 
People’s Party to  share its  power with other  parties.  Moscow also wants this. 
Sabiha  Sertel  wants  democracy  today,  tomorrow  she’ll  want  other  things”.525 
Yalcin focused on equating more freedoms with national  instability that could 
lead to a communist takeover.
One of their most famous exchanges took place between October – December 
1945  leading  to  the  4  December  events.  They  wrote  articles  back  and  forth 
discussing the existence of fascism in Turkey and what it means.  On 16 October 
1945 Sabiha Sertel wrote an article entitled “Happy Fascists[Mes’ut Fasistler]” 
where she argued that;
“All elements – right and left – in all corners of the world have united 
against Fascism. Those who used to spread fascist doctrines are being 
524 Mumcu, 40’larin Cadi Kazani, 90-91
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eliminated. But the Fascists in Turkey continue to sing like nightingales 
as  during  war.  According  to  them,  those  who  advocate  further 
democratization in Turkey are traitors. Because fascism is the enemy of 
all leftist views. Only Argentina, Portugal, Spain and Turkey are left as 
places where these views can be expressed and defended as freely as 
before. Even though the elimination of Fascists and fascist thought is the 
priority of the new world being established, our fascist have painted their 
black and brown shirts with democracy and established a front against 
right and left. Happy Fascists”.526i
Sertel was attacking the dominant narrative and the Republican establishment for 
not starting reforms and for allowing authoritarian elements to continue. In an 
article on 20 October 1945, Sertel wrote that;
The case  that  government  newspapers,  have been fervently defending 
lately has been: “There are no fascists in Turkey”. Starting from 1933 
and accelerating in 1942 until today, books and articles defending the 
Fascist ideology and racism thesis were not burned. Magazines, books, 
and leaflets remain alive.
Fascism now has  the  mask  of  democracy  ….  Democracy  is  such  an 
international  mask that  once you put it  on your face,  you  can defend 
racist and totalitarian elements. Especially if you have a defender like 
People’s Party don’t be afraid. Freedom is safe”.527
Sabiha Sertel argued that fascism in Turkey had never been suppressed and now 
using the discourses of democracy and national unity it was establishing its power 
and refusing any criticism.  According to Sertel,  the government’s  hold on the 
press  was  a  totalitarian  policy.  Huseyin  Cahit  Yalcin  wrote  a  response  in  23 
October 1945 entitled “Struggle to Destroy Fascism” where he argued that;
“I  understand  Moscow  claiming  that  Fascists  exist  in  Turkey, 
complaining  that  Fascists  are  in  the  government  and  demanding  the 
eradication of Fascism in Turkey. Because, according to them, this will 
weaken Turkey,  make it an easy prey for Moscow and establishing a 
Bolshevik “friendly”  government  ….. But how can our heart  not hurt 
when we see one of our own, a citizen from our own soul and blood 
repeating  the  same  words  like  a  parrot  aiding  imperialist  Bolshevik 
propaganda”.528
This article again touches on the “foreign agents” narrative and Huseyin Cahit 
argued that it pains him to see such views expressed but he has to call them out. 
The dominant narrative of national unity and the instability reforms will create are 
continued in these articles.
526 Sabiha Sertel, “Happy Fascists [Mes’ut Fasistler],” Tan, 16 October 1945.
527 Sabiha Sertel, Tan, 20 October 1945
528 Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, ‘Struggle to Destroy Fascism’, Tanin, 23 October 1945
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Sabiha Sertel’s article on 1 December 1945 entitled “Bu devrim Ibret ve Meserret 
Gazeteleri” stated that;
“People’s Party has given authority on their side to answer the critiques 
of Tan and Vatan. But these answers are demagogical ravings filled with 
slander towards Tan and Vatan newspaper and their owners. We excuse 
them on this count. Because what are they to do when the government is 
indefensible.  People’s Party has given written and verbal  order not to 
read  or  sell  these  newspapers  because  it  considers  Tan  and  Vatan’s 
publications in favor of independence and democracy as treason”.529
Huseyin Cahit Yalcin on 4 December entitled “Kalkin Ey .. Ehli Vatan: Bir Vatan 
Cephesine Luzum Vardir [Rise up …. Tame Nation: There is a need for a home 
front] where he stated that;
“This nation, for centuries, resisted attacks from the north. Today again 
land and bases from the Bhosphorus is demanded ….. When I opened 
“Gorusler”  and  read  Mrs.  Sertel’s  “Chained  Independence”  article,  I 
immediately understood the kind of independence they aimed to achieve 
with red irons adorning the pages”.530
The article  was the catalysis  for what  is  called the December  4 events where 
students destroyed  Tan Newspaper.  This episode demonstrates  clearly that  not 
only was there debate but a very heated one about the nature of democracy in 
Turkey. The alternative view that Turkey needed reforms was being voiced, the 
governments policies or lack thereof was being discussed and furthermore these 
criticisms  were  being  countered  by  the  usage  of  the  dominant  narrative.  The 
criticisms were not discussed but rather attacked by relying on how making them 
unsettled the unity of the nation.  Yalcin’s attacks on Sertel do not discuss the 
specific merits of a policy or a certain reform rather he frames the criticism as 
efforts of ‘foreign agents’ to destabilize Turkey. The notion of ‘foreign agents’ is 
a  recurring  one  as  it  assumes  Turkey  to  be  unified  only  to  be  infiltrated  by 
‘foreign agents’ aiming to divide the country. 
DECEMBER 4 EVENTS
On 4 December students started to walk from Istanbul University towards Tan 
Newspaper.  Zekeriya  Sertel  had  warned  the  governor  Lutfi  Kirdar  but  the 
529 Sabiha Sertel, ‘Bu Devrim Ibret ve Meserret Gazeteleri’, Tan, 1 December 1945.
530 Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, “Kalkin Ey Ehli Vatan: Bir Vatan Cephesine Ihtiyac Vardir [Rise up … 
Tame Nation: There is a need for a home front],” Tanin, 4 December 1945.
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demonstrators  met  with no resistance as they walked to Tan newspaper.  After 
destroying Tan, they walked towards the printing houses of La Turquie and Yeni  
Dunya. They ranted “Long Live Inonu, Damn the Communists”. The plan was to 
go to Kadikoy and attack the Sertel’s house but the governor stopped them when 
he ordered the Kadikoy ferry the demonstrators were riding to the islands. Sabiha 
Sertel, Zekeriya Sertel and Cami Baykurt were arrested and investigations were 
started about the lecturers who had promised articles.531 
In his memoirs Zekeriya Sertel recounts the events of 4 December as follows:
“Towards the end of 1945, the first issue of the magazine ‘Gorusler’ was 
published. Gorusler’s  publication made a huge impact.  The first issue 
was  snatched.  Within  a  day  we  had  no  copies  left.  Under  the  title 
“Chained Independence” the magazine had demonstrated through strong 
articles and pictures how the one chief and one party system chained our 
democratic right and freedoms. In the first page we declared that we had 
obtained articles from Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Koprulu. 
Gorusler received wide interest because it answered the public’s need for 
freedom. The public found what it  wanted to say but couldn’t  in this 
magazine.  However,  the publication of the magazine had angered the 
government especially Inonu and Saracoglu. It was the second and third 
day  of  the  publication.  An acquaintance  came.  He  informed  me that 
tomorrow  some  university  students  were  going  to  organize  a 
demonstration in front of the publication house. ….. He also advised to 
take precautions … I phoned the Governor Lutfi Kirdar. I gave the news 
and requested that the government take precautions.
The Governor: “I know and I have taken the necessary precautions, don’t 
worry.” 
I  opened  the  newspaper  the  next  day.  Huseyin  Cahit  Yalcin  had  an 
article in Tanin entitled “Kalkin Ey Ehli Vatan” provoking the public 
against us. He called the Tan newspaper communist and called on the 
public  to  destroy  our  publishing  house.  This  meant  that  the 
demonstration had been organized by the government and had ordered 
Huseyin Cahit to write such an article. ….. Early that morning a student 
phoned warning me that some students were getting ready to attack the 
Tan  publishing  house.  I  phoned  the  governor  again  and  asked  what 
precautions were taken.
He  said  “Don’t  worry.  The  police  blockaded  the  publishing  house. 
There’s no danger.” 
The morning of 4 December 1945 fascist university students with bijlen, 
sledges  and  red  ink  attacked  the  publishing  house.  The  police  just 
watched the events unfold. The demonstrations used the bijlen to break 
the doors.  They broke the  machines  with  the  sledges.  …. Then with 
bottles  of  red ink in  their  hands  they started  looking for  us  shouting 
“where are the Sertel’s”. Their aim was to undress us, paint us in red and 
then take us around in streets shouting “Here are the reds”.  All these 
happened in front of the police.532 
Sabiha Sertel’s account also discusses the warnings from the Governor and states 
531 
532 Sertel, Hatirladiklarim, 267-271
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that:
“ Zekeriya … phoned the Governor Lutfi Kirdar:
‘I had received information about an attack on the publication house and 
informed you.  You said ‘Don’t  worry,  nothing will  happen’.  But  the 
publication  house  has  been  destroyed  and  now  I  hear  that  they’re 
attempting to come to our house. At least prevent that.’
The Governor answered by saying:
‘The danger has passed, but, where are you phoning from?’
‘My house’
‘Don’t stay there!’
So we were still not safe,  …. We returned home after three days.533
Celal Bayar and Tevfik Rustu Aras refused any involvement with the magazine. 
This  had  broken  the  alliance  of  the  “liberals”  and  “leftists”  against  the 
government in calling for further democratization.  Sertel  states in his memoirs 
that;
“Tevfik Rustu had separated  from Celal  Bayar  and Adnan Menderes. 
The newly established Democrat Party had started denying the principles 
we  had  thought  of  at  first.  We  knew  that  Celal  Bayar  and  Adnan 
Menderes would want to break away to liberalism sooner or later. But 
we had thought that we could at least work together until a democratic 
system  was  established.  The  destruction  of  Tan  publishing  house 
accelerated the process and everyone retreated to their own camp before 
we could achieve our aims”.534
As the “liberals” aligned themselves with the center and adopted the dominant 
narrative  two trends appeared.  Firstly,  the “left”  became more  and more  of  a 
fringe opposition and the attacks towards it intensified. Secondly, the “liberals” 
and namely the Democrat Party adopted RPP’s tactic of accusing people of being 
leftist. As shown in this caricature Vatan and Tan both tried to influence the new 
party and create an alliance against the government.
533 Sabiha Sertel, Roman Gibi (Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 1987), 314-317
534 Sertel, Hatirladiklarim, 235
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The events that led to the destruction of Tan ensured that Vatan and Democrat 
Party  distanced  themselves  completely  from  Tan  and  the  possibility  of  any 
alliance  against  the  policies  of  the  government  was  destroyed.   The  constant 
attacks  towards  Tan newspaper,  the  reaction  of  the  students,  the fact  that  the 
writers of the magazine rather than the students themselves were reproached by 
law  demonstrates  a  systemic  effort  by  the  government  to  silence  alternative 
voices. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter focused on the period from 1945 to 1947 in an attempt to explain the 
beginning of the ‘transition period’. As a transitional period, the main narratives 
about the Turkish nation, democracy, foreign policy threats were being defined 
and redefined based on Turkey’s historical definition of itself and the changing 
international and domestic conditions. The dominant narrative itself adopted to 
these changing conditions by internationalizing the foreign policy objectives of 
Turkey and adopting an orthodox interpretation of American foreign policy. The 
democratization debates were controlled through framing the debate on national 
security terms and aligning them with the changing international conditions. As a 
consequence, the liberal front that presented alternative narratives was destroyed 
and an important component of the front, the Democrat Party, was co-opted into 
the  dominant  narrative.  It  needs  to  be  further  emphasized  that  the  Cold  War 
narrative  was  an  enterprise  readily  entered  into  by  Turkish  elites.  The 
juxtaposition of the Cold War narrative into the events of the day reinforced the 
general  Turkish  narrative  of  itself.  This  section  has  demonstrated  how  these 
narratives and discourses about the Turkish nation, democracy, foreign policy, the 
United  States  and  the  international  system not  only  reinforced  the  Cold  War 
narrative  but  also  reinforced  a  specific  understanding  of  Turkish  history.  The 
dominant discourses of/about events were based on a specific understanding of 
modernity,  of democratization,  and most importantly of the Turkish nation. As 
Hobsbawn states “the “narrative” of the nation is told and retold through national 
histories, literatures, the media and popular culture, which together provide a set 
of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and 
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rituals”.535 The  manner  in  which  the  international  system,  foreign  policy  and 
threats  to  national  unity  were  interpreted  is  linked  to  an  understanding  of 
Turkey’s past and an ideal for its future. The next chapter focuses on the period 
between  1947  and 1949  when  the  debates  about  democratization  and  foreign 
policy shift focus. With the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan the alignment 
of Turkey with the Western sphere becomes more apparent there is an increasing 
criticism from the alternative narratives. Furthermore, the democratization debate 
shifts focus as the dominant narrative becomes a defender of democratization on 
its own terms.
CHAPTER VI: SOLIDIFICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will  focus on the period from the announcement  of the Truman 
Doctrine till the start of the Korean War. This period is generally characterized 
as  the  solidification  of  Cold  War  alliances  and  the  establishment  of  United 
States’s Cold War foreign policy. American foreign policy through the Marshall 
Plan and the Truman Doctrine starts to delineate its sphere of influence. With 
respect to Turkey, in the international level it is perceived as the period when 
Turkey joined the Western alliance. The events of the period such as the Truman 
Doctrine,  Marshall  Plan  solidified  Turkey’s  position  within  the  Cold  War 
discourse. Domestically, this period is also when the ‘transition to democracy’ is 
‘achieved’. 
Turkish-American  relations  became  closer  and  Turkey  entered  the  Western 
Alliance with the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The 
Truman Doctrine declared on 12 March 1947 stated that economic and military 
aid would be extended to Greece and Turkey in order to help them against the 
Soviet Union. The declaration itself did not name the Soviet Union but stated 
535 Hobsbawn, “Inventing the Past,” 52
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that  it  was  ‘the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  support  free  peoples  who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities  or by outside pressures.” 
The Marshall Plan declared on June 1947 aimed to reconstruct the devastated 
economies of European states. The plan was extended to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe but it was rejected.  This was another instance of the diverging 
visions  of  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Domestically,  the 
democratization  debates  shifted  focus  as  the  dominant  narrative  became  a 
defender  of  democratization  defined  on  their  own  terms.  The  debates 
surrounding the extension of Martial Law is an example of how democracy was 
defined in  order  to  fit  the  dominant  narratives  understanding of  Turkey as  a 
nation and its role in the international system. 
These  narratives  focus  on  the  establishment  of  the  Cold  War  dynamics  and 
Turkey’s efforts to situate itself within them. This chapter focuses on the two 
main narratives that are being consolidated during this period. The first narrative 
focuses on domestic politics and the redefinition of what democratization means 
based  on  the  newly  forming  understanding  of  national  security.  The  second 
narrative focuses on internationalizing Turkey’s crisis and situating them within 
the Cold War dynamics. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first 
part will discuss the dominant and alternative narratives in domestic and foreign 
policy focusing specifically on the main narratives within these spheres. It will 
provide  the  main  debates  surrounding  the  concepts  of  democratization  and 
national  security and discuss the manner  in which these redefinitions became 
embedded into the narratives of Turkish identity. This part will also discuss the 
ways in which Turkish foreign policy was embedded into the narrative of the 
Cold War and aligned with Western ideals and aims. The second part  of the 
chapter will discuss the ways in which the opposition shown to the dominant 
narratives in the previous section was silenced and co-opted by the dominant 
narrative.  The  next  step  was  to  establish  dominance  over  the  definition  of 
democratization  and silence  the  remaining factions.  The first  part  focuses  on 
domestic politics and specifically the narratives of democratization and national 
security and how they became interlinked. The second part  discusses Turkish 
foreign policy and the aim to embed the crises faced into the parameters of the 
emerging Cold War dynamics.
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II. ‘SOLIDIFYING’ DEMOCRACY
This section aims to discuss the ways in which the debate shifted its focus from 
whether or not democratization was necessary to how and when democratization 
should  happen  and  who  should  be  included  in  the  process.  The  debate  was 
framed  so  as  to  exclude  communism  from  the  democratization  process  by 
identifying  it  as  a  threat  to  national  security.  By excluding  communism and 
socialism  from  their  definition  of  democratization,  they  could  stand  for 
democratization  and  also  national  security.  By  controlling  the  process  of 
democratization  and  tying  it  to  an  understanding  of  national  security,  the 
narrative changed from framing democratization as a danger to national security 
to framing democratization – a democratization defined by them – as necessary 
to national security.  As such the narrative of “threatening to divide the state” 
remained the same but rather than have as its perpetrators liberal democrats, it 
only focused on communists.
The  framing  of  the  debate  around  communism ensured  that  not  only  was  it 
against  national  unity  but  also  against  the  goal  of  westernization  and 
modernization that were the cornerstones of the Republican ideal. As argued by 
Cihad Baban; 
“There  are  communist  agents  in  Turkey  ..  .disguising  in  different 
manners, there are teachers among them, leftist voices have come from 
the Faculty of History and Language in Ankara and became teachers … 
the danger is spreading … the Ankara University Senate has not shown 
the sensibility expected from it in this national cause”.536
The  continuing  theme  of  ‘foreign  agents’  needs  to  be  underlined  here  as  it 
implied that Turkey itself was a unitary and stable unit but it was these ‘agents’ 
creating instability. As such the problems being experienced were the result of a 
conscious  foreign  effort  to  destabilize  Turkey and not  because of  issues  that 
might  be  inherent  in  the Turkish political  system.  Framing  communism as  a 
threat to national unity defined democratization that could happen in a specific 
manner. Recep Peker defined it in a 1947 speech “communism is the denial of 
536 Cihad Baban, ‘Leftist Issue in the Ankara University’, Tasvir , 21 December1947
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nationalism” and argued that those who adhered to international ideologies were 
threatening national unity. Thus according to this perspective, the primary focus 
of the communism debate is not about how it affects democratization but how it 
affects national unity. He also stated “apart from those that have led astray by 
international ideologies, all Turks want national unity”.537 Thus, communism was 
defined  a  direct  threat  to  national  unity.  National  unity  was/is  one  of  the 
cornerstones  of  the  narrative  of  Turkish  identity;  and  national  unity  was 
concomitant with complete belief with Republican ideals.  As such predicating 
national unity into the discussions of communism automatically brands it as a 
national threat. Democracy was reconceptualized based on this understanding of 
the threat of communism and became interrelated primarily with nationalism.
This  was  not  only  limited  to  communists  nor  was  this  attitude  towards 
communism developed concomitant to the development of Cold War dynamics. 
The  discussions  of  religion,  democracy,  and  changing  press  law,  extending 
martial law were all interpreted as threats to Republican ideals. As stated “the 
government  considers  the  support  of  Republican  institutions  as  the  basis  of 
democracy”.538 Definition of the Turkish nation was directly implicated within 
this discussion since changing the nature of the one-party regime would have 
inevitably altered the trajectory the Turkish state was set on. Communism was 
seen as  a  way to destabilize  the Turkish state  and communists  were seen as 
agents of the Soviet Union. As stated in Ulus  newspaper “the activities of the 
red fifth column are linked with the issue of Russian demands. The main issue is 
to  weaken the  present  government  who is  determined  to  defend the  right  of 
Turkey till the end”.539 As such communism was a tool used by “foreign agents” 
to threaten national unity but unlike previous threats it used internal dynamics 
and  citizens  to  achieve  this  goal  hence  becoming  even  more  dangerous  to 
national  unity.  Examples  from Greece  were  given  to  demonstrate  this  point; 
“Greece is not under occupation. They do not have Serb or Bulgarian gangs in 
their mountains. All these are because of their own children who are left without 
537 Recep Peker makes a Description of Nationalism, Ulus, 29 March 1947, in Basbakanlik Devlet  
Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 12.6.9.7.
538 In  the Face of a Comlicated Nature,  Nihat Erim, 1 December 1948, in  Basbakanlik Devlet  
Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.68.2.
539 “Continuing Provocations”, Ulus, 31 August 1946
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any love for their nation once under the influence and service of foreigners”.540 
‘Foreign agents’ infiltrating to destabilize the government is a common narrative 
used  in  Turkish  historiography.541 It  achieves  the  vilification  of  an  “other” 
sinister  enough  to  corrupt  Turkish  citizens  but  also  reifies  the  narrative  of 
national unity since national unity though threatened is still intact for events are 
not  ascribed directly  to  Turkish citizens  but  “foreign  agents” and once those 
“foreign agents” are dealt with national unity can continue. Internal provocation 
became  the  rationale  for  continuing  a  certain  style  of  democracy,  the 
continuation of martial law, closing down of parties and the limiting of general 
freedoms. As argued, 
“the propaganda against the Turkish state that started outside have in no 
time turned to internal attacks on the regime and state authority. We are 
for freedom. If communism was not a system that specifically targeted 
the elimination of freedom we could have allowed it to be discussed. But 
communism will destroy the freedoms it champions the first chance it 
gets. Communism is a new form of imperialism. Communism in Turkey 
is about the survival of the Turkish state”.542
The  framing  of  the  discussion  excludes  communism  in  the  definitions  of 
democracy. The freedoms that are being demanded are presented as ploys from 
communist agents to take over and eradicate democracy and national unity. The 
alternative  narratives  focused  on  the  domestic  problems  that  Turkey  was 
encountering and the need to solve them. Turkish foreign policy in itself was not 
the focus of their criticisms but rather the domestic condition of Turkey.
540 “An Important Example”, Ulus, 7 September 1946
541  For the way in which the ‘foreign agents’ narrative is used in Turkish history textbooks see: 
542 “You can not threaten the Existence of the Turkish nation”, Ulus, 18 December 1946
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As can be seen in the above illustration the criticism towards the definition of 
democracy was focusing on the economic hardships. The illustration does not 
differentiate between political allegiances but presents all the parties involved as 
interested in their own plight and crying because of their own concerns whereas 
the public at large is crying because of hunger. As stated in an article;
“what did we do in 25 years
we tore down houses and built public squares
we built statutes
when we couldn’t deal with one party … we established another one
we made Fahri Kurtulus a member of Parliament
we made Cemil Barlas a minister
what we didn’t do …..
we couldn’t give the people the coal they needed
we couldn’t save the hundreds of kids dying of tuberculosis
we still couldn’t teach the people to live without food, water and clothes 
and to economize”543
543 Markopasa, 5 November 1948
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The  debates  surrounding  the  extension  of  the  Martial  Law  demonstrated 
demonstrates how domestic politics and foreign policy concerns became more 
interlinked.  Furthermore,  the  debates  reveal  the  manner  in  which  the 
international system, the ‘Cold War’ and Turkey’s role in it were defined by the 
dominant narrative. In a speech explaining domestic and foreign policy, Prime 
Minister  Recep  Peker  stated  that;  “When  the  existence  of  states  are  in 
consideration the main issue is strategy. The area where Martial Law is being 
imposed is the Marmara area where the Bhosphorus is .. this is the area that will 
be first thought of if Turkey is going to be attacked. As a consequence, it is the 
most important area in establishing Turkey’s security”.544
Furthermore, in describing the present state of the international system he stated 
that;
“Even though the war between the Allies and Axis powers is over, the 
guns and bombs of the Second World War have been replaced by an 
insidious silence. Turkey needs to be alert because in the present danger 
will  not  be  as  obvious  as  an  invasion.  Land  has  been  demanded  of 
Turkey. A foreign base has been demanded under the guise of common 
defense in the Bhosphorus. We live in a period where there has not been 
a withdrawal of these demands”.545
As such the threat Turkey was facing was identified. It was under danger of an 
external attack and had to be prepared for it by continuing martial law. These 
discussions  framed  Turkey’s  national  security  with  Cold  War  terms.  Rasin 
Kaplan stated that; “when the great American nation states that peace has not yet 
been established, that peace is in danger, and one of those areas under the most 
danger is our borders, some are still indecisive and still don’t comprehend the 
reasons  for  martial  law”.546 Hence,  the  reframing  was  based  on  America’s 
definitions of threat and Turkey was positioned within that definition. As stated 
in the report; “there is no peace in the world and international trust has not been 
established. President Truman has pointed out the dark and dangerous situation 
the  world  is  in  his  speech  to  the  Congress”.547 Thus,  the  danger  defined  by 
Truman  was  adopted  to  be  the  primary  concern  of  the  Turkish  state. 
Furthermore, it was stated that;  “the pain and suffering continued as could be 
544 Parliament Meeting, 28.5.1947, in  Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, 
Code: 30 01, Place: 12 71 3
545 Parliament Meeting, 28.5.1947, 0 30 01 12 71 3,
546 Ibid.
547 Ibid.
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seen in the continuing chaos in Greece. Which nation does not take precautions 
when her neighbors’ house is burning down? Our first precaution is martial law. 
Martial Law creates order”.548
The  opposition  countered  this  effort  by  pointing  out  that  martial  law  was 
interfering with political life. Bayar pointed out “why is martial law necessary on 
top of the security provided by the political force”?549 A further argument used 
by the opposition was that martial law might be used as a political tool to weaken 
the opposition and police domestic politics. Ismail Hakki Cevik pointed out that 
even  though  the  argument  for  martial  law  was  to  fight  communism,  the 
government’s actions proved otherwise, it was used for domestic purposes. The 
opposition in its arguments against the extension of martial law tied the matter of 
political stability and the future of the democratization process.550
Furthermore, Hasan Dincer in his speech argued that;
 “even though absolute peace has not been established the Second World 
War is over, and even though there might be foreign powers who have 
demands on our lands these are not valid reasons to extend martial law. 
Because our constitution specifies that martial law can be declared when 
there is an external threat. It means that politically and militarily war has 
become inevitable”.551
The arguments concentrated on maintaining a division between internal stability 
and external threats. The Republican Party wanted a national security approach 
that linked the domestic and foreign threat. The main discussion point was its 
implication  for  the  democratization  process.  The Republican  Party wanted to 
control the process by directly associating it to the notion of national security. 
The  opposition  countered  this  because  it  would  limit  the  democratization 
process.
Their priority as can be seen in these discussions is the maintenance of order. 
Furthermore, the ‘Cold War’ understanding of international distrust, of imminent 
danger are reproduced within these debates as Truman’s declaration that threat 
still exists is taken to demonstrate that Turkey needs to continue being ready for 
a possibility of war. The problems with the Soviet Union were intertwined with 
548 Ibid.
549 Ibid.
550 Ibid.
551 Ibid.
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the American narrative of the Cold War not only underlying the importance of 
Turkey as one of the states directly under threat but also further strengthening the 
dominant discourse about foreign threats against the Turkish state. The foreign 
policy/domestic  politics  became more  intertwined  as  the Cold War discourse 
adopted  necessitated  further  controls  by  the  government  to  monitor  the 
communist threat against the unity of the state. The discourse adopted is that of 
the Cold War whereby the next attack might not necessarily be one of direct 
attack causing the Third World War but the threat is communist infiltration that 
can be defended by allying oneself with freedom loving nations. The tensions 
with the Soviet Union was embedded into this discourse of threat and necessity 
for security. 
III. INTERNATIONALIZING FOREIGN POLICY
This  section  focuses  on  how  the  foreign  policy  issues  Turkey  faced  were 
internationalized and Turkish foreign policy in general was embedded into the 
general American Cold War narrative. This was done through adopting adopting 
America’s  Cold  War  discourse  and  the  western  interpretations  of  the 
international system and Soviet foreign policy. 
Firstly, the dominant narrative adopted an orthodox interpretation of American 
foreign policy defining it as primarily isolationist. A similar statement was made 
in 1947 to a New York Times correspondent; “The Prime Minister expressed his 
contentment  of  America  leaving  its  isolationist  policies  and  argued  that 
American involvement will not only help the world but also the United States 
herself.552” More detailed discussions were made in newspapers that argued that;
“Ever since gaining its independence 169 years ago United States has 
served to save the independence of humanity twice. In  the first world 
war American army came to the help of Europe that had lost its strength 
and hope …. It has again been this nation that brought in its technical 
knowledge and military strength and increased the Allies chance of a 
victory”.553
This narrative was taken further by Falih Rifki Atay who argued that; “American 
552 NY  Times  Correspondent  on  Turkey,  17  April  1947,  in  Basbakanlik  Devlet  Arsivleri,  
Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:12.70.5.
553 Esat Tekeli, “America’s Independence Day”, Ulus, 6 July 1945
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foreign  policy  has  left  its  isolationist  policy  and  changed  its  direction  after 
participating in two world wars in 25 years without any calculations or territorial 
designs. It is no doubt that if this direction had been adopted at the end of the 
First World War the Second World War would not have happened”.554 This view 
is in line with the “orthodox realist” explanation of American foreign policy555 
that argues that American isolationist policies had to be left behind and America 
needed to become more involved in European affairs to prevent further wars. 
The  Turkish  narrative  of  American  foreign  policy  clearly  ascribed  to  the 
orthodox realist interpretation of American foreign policy. The Prime Minister 
ascribes  to  the  dominant  American  narrative  about  America’s  isolationist 
policies and it coming to the aid of states in need. The alliance with the United 
States was also presented as part of the Westernization process, and as part of the 
progress deeply embedded in the definition of the Turkish nation.
“America who is in every way the strongest and most democratic state in 
the world has  decided  to  strengthen  our nation that  is  the fortress  of 
democracy in the Near and Middle East. She is giving millions of dollars 
worth  of  arms  and  supplies  to  support  our  national  defense.  She  is 
sending specialists to demonstrate  how to use them. The only way to 
develop and renew our country is to take advantage of America”.556 
America is presented as the pinnacle of modernization that Turkish identity was 
based  on  achieving.  As  such  their  aid  becomes  a  necessary  step  in  the 
progression towards that goal that was established by the revolution. Thus it is 
not only that America has higher ideals but also that those Republican ideals are 
what are based upon. Moreover, Turkey’s role in receiving the aid and in allying 
itself with America was explained within the contours of the Cold War discourse 
(explaining the international system and Turkey’s relations with other states).
Framing America and its foreign policy goals as representative of the Republican 
ideals Turkey aimed to realize meant that Turkish foreign policy aims, threats 
554 “Decisiveness in Foreign Policy”, Ulus, 8 October 1946
555 Halle argued that “in 1917-1918, the United States, morally and psychologically unequipped to 
do so, came into the War at the eleventh hour to restore the balance of power, while pretending 
that it was doing something altogether different and nobler. The result was that the lesson was not 
learned the first time, that it had to be repeated in 1941, and that it would finally be learned only in 
1947, when at last the United States, now grim and realistic, would abandon its isolationist policy 
and all its outworn traditions in order to meet the challenges of Stalinist Russia”,  Cold War as 
History, 26
556 Abidin Daver ,“Devlet Makinesini Islah”,Cumhuriyet, 20 August 1948
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were redefined in order to fit these principles. In an article written on 1948 Nihat 
Erim provided an overview of the international system by stating that;
“On the one hand Iranian  government  forces  have  received  orders  to 
enter  Azerbaijan  lands  and  on  the  other  hand  the  change  in  attitude 
Molotov  displayed  in  New  York  ……The tense  atmosphere  that  has 
existed since the war ended has reacted its limit. Especially in recent 
weeks it has reached a new level when Molotov asked about the number 
of Allied soldiers in Allied states. The implication of this question was; 
what  is  the  purpose  of  these  forces.  This  question  was  not  left 
unanswered.  England and the United States stated that  we should not 
only state how many forces are on the ground but how many forces a 
state has mobilized. The implication was that the reason behind allied 
forces in Europe is the large army the Soviet Union has at home”.557
The interpretation of the Second War World, the international system and Soviet 
foreign policy aims in this article is in accordance with the traditional American 
Cold War interpretations that questioned appeasement as a viable policy option, 
that regarded Soviet Union as an expansionist power that could not be reasoned 
with and that concluded that this expansion had to be met with resolution. Such an 
approach not only vilifies the Soviet Union to an extent where their every action is 
reduced to  the seeking for  more  power for  the  sake of  it  but  also closes  any 
possibility  of  approaching  the  issues  experienced  with  the  Soviet  Union  in  a 
diplomatic manner.  Hence, the Cold War definition of the international system 
and America’s conception of threat were adopted. Furthermore, the turbulence in 
Greece is given as a reason to be careful since the threat can expand. Moreover, 
examples from Italy and Belgium were given in newspapers about the dangers 
posed by communism. Yeni Sabah argued that;
“It  is  clear  that  communists  are  creating  frenzy  in  Italy,  government 
searches  in  communist  headquarters  found  guns,  ammunitions  and 
bombs. The communists themselves  admitted that  they were  going to 
side  with  the  Soviets  and  create  anarchy.  Shouldn’t  necessary 
precautions be taken against the armament of the fifth column? In the 
case  of  an  outside  attack  the army will  be  busy fighting  the  enemy.  
Should  it  also  be  expected  to  deal  with  domestic  sabotage  and 
rebellion”.558
By  giving  examples  of  the  dilemmas  faced  by  established  democracies  in 
Europe,  the article  argues that;  “we need to  learn lessons from these foreign 
examples as we are just  entering the democratic  stage”.559 The implication of 
557  Ulus Newspaper,  1 December 1948, In the Face of a Complicated Picture, Nihat Erim, in 
Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 0 30 01, Place: 11 68 2,
558 Yeni Sabah, 8.8. 1950
559 Ibid.
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these arguments was that Europe with all the established rules and procedures 
was ill-equipped to deal with the threat of communist infiltration which could 
not only be solved by large armies. How could Turkey deal with these threats 
when it had such fragile institutions? As the government program stated in 1947; 
“aim of the government is to further develop democracy and establish political 
security  which  we  believe  is  a  prerequisite  for  it”.560 Yet  by  adopting  the 
discourse  of  the  Cold  War  the  dominant  political  understanding  of  what 
constituted  a  threat  to  establishing  political  security  was  widened.  Political 
security now included any leftist ideas, any criticism that the present rules and 
procedures be changed, any questioning of the foreign policy choices. As stated 
by Nihat Erim; “Think of our foreign relations, think of the threats we face, in 
these conditions if martial law is lifted, if press is completely free, how will this 
end?  What  will  happen  after”?561 Thus  lifting  restrictions  on  the  press,  not 
renewing  the  martial  law  became  direct  threats  on  the  Turkish  nation.  The 
argument  was  based  on  the  threat  of  “communism”  being  so  prevalent  and 
‘foreign agents’ manipulating Turkish citizens.  Russia’s aims and its  dealings 
with Turkey were embedded within the larger  Cold War context.  Nihat Erim 
argued in an article that;
“Turkish answer proved baseless the tension trying to be stirred about a 
couple of small ships that crossed the Straits during the Second World 
War. Soviets want to change the Montreux Agreement for reasons yet 
unknown.  They want to set up such a system that the Black Sea states -  
i.e.  Russia -  can have privileged rights.  Aim is to have Turkey in a  
position so that it has to bow to the Soviets, Russia does not only aim for  
hegemony in the Black Sea but also the Mediterranean”.562
The Russian threat is not only presented as a threat to Turkey but also to the 
region and  the  international  system situating  Turkey at  the  center  of  it.  The 
argument  is  based upon Turkey’s  credentials  as a  “peace-loving nation” who 
wants  to  solve  issues  through  international  means.  As  stated  by  the  Prime 
Minister; 
 “We  desire  sincere  and  friendly  relations  with  all  our  neighbors 
including our great  neighbor Soviet Russia.  but  the realization of this 
does  not  depend  solely  on  our  desire  ……  In  view  of  the  overall  
560 The Government Programme read by Hasan Saka, 13 October 1947, in  Basbakanlik Devlet  
Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: D7, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:54.328.3.
561 Nihat Erim Kocaeli Speech (the Changing of the Press Law), in Basbakanlik Devlet Arsivleri,  
Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:11.65.7.
562 Nihat  Erim,  “After  the  Turkish  Answer”,  Ulus,  24  October  1946,  in  Basbakanlik  Devlet  
Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:11.66.2.
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security,  not  only of Turkey but also of the  Mediterranean region to 
which Turkey belongs we deem it essential that a Mediterranean  defense 
system  should  be  set  up  and  linked  to  the  general  security  system 
provided for under  the Atlantic pact”.563
Internationalizing the problem also meant internationalizing the solution clearly 
situating Turkey within the Western Alliance. In its foreign policy declarations 
references are made to the United Nations, its principles and how Turkey is an 
intricate  part  of  it  by  stating  that  “our  government  who  has  abided  by  the 
principles of the United Nations will continue to work for the establishment of 
peace and security”.564 As well as internationalizing the problem, relations with 
the  Soviet  Union  were  also  embedded  in  a  democracy/authoritarianism 
dichotomy that reproduced the main Cold War narrative and American foreign 
policy aims. As stated in Tanin; “It is a trouble upon the world …. Russia is not a 
state or government owned by a nation, it’s a huge ragtag, a nations’ prison and 
an example of hell on earth .. Rights and liberties of the civilized European states 
cannot  enter  the  borders  of  the  Russian  Empire.  Because  if  Russian  rulers 
recognize freedoms Russia will crumble”.565
Soviet foreign policy aims was regarded with suspicion and any attempt to enter 
talks was seen as appeasement. As argued by Abidin Daver ;
“History has shown that a loose and cowardly appeasement policy gave 
Germany and Japan courage and caused the Second World War. Soviet 
Russia aims to fill the void left by Germany and Japan. Since Moscow 
worships power, it interprets lenient policies as a sign of weakness and 
attempts to realize its  own ambitions at  every juncture.  Either  Soviet 
Russia  will  continue  to  expand  or  there  will  be  war.  Since  lenient 
policies have failed, United States and Great Britain have no choice but 
to apply a policy based on power and resilience”.566
The alternative narrative concentrated on the implications of the American aid 
and aligning with America. Was America really exporting democracy or buying 
Turkey’s independence? The criticism focused on how aligning with America 
meant betraying the ideals of the Turkish revolution and independence. As the 
below cartoon illustrates, American aid and its promise of democratization was 
563 Questions submitted to H.E. M. Adnan Menderes,  Prime Minister of Turkey,  by Mr. Ralph 
Izzard,  Special  Correspondent to the Daily Mail, London,  5 June 1950,  in  Basbakanlik Devlet  
Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: E4, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place:60.372..2.
564 Nihat Erim, “In the Face of a Complicated Nature”, Ulus, 1 December 1948, in  Basbakanlik  
Devlet Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 30..1.0.0, Place: 11.68.6
565 Tanin, 5 January 1946
566 Abidin Daver, “Rusya’ya Karsi Uysal mi, Metin mi Davranmali”, Cumhuriyet, 20 April 1947
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seen as another vehicle for imperialism.
According to Ali, the Republic had lost its anti-imperialist and populist qualities 
and resorted to violence and necessitated the support of America to remain in 
power.  He  stated  that,  “they’re  making  up  the  story  of  communists  in  the 
country”, and argued that;
“in reality our country has neither  enough communists to constitute a 
threat, nor a workers’ movement strong enough to support them. Despite 
this such a threat  is  being fabricated in order  to get  money from the 
States…. That is why they allow socialists parties to be opened so that 
they can close them for being “communist”. Newspapers that have done 
nothing but tell the truth are branded as “reds” and silenced. Professors 
who have an independent mind are fired. All these are done to give the 
impression,  internally  and  externally,  that  the  country  is  under  a  red 
threat”.567
Leftist  papers  criticized  the  alliance  with  America  because  they  felt  that  it 
diverted attention from the urgent reforms necessary to democratize Turkey and 
that a policy of neutrality would have benefited the realization of those reforms 
more. Hence to them the Marshall Plan was a way of creating dependency to the 
West that the independence war and the establishment of the Republic with its 
anti—imperialist rhetoric had initially tried to avert. As stated;  “WHERE ARE 
WE  GOING?  Are  we  going  to  sign  another  Sevr  agreement  in  the  25th 
anniversary of the Republic”.568 Mehmet Ali Aybar argued “Turkey was leaving 
567 Zincirli Hurriyet, 5.2.1948
568 Towards a New Sevr, Zincirli Hurriyet, year 1, No: 1, 5 April 1947
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a Swiss and Swedish type neutrality in favour of becoming an American station 
in the Near East necessitating a large army and stated that there is no benefit in 
allying Turkey to only one side”.569 With respect to the Marshall Plan he stated 
that “do you know what America wants from us in return for 150 million $ ….. 
They want us to play the role Poland played in WWII, and for us to already 
surrender to America.  We need to be friends with America,  England and the 
Soviet Union”.570
As seen in this cartoon published in Markopasa on 21 April  1947, the aid is 
perceived as being just another vehicle for controlling Turkey; whereas fascism 
used troops the Americans were using dollars. To the critics Marshall Plan was a 
vehicle for Western imperialism and would result in turning into a dependent 
country. The foreign policy of allying with the United States was criticized on 
two  fronts.  Firstly  there  was  the  argument  that  the  United  States  was  not 
Turkey’s only choice. The left because of the manner in which Turkey became 
linked to an alliance limiting its  foreign policy options criticized the Truman 
Doctrine  and  the  Marshall  Plan.  Secondly,  the  argument  revolved  around 
economic imperialism and how the Marshall  Plan and American “aid” would 
colonize Turkey. The main themes of the criticisms were not directly linked to 
Marxist thought but based on Turkey’s war of independence and the struggle to 
lift the capitulations imposed on the Ottoman Empire.  
569 Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Before and Above Everything Independence”, Zincirli Hurriyet, 5 April  
1947, Year 1, No. 1, p.4
570 Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Before and Above Everything Independence”
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IV. SILENCING, CO-OPTING, REDEFINING
As the above illustration demonstrates communism had been framed as an open 
threat and accusing someone of being a communist was something that could be 
done without much evidence.  The debates within this period marginalized the 
alternative narratives even further. The two events that represented their further 
marginalization  and  being  branded  as  traitors  was  the  endless  cases  brought 
against Markopasa and the Sokmensuer speech.
MARKOPASA CASES
Cemil Barlas had accused Markopasa of having “roots outside” implying that 
Markopasa writers  had ties to the Soviet  Union. As seen before the “foreign 
agents” narrative was used again to thwart criticisms towards the government. 
Markopasa writers reciprocated the accusation by stating that;
“you have become slaves by opening your doors to foreign investments. 
You have put up walls against ideas and science. As if these weren’t 
enough, now you go on about roots, roots outside, inside, on air … Why 
are  our  roots  outside?  Did  we  cover  the  face  of  freedom?  Are  we 
carrying fake identity cards? Do we have foreign bank accounts? ….. We 
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will  continue  to  tell  the  truth  even  if  it  means  looting,  death  or 
deportation. Is that why our root is outside”?571
In reply to Huseyin Cahit Yalcin argued that;  “according to him saying “let’s 
not  sell  out  to  the  English”  means  let’s  sell  out  to  the  Russians.  Maybe  its 
impossible for those like Yalcin to live without selling at, but we are only on the 
side of independence and justice” ….572 The main discussion revolved around 
staying  true  to  the  anti-imperialist  roots  of  the  war  of  independence  and 
maintaining  neutrality.  There  writers  actively  questioned  the  narrative  of 
inevitability of choosing a side and argued that Turkey could have more agency 
if  it  did not  use the United  States  as  a  tool  to  maintain  the status  quo.  The 
newspaper  was  under  constant  pressure  from  the  government  and  ran  with 
headlines such as “newspaper that is published when not being seized”, “political 
humor newspaper that is published when it finds the opportunity”, and “it is sold 
everywhere in the world but Ankara and Samsun”.573
During its brief life a myriad of cases were opened against it. Cemil Sait Barlas 
opened a case on January 1947 where Sabahattin Ali was accused of insulting 
Cemil Barlas and all parliamentarians. The article was written as a response to a 
speech Cemil Barlas gave where he argued that Markopasa had roots outside.574 
Sabahattin  Ali  was  sentenced  to  4  months  of  jail  time  and  was  released  on 
September  1947. On 10 March 1947 Falih Rifki  Atay opened a case for the 
article “Marko Pasa Ansiklopedisi: Biliyor musunuz? [Marko Pasa Encylopedia: 
Did you know?]”, where it was insinuated that Falih Rifki Atay lived in wealth. 
Sabahattin  Ali  was  sentenced  to  three  months  of  jail  but  the  sentence  was 
postponed. An unexpected oversight led to further cases when Markopasa did 
not respond in time to a demand about the author of a poem entitled “Dedigin” 
sent to it by a reader. The court closed Markopasa but because the notification 
had not reached them they published the 22nd issue of the magazine on 19 May 
1947 causing two other cases to be opened. When Marko Pasa was closed down 
by martial  law Sabahattin  Ali  opened  Merhum Pasa  on  26 May 1947.  Two 
571 Markopasa, 16 December 1946
572 Markopasa, 16 December 1946
573 Markopasa
574 This is again another example of the “foreign agents” narrative that was so prevalently used 
during this time and is still a part of the Turkish foreign policy narrative.
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articles from its first issue were also brought to court. Nihal Atsiz opened a case 
because of an article entitled “Young Friend [Genc Arkadas]” and Ismet Rasin 
Tumkurt because of “Hasan Ali – Kenan Doner” article. Sabahattin Ali was sent 
to jail for 12 days.575
The story of MarkoPasa presents a narrative not only of alternative visions but 
also a systemic effort to silence them by the government. MarkoPasa was not a 
“communist” publication. It criticized the government openly and did have leftist 
leanings but it did not support alliance with the Soviet Union per se. What it did 
was challenge the dominant narrative of “inevitability” of having no choice but 
to choose a side, of America’s “ideals” and pure motivations. They were branded 
as  a  “communist”  threat  because  it  strengthened  the  governments  position 
against them. Including MarkoPasa in any narrative of the Turkish Cold War not 
only  destabilizes  the  inevitability  narrative  but  also  problematizes  the 
westernization and modernity narrative. 
SOKMENSUER SPEECH 
On Janury 1947 Giresun representative Ahmed Ulus made an inquiry about the 
investigations on communist movement conducted by the State of Emergency. In 
reply Sukru Sokmensuer  read a report  outlining the communist  movement  in 
Turkey classifying  them into  five  periods.   According to  Sokmensuer  in  the 
fourth period “we witness sneaky and systemic communist publication activities. 
Poets  and authors  such as  Nazim Hikmet  started  to  spread communist  ideas 
under  the guise of  art  and these publications  had some effect  on young and 
excited brains.”.576 Sokmensuer read reports and letters claimed to have belonged 
to  Sefik  Husnu.  One  of  these  reports  stated  that  “we  guided  perfectly  two 
Marxist magazines published in Ankara. On the other side we tried to publish 
articles  in  Tan  newspaper  that  conveyed  our  views  on  the  war  and  general 
politics.”577 According  to  this  speech,  the  communists  also  attempted  to  lure 
575 For  further  details  on  the  history  and  cases  surrounding  Markopasa  see;  Levent  Cantek, 
Markopasa:  Bir  Mizah ve  Muhalefet  Efsanesi (Istanbul,  Iletisim Yayinlari,  2001);  for  a  more 
comprehensive  account  of  the  popular  culture  of  the  1945-1950  period  with  references  to 
Markopasa and other magazines see Levent Cantek, Cumhuriyetin Bulug Cagi (Istanbul: Iletisim 
Yayinlari, 2008).
576 Oner, Davam, 7
577 Ayin Tarihi; January 1947
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opposition  leaders  by  using  Tevfik  Rustu  Aras  to  contact  them.  He  further 
implied that Maresal Fevzi Cakmak consciously or not was involved in these 
communist activities.
In response to these accusations, on 5 February 1947 Maresal wrote an article 
stating that he was and always had been against communism. To prove that he 
provided examples  of  curtailing  communism when he was part  of the armed 
forces and added that  he had even warned the government  in the past  of an 
Education  Minister  supporting  communist  activities.578 On  8  February  1947 
Hasan Ali  Yucel wrote an open letter  asking the Maresal whether or not the 
mentioned Education Minister was himself. Fevzi Cakmak did not answer this 
letter  but Kenan Oner wrote an accusatory article in Yeni Sabah. In response 
Hasan Ali Yucel opened a defamation case against him where he stated that “not 
only  did  you  harbour  communists  in  your  ministry,  you  also  protected  them 
against attacks. You destroyed, beat up and crushed 23 young men with tortures 
that made one regret the ending of the Spanish Inquisition by mixing them up 
with nationalist issues”.579 The Oner-Yucel case started in February and one of 
the  main  issues  it  focused  on  was  the  identity  of  the  communists  Yucel 
protected.
27 DECEMBER DEMONSTRATIONS
The  political  climate  was  becoming  tenser  over  the  issue  of  who  were 
communists and whether or not they were infiltrating the government. A series 
of events culminated in the 27 December demonstrations.  The trigger for the 
events was the petition signed by 67 students demanding the expulsion of Prof. 
Pertev Naili Boratav (editor of Yurt ve Dunya) and Assoc. Prof. Behice Boran 
(editor of Adimlar) from the university. On 5 March 1947 24 SAAT published a 
petition signed by 108 students attacking the petition of 67 students defending 
the  lecturers.  On  5  March  Pertev  Naili  Boratav  had  to  cancel  a  conference 
because  the  hall  was  filled  with  students  making  anti-communist  speeches. 
578 Oner, Davam, 10
579 Gokhan Atilgan,  Behice Boran: Ogretim Uyesi, Siyasetci, Kurumcu (Istanbul: Yordam Kitap, 
2007), 90
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Selahattin Erturk warned about the “red flames surrounding the nation”.580 On 6 
March  around  a  thousand  demonstrators  demanded  that  conferences  be 
cancelled, expulsion of the communist teachers and students and the seizure of 
the Yurt and Dunya’s that had been bought during Yucel’s term. Kansu attempts 
to  appease  them  without  much  result.  The  demonstrators  sang  the  National 
Anthem and walked towards  Ulus  Square  while  destroying  copies  of  Marko 
Pasa and  24  Saat.  The  demonstrators  are  not  investigated.581 Hikmet  Tanyu 
wrote  a  leaflet  that  repeated  Sokmensuer’s  allegations  and  described  the 
demonstrations.  Assoc.  Prof  of  History  at  DTCF  Osman  Turan  published  a 
leaflet entitled “Gafletten Uyanalim” where he argued that these lecturers needed 
to be treated as “foreigners” as done in the United States and Great Britain.582
On 11 December Law Faculty Student Association General Assembly declared, 
“communism should be crashed where ever its seen, Reason for our existence is 
to live for the country, and to die for it when necessary”.583 The decision painted 
the  decision  to  fight  communism  as  a  life  and  death  issue.  The  declaration 
branded being a communist  as being traitors and was narrated in an either/or 
dichotomy.  Furthermore,  they declared that  “being communist  meant  being a 
Russian  agent”.584 All  associations  associated  with  the  National  Student 
Association declared their support for the Law Association.585
On 17 December 1947 Vatan newspaper declared “Anatolia has received with 
content  the decision of Turkish Student Association.   The other  day students 
from Izmir, Kutahya, and Konya sent letters declaring that they also mobilized in 
the struggle against communism”.586 RPP representative Fahri Kurtulus declared 
in a speech in Istanbul University that the communists started all fires.587 On 19 
December 1947 Parliamentarian Sadi Irmak made a speech stating that “these 
people carry list of names of the nationalists they aim to hang by the courts they 
580 Mumcu, 40’larin Cadi Kazani, 101; Cetik, Universitede Cadi Kazani, 19-21
581 Mumcu, 40’larin Cadi Kazani , 19-21
582 
583 Komunizmle Mucadele, Tasvir, 12 Aralik 1947
584 Komunizmle Mucadele, Tasvir, 12 Aralik 1947
585 Atilgan, Behice Boran, 99
586 ‘Gencligin Kominizm ile Mucadelesi’, Vatan ,17 Aralik 1947; Atilgan, Behice Boran, 99
587 ‘Egitim Bakanligi Binasini Moskova Emrindeki Kizillar Yakti’, Kudret, 27 Aralik 1947, 1,4.
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aim to establish” referring to Boran, Boratav and Berkes.588
Sokmensuer’s  speech,  nationalist  student  demonstrations,  petitions,  and  the 
leaflets  increased  the  tension  during  this  period  and led to  the 27 December 
demonstration. The morning of 27 December nationalist youth walked towards 
Ulus Square shouting,  “we don’t  want communist  teachers”,  after  singing the 
Turkish National  Anthem and put  a  wretch  on the Ulus monument  and then 
turned to Cebeci where about ten thousand had gathered”.589  Afterwards they 
walked to History Faculty and forcefully entered Rector Sevket Aziz Kansu’s 
office and demanded that he chant, “Damn the Communists” with them. They 
made him write, sign and stamp his resignation. From there they went to Turkish 
Youth Association (Turkiye  Gencler Dernegi - TGD) center and destroyed it. 
This  demonstration  lasted  5 hours  and did  not  meet  any resistance  from the 
police forces. Some parliamentarians even joined the demonstrations.590 
These events demonstrate that not only were the leftist opposition and criticism 
slowly  marginalized  but  anyone  deemed  to  not  completely  support  the 
government was also attacked under the guise that they were “communists” and 
“Russian agents”.  Furthermore,  even a small  narration of the series of events 
demonstrates that this period was not “unproblematic. It was not only domestic 
politics and democratization that was questioned but also the alliance with the 
West,  specifically  the United States  endangering the Westernization  narrative 
that was central to the identity of the Turkish state. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main narratives that permeated the recounting of events as shown in this 
chapter can be observed in these discourses and as such there is a clear alignment 
between the dominant discourses of the events as they unfolded and as they were 
588 ‘Meclis Milli Egitim Encumeninde Solcu Prof.’ler Hakkinda Siddetli Tenkitler Yapildi’, Tasvir, 
20 Aralik  1947,1.5;  ‘Faultedeki  Tahkikat  Meselesi’,  Ulus,  23 Aralik  1947, 1.2;  Derendelioglu 
1977: 198
589 “Ankarada  Yuksek  Tahsil  Gencliginin  Heyecani”,  Vatan,  7  Mart  1947,  1,4;  “Gencligin 
Komunizm Aleyhinde Mitingi”, 28 Aralik 1947, 1,4.; “Fakulteden Tahkikat Meselesi”, Ulus, 23 
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recounted. The chronological sequence of events presented in the histories of the 
Cold War reinforces the dominant discourse presented above. They concentrate 
on the “Soviet threat”, the American aid in the form of the Truman Doctrine and 
the  Marshall  Plan,  the  process  of  democratization  “started”  by  the  Inonu 
government  with the multi-party elections  of 1946. Such a narrative  tells  the 
story of the Turkish nation democratizing and westernizing in a way that fits into 
the imagination of the Turkish nation and the trajectory it should follow. The 
Cold War was emplotted into the westernization narrative with the alliance to the 
United States whereby joining NATO, entering the Korean War was presented as 
being accepted by the “West” and as proof that Turkey had finally become part 
of “Europe” and risen “to the level of civilized nations”. The Cold War alliance 
was written into the westernization narrative of the Turkish nation and it reified 
and reproduced the notion that Turkey was part of the “West”. Based on that the 
becoming  of  part  of  the  “Western  democracies”  within  the  Cold  War  also 
supported  Turkey’s  claims  to  democratize  and  become  part  of  the  modern, 
developed  and  western  world.  The  understanding  of  modernization  and 
democracy held by US officials when dealing with Third World countries fit the 
general vision the elites had for Turkey’s future. 
The dominant discourses that were produced and reified during this period were 
based  on  a  certain  understanding  of  the  Turkish  nation.  The  narrative 
(re)produced  by the  dominant  elite  is  the  Turkish  nation  imagined  since  the 
establishment of the republic; an imagination rooted in a specific comprehension 
of modernity and westernization. This argument not only highlights the specific 
nature  of  the  Turkish  modernization  project  (based  on  a  strictly  defined 
materialist-positivist  interpretation)  but  also  the  continuities  between  the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkish state that were “forgotten” by the Turkish ruling 
elite  as  they  based the  identity  of  the  Turkish  state  on  dichotomies  such  as 
modern/pre-modern,  western/non-western  where  the  Ottoman  past  was 
constructed as the pre-modern, non-western “other” of the Turkish state.
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CHAPTER VII  - CLOSURES
I. INTRODUCTION
The period from 1949 to 1951 is usually part of the ‘closure’ of the origins story of the 
Cold War. It contains within itself events such as the Korean War and the establishment 
of NATO that are narrated as the closing events of the origins of the Cold War. These 
events  signals  that  the  Cold  War  had  began.  NATO has  an  important  place  in  that 
narrative as the culmination of the ‘change’ American foreign policy undergoes from an 
isolationist power to one that enters alliances in order to assume its role as the ‘protector’ 
if the world.  The period between 1949 and 1951 are characterized by the rise to power 
of the Democratic  Party and Turkey’s  entrance into the Atlantic  Pact.  The Democrat 
Party won the 14 May 1950 elections.  Celal  Bayar  became President  of the Turkish 
Republic  and he appointed  Adnan Menderes  as  Prime Minister.  This  was a  massive 
change  in  Turkish  domestic  politics.  For  the  first  time  since  its  establishment  the 
founding party,  RPP,  was out  of power.  Despite  this  change of power the dominant 
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narratives that had been established with respect to democratization and foreign policy 
were continued under the rule of the Democrat Party. The rule of the Democrat Party 
reified  the  dominant  narratives  about  westernization  and  the  American  Cold  War 
discourse. 
The aim of this chapter is to show the final stage in the dominant narratives establishing 
themselves and the silencing of the alternative voices. Through the stages outlined in 
previous chapters, Turkish foreign policy and domestic politics was aligned with the 
changing international conditions based on dominant narratives of westernization and 
democratization that were part of the Republican ideal. The results of these processes 
become clear with Turkey joining the Korean War and its search for a place in the 
Atlantic Pact. 
 “The representation that constitute a crisis are produced in and through 
cultural processes and out of cultural resources – that is, in reality we 
know  and  endow  it  with  meaning.  This  constructive  process  is 
unavoidable for the simple reason that in order for the state to act, state 
officials must produce representations. These representations fix in place 
one particular  set  of  greatness  that  come to constitute ‘a  situation’ to 
which the state must then respond”.591
The previous  chapters  provided an  overview of  the  transition  in  the  codes  of 
intelligibility’  from  1945-1947  to  1947-1949  showing  the  construction  and 
representation  of  events  based  on  codes  of  intelligibility’  giving  meaning  to 
events and constructing threats by drawing from Turkish history.  The domestic 
and  foreign  policy  of  Turkey  during  these  periods  went  through  stages  of 
silencing alternative narratives and adapting to changing international conditions.
II. “CLOSURES” OF DEMOCRACY
The dominant  narrative  of  democratization,  westernization  and the  communist 
threat carried did not alter with the change of government but was actually more 
forceful  than  ever  before.  The  definition  of  communism and democracy were 
aligned even more closely with the Cold War discourse that was being adopted. A 
recurrent  theme  in  pointing  out  the  threat  of  communism  and  why 
democratization  needed  to  be  controlled  were  the  problems  being  faced  in 
591 Jutta Weldes, The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. identity and missiles in Cuba, 57
193
Western European countries. The main argument was that if communism could 
create  instability  in  western  democracies,  how could  Turkey’s  newly  forming 
democracy survive such a threat. Democratization had to be controlled in order to 
make sure that the threat of communism did not overtake the Republican ideals.
As argued in Yeni Sabah; 
“It  is  clear  that  communists  are  creating  frenzy in  Italy.  Government 
searches  in  communist  headquarters  found  guns,  ammunitions  and 
bombs. The communist themselves admitted that they were to side with 
the Soviets and create anarchy … Shouldn’t  necessary precautions be 
taken against the armament of the fifth column. In the case of an outside 
attack  the  army  will  be  busy  fighting  the  enemy.  Should  it  also  be 
expected to deal with the domestic sabotage and rebellion”.592
The  dominant  understanding  of  communism  and  democracy  were  aligned 
together,  if  communism  was  too  dangerous  than  it  was  acceptable  to  make 
sacrifices from democratization. Any communist activity was presented as being 
in league with the Soviet Union and as part of an effort to destabilize governments 
to further the interests of the Soviet Union. Within this framework stability was 
prioritized  over  democracy  and  any  reforms  that  would  create  room  for 
communist activities was denied. As stated in an article; “the understanding of 
democracy and independence in this manner may cost a lot.  We need to learn 
lessons  from  these  foreign  examples  as  we  are  just  entering  the  democratic 
stage.593”   Hence  the  general  attitude  was  to  use  the  examples  of  western 
democracies  in  trouble  in  order  to  underline  why  democratization  had  to  be 
monitored in Turkey. According to this narrative, the international conditions and 
the Cold War meant that Turkey was not in a situation to afford all the freedoms 
of a western democracy.
In an interview594 given on 1 December  1953, the Prime Minister  answered a 
question  about  communism in  Turkey by stating  that;  “there  is  no  significant 
communist issue in Turkey. This is because communism is against the traditions 
of  the  Turkish  nation  and  is  incompatible  with  its  sense  of  freedom  and 
independence”.595 As  such,  communism  in  Turkey  was  branded  as  being 
592 Newspaper  Clippings,  8.8.1950,  Yeni  Sabah,  in  Basbakanlik  Devlet  Arsivleri,  Cumhuriyet  
Arsivi, File: A6, Code: 204, Place: 811 3
593 204 811 3, Newspaper Clippings, 8.8.1950, Yeni Sabah
594 The interview was given to U.S. news and World Report
595 Ayin Tarihi, Aralik 1953, no.241
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‘impossible.’  In  a  rally  against  communism  workers  stated  that  even  though 
communism had tried to enter the Turkish workers’ minds “the Turkish worker 
was shrewd enough to defeat that sickness”.596 Another important debate was the 
criticism surrounding the manner in which troops had been sent to Korea. In a 
speech in 1950 the Prime Minister stated that; “I want to remind everyone of the 
vicious attacks towards us because of the Korean events. No one has forgotten the 
severity  of  the  attacks  made  at  critical  moments  in  the  state’s  security  and 
international  reputations”.597 What  was underlined was that  questioning foreign 
policy actions even if only to emphasize the necessity for democratic processes 
was deemed unacceptable. He further stated that; 
“I  will  discuss  an  event  that  pleased  us  in  Erzurum.  People’s  Party 
received us in Erzurum. People’s Party received us cordially.  We had 
productive  discussions  about  the  future  of  the  country.  Nation  party 
members demonstrated the same hospitality.  Erzurum showed that the 
freedom necessary for multi-party system can be established. A multi-
party system does not necessarily have to lead to bitter rivalries. It shows 
that  despite differing views citizens will  look for  ways  to serve their 
country without hurting each other. There is a group at the center that 
continuously creates  an atmosphere  of  disturbance.  These  incitements 
are artificial and do not exist within party officials”.598
Within this framing the questioning of the democratic process was reduced to a 
number of party officials who wanted to make political gain out of criticism when 
it  had  to  be  clear  that  questioning  foreign  policy  was  against  the  ‘national 
interest’.
The linking of foreign policy and democracy thus continues whereby ‘democracy’ 
can  not  mean  questioning  foreign  policy  objectives  and  presenting  a  ‘weak’ 
Turkey  that  is  squabbling  among  itself.  The  joining  of  Korean  War  and  the 
Atlantic  pact  itself  were  moreover  presented  as  part  of  the  process  of 
democratization and acceptance of Turkey among the ‘civilized’,  ‘modern’ and 
‘democratic’ states. This attitude is best reflected in a statement made by Fuad 
Koprlulu in 1951 where he states that “the Atlantic Pact is not just a military and 
596 204 811 3, Newspaper Clippings, Aksam, 27 Agustos 1950,
597 President and Prime Minister in Erzurum, in  Basbakanlik Arsivleri, Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: 
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political community, it is also a civilizational community, a culture community, a 
democratic nations community”.599
III. INTERNATIONALIZING FOREIGN POLICY
The  establishment  and  consolidation  of  an  understanding  of  the  threat  of 
communism  and  democratization  was  interlinked  with  Turkish  foreign  policy 
being analysed through the lenses of the Cold War and its actions being embedded 
in the Western alliance. One of the great debates of this period centered around 
Turkey’s  involvement in the Korean War and being accepted into the Atlantic 
Pact.  Turkey aligned itself  definitively in  the Western  camp of  the Cold  War 
divide and argued in favor of more alliances and pact in order to protect against 
Soviet infiltration. 
Discourses about the Cold War were used in drawing the boundaries for the kind 
of democracy to be established, the nature of the Turkish state and how its history 
was  to  be understood.  Government  officials  used  the  Cold  War  discourses  to 
strengthen their own position. As such not only did they inject Turkey into the 
orthodox  Cold  War  narrative  but  they  also  amplified  Turkey’s  role  in  it. 
Especially surrounding the discussions about the Marshall Plan Turkish officials 
underlined Turkey’s importance and the necessity for further aid in order to keep 
Turkey as  a  bulwark against  communism.  As stated  by  Yeni  Sabah;  “Turkish 
officials argued that because of its strategic importance and geographic location 
put the country in a position of strength and made her an important asset in the 
fight against communism”.600 Newspapers published endless articles asking the 
government  to  be  more  proactive  in  obtaining  American  aid,  underlining  the 
importance  of  joining  the  Atlantic  Pact  and  attempted  to  underline  Turkey’s 
importance in the Cold War. The argument was that:  “When a great and rich 
nation like England gets the maximum amount of aid, its not right that Turkey, 
whose economy suffered from the war, even though it did not enter it,  should 
599 Ayin Tarihi, Ekim 1951, no.215600Yeni  Sabah,  Newspaper  Clippings,  8  August  1950,  in  Basbakanlik  Devlet  Arsivleri,  
Cumhuriyet Arsivi, File: 1. BURO, Code:490..1.0.0, Place:204.811.3.
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receive less than Sweden who was neutral during the war and is neutral now”. 601
Turkish argument was based on the assumption that Turkey deserved more aid 
because of its pivotal role in the Cold War and because of its alliance with the 
West. Sedat Simavi stated in an article; “We have to explain to the Americans that 
we have a strong army. We are trustworthy people. We do not have communism. 
As such we deserve the most aid,” furthermore he argued that “Europe has one 
hope today: the Turkish army”. 602 Turkey’s strategic importance in the Cold War 
divisions was constantly underlined by the press and the government and used as 
one of the main arguments for more aid. 
As stated in Cumhuriyet;
“events  at  the  end  of  WWII  and  Soviet  Russia’s  policies  have 
strengthened Turkey’s alliance with the democratic front ascribing to the 
principles of the United Nations. This front needs to include us in its 
haphazard agreements. Turkey should either be included in the Atlantic 
Pact like Italy, or in a Mediterranean Pact set up to compliment it, and if 
these are not possible Necmettin Sadak should endeavour  to obtain a 
guarantee from Great Britain and the United States”.603
The main premise of the arguments was Turkey’s strategic importance in the Cold 
War geopolitics. Menderes argued in an interview that; “in view of the over-all 
security, not only of Turkey but also of the Mediterranean region to which Turkey 
belongs, we deem it essential that a Mediterranean defense system should be set 
up  and  linked  to  the  general  security  system provided  for  under  the  Atlantic 
pact”.604 Turkish foreign policy aims stressed alliances mainly because belonging 
to one would underline turkey’s acceptance into the Western bloc. This was seen 
as a step in the westernization of Turkey that had been part of the Republican 
ideal.  Within  the  international  conditions  this  westernization  was  defined 
primarily through belonging to the western security system rather than adopting 
Western democratic ideals. As Menderes stated;  “I have stressed the importance 
we attach to our alliance with Great Britain …..I believe that it  is to the vital  
601 Cumhuriyet, 19.9.1950602Sedat Simavi, “American Aid,” Hurriyet,  14 January 1951, in  Basbakanlik Devlet  Arsivleri,  
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interests of both parties that we should strive to further reinforce, in the practical 
field this alliance which has assumed a national character in Turkey and which has 
become one of the pillars of our foreign policy”.605 It is important to note that 
Menderes defines the alliance with Great Britain as having “assumed a national 
character.” Within the dominant narratives of westernization and democratization, 
more so than the reforms in domestic  politics,  the alliance with the West was 
presented as proof of Turkey’s successful Westernization process. This is evident 
in Menderes’s declaration on 21 February 1951 where he states that;  “Turkey’s 
acceptance  into  the  Atlantic  Pact  with  equal  rights  has  been  received  with 
pleasure. This event is an important step in achieving the common security aimed 
by the Democratic world”.606 Two points are important here; “equal rights” and 
“Democratic  world”.  According to  the  dominant  narrative  acceptance  into  the 
Atlantic Pact implied being accepted as part of the West and as an affirmation of 
Turkey being democratic.
The  main  foreign  policy  debate  centered  around  the  Atlantic  Pact  and  the 
necessity for accepting  Turkey into the  pact.  In an article  in  1950 Necmeddit 
Sadak emphasized that “whether Turkey enters the Atlantic Pact or not is not only 
about  Turkey’s  security  but  also  of  Europe’s.  The  issue  is  not  Turkey  being 
accepted to this and that pact. Events have shown how inadequate the Atlantic 
pact is. […] Under these circumstances not taking advantage of Turkey’s status 
and strength  within  the  European security  system is  as  much  an  oversight  as 
leaving Turkey’s security out of any contractual obligations”.607
In an article Hikmet Bayur outlined the problems in the international system and 
the opportunities it presented Turkey by stating that;
“  The  reality  of  the  situation  is  that  Russia  is  not  a  direct  threat  to 
America. United States has to protect certain states that can constitute 
support for it so that it is not left facing a Russia that took over a great  
part of the old world. The Soviets after  swallowing most Eastern and 
Central European states in 1945, have set out to swallow Asia by using 
local  communists  [..]  they  have  swallowed  China,  now  they  are 
swallowing Korea. In this endeavor, Russia at times takes advantage of 
the nationalistic and anti-imperialist feelings of Asians. For example in 
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Indo-China, nationalists and communists have united in fighting against 
the French. But if America was not protecting them Russia would have 
already taken India and Indo-China behind the Iron Curtain and it still 
might.”608
Because of these reasons he argues that neither Asia nor Europe is showing the 
United States the necessary understanding and this situation  “provides Turkey an 
opportunity to play the role of a great power”.609  These perspectives were based on 
underlying the strategic importance of Turkey to Cold War dynamics in general 
and European security system specifically.  The main premise of the alternative 
narrative was to continue to argue for neutrality in foreign policy and underline the 
anti-imperialist  nature  of  the  Turkish  revolution.  According to  these  narratives 
establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union was seen as the basis for an 
independent  Turkish foreign policy.  As stated by Zekeriya  Sertel;  “History has 
made us neighbors with the Soviets … Soviet Union is no longer Tsarist Russia. It 
would  be  stupid  to  ignore  this  historical  change.  Soviets  could  have  no  aims 
towards Turkey other than friendship. For a Turkey that has experienced the pains 
of imperialism the right path is friendship with the Soviets”.610 The argument was 
not to forsake one side for the other but to establish friendly relations with all 
without becoming entangled in great power politics; “we said that let’s expand the 
alliance with Britain and make one with the United States and Russia. Russia’s 
position as a strong state and as our northern neighbour will not change. History 
has proven that it is in our interest to live in peace with our neighbour. We want 
friendship with all states for the sake of Turkey”.611
Zekeriya Sertel’s letter to the Prime Minister on 1951 where he stated that; 
“I don’t think Turkey’s entrance to the Atlantic Pact is possible nor is it 
desirable.  Considering  the  fragile  nature  of  turkey’s  geopolitical 
position,  the  only  policy  that  will  ensure  its  safety  is  neutrality. 
Unfortunately since all ideas in the country are under certain influences 
being directed towards a certain direction and since any differing opinion 
are  being  branded  as  traitors  those  who  want  to  establish  friendly 
relations with the Soviets as Ataturk suggested are being silenced and 
neutrality policy is no longer discussed nor is it possible to be defended. 
Since the times of Ismet Inonu Turkey has always been careful to align 
its  policies  with  the  United  states  and  has  never  considered  the 
possibility  of  other  policies.  Even  today  American  and  Western 
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guarantees  are  pursued,  when  in  reality  the  most  serious,  safe  and 
healthy policy is that of neutrality.  It  can be argued that there can no 
longer be a small neutral country and Turkey once forced to choose a 
side had to side with the democracies”.612
IV. SILENCING, CO-OPTING, REDEFINING
As discussed, the mainstream opposition had already been co-opted or silenced by 
this  time and the dominant  narrative  had been consolidated.  There were some 
attempts  to  question Turkey’s  involvement  in  the Korean War and its  foreign 
policy  choices  in  general  but  they  never  achieved  a  wide  audience  like 
Markopasa’s criticisms used to. The Young Turks European Committee and the 
Turkish Pacifist Organization are examples from the fringes that did not achieve 
success and especially in the case of Turkish Pacifist Organization were tried and 
imprisoned immediately.
The Young Turks European Committee issued an invitation to join against the use 
of  the  atomic  bomb  and  where  they  criticized  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
government. In an Open Letter to the DP Government the Committee stated that; 
“When the  Turkish  public  voted  the  DP government  on  14 May it  convicted 
Turkey to a domestic policy that is anti-democratic and a foreign policy based on 
being America’s slave. ….DP Party programme, its actions in the last two months 
and the latest clemency law have been used as tools to limit the democratic rights 
of  Turkish  voters  and  peasants  under  the  mask  of  ‘clearing  out  leftist 
movements’”.613 In this letter they also made a series of demands:
“1.  State  institutions  need  to  be  cleared  of  all  foreigners  and  all 
agreements  that  destroy  our  economic  independence  need  to  be 
cancelled.
2. Join the Stockholm Decleration in demanding the banning of atomic 
bombs
3. to enter into friendly relations with the Soviet  Union and people’s 
democracies, recognize China, Korea and Germany”.614
They further stated that; “they claim that the Soviet state will attack our country. 
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In reality the only threat is US imperialism”.615 The alternative narrative continued 
its attacks on the foreign policy choices of the government but at this time it was 
only a few fringe groups left and their declarations and protests were not able to 
become mainstream.  Furthermore,  their  attacks  were  branded as  being  against 
national unity especially at a time when Turkey had been accepted into the West, 
the  protests  were  framed  as  endangering  Turkey’s  chances  of  achieving  its 
Republican  ideals.  Menderes  stated  that;  “I  want  to  remind  everyone  of  the 
vicious attacks towards us because if the Korean events. No one has forgotten the 
severity  of  the  attacks  made  at  critical  moments  in  the  state’s  security  and 
international reputation”.616
Turkish Pacifist Association established by Behice Boran aimed to “enlighten the 
Turkish public about the dangers of atomic weapons and atomic war”.617 TPA was 
the  main  opposition  to  the  decision  to  send  soldiers  to  Korea.  Their  main 
argument centered around the argument that the decision had been taken not to 
ensure the safety and interests of the Turkish nation but to ensure the interests of 
the United States. Their aim was to make a declaration to explain their opposition 
to  the  public.  They  also  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Turkish  National  Assembly 
highlighting three points:
“1. Council of Ministers took the decision to send soldiers after a series 
of meetings with American Senator Caine.
2.  This decision could not have been taken, as argued,  to uphold the 
agreements entered into with the United Nations
3.  Sending  soldiers  to  Korea  meant  a  declaration  of  war  and  the 
constitution gave that right to the Parliament. The government making 
this decision was unconstitutional”.618
The declaration was distributed around Istanbul but the distributors were arrested 
within days.  In the aftermath of the arrests Menderes gave a speech where he 
stated that “any propaganda and incitement against sending troops to Korea can 
not  be  resolved  with  good  intentions”.619 Behice  Boran  and  associates  were 
convicted to 15 months in prison. The nationalists found this sentence light and 
argued that  “there  is  death  to  communists  in  Korea,  but  here  there  is  prison. 
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Communists in other places should flee to Turkey to save their lives! It was the 
nation’s right to see at least two communists hanged”.620 As such the attempts to 
question  were  either  too  marginalized  to  have  effect  or  were  silenced  swiftly 
before they could have any effect. By 1950 the dominant narrative of the Cold 
War dynamics, of democratization, of westernization had been safely established.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter focused on the period between 1949 and 1951 when the dominant 
discourses that have been traced in the previous chapters had become established 
and the alternative narratives previously discussed had become marginalized. The 
Korean War and the Atlantic  Pact were clear  manifestations  of the manner  in 
which  the  national  security  definition  of  the  dominant  narrative  had  become 
consolidated. Turkey joined a war that it had no direct interests in because of the 
Cold War dynamics that it  embedded its foreign policy into. Furthermore,  this 
period clearly demonstrates the manner in which the democratization process was 
defined and controlled by the dominant narrative to fit a certain understanding of 
what the Turkish nation meant and what represented Republican ideals. That the 
decision for the Korean War could be taken through undemocratic means but be 
justified because it meant Turkey’s acceptance among “democratic” nations is an 
example of how a very specific understanding of democracy had been adopted. 
The  preceding  chapters  have  attempted  to  demonstrate  the  ‘process’  and  the 
debates  in  re/formulating  and  re/defining  concepts,  identities  and  events  that 
become fixed and linear through the historiographical operation on the Cold War. 
These chapters have tried to disrupt these historiographical operations on three 
fronts.
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CONCLUSION
“I have tried to describe my position in terms of circles, standing there in 
the middle. These circles contain the audiences that get to hear my story. 
The closest circle is the one closest to my home in Igboland, because the 
material I am using is their material. But unless I’m writing in the Igbo 
language, I use a language developed elsewhere, which is English. That 
affects the way I write. It even affects to some extent the stories I write. 
So there is, if you like, a kind of paradox there already. But then, if you 
can, visualize a large number of ever-widening circles, including all, like 
Yeats’s widening gyre. As more and more people are incorporated in this 
network,  they  will  get  different  levels  of  meaning  out  of  the  story,  
depending  on  what  they  already  know,  or  what  they  suspect.  These 
circles go on indefinitely to include, ultimately, the whole world”.621
The main of this thesis has been to underline what Achebe describes in the above 
quote with respect to the field of international relations. There are many stories of 
international  relations  as  a  field  and  there  are  many  histories  of  international 
relations. These stories exist within ‘a large number of ever-widening circles’ yet 
the Eurocentrism of the field has predominantly presented itself as if there is only 
621 Jerome Brooks, “Interviews: Chinua Achebe, The Art of Fiction No.139”,  The Paris Review 
133, Winter (1994)
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one center and a linear direction that expands from there. As such, the thesis has 
aimed  to  discuss  how  international  relations  as  field  can  be  ‘decentered’  or 
‘decolonized’. There have been a series of strategies developed in this endeavor 
and they have all presented different ways to overcome the issue of Eurocentrism 
in the field. Building on these works the thesis has argued that problematization of 
history is of paramount importance in the project to decenter IR. The concepts 
used,  identities  constructed  and  stories  told  are  based  upon  a  limited 
understanding  of  history  that  is  centered  upon  the  Western  experience.  As  a 
consequence,  the  historical  epochs,  periods,  and events  that  are  seen as  being 
constitutive and used as an explanatory framework within the field themselves 
need  to  be  questioned  because   “with  few exceptions,  the  accounts  of  world 
politics that serve as the ground for IR theory-building and empirical analysis are 
Eurocentric, taking the perspective of the most powerful states in the international 
system”.622 Thus, the thesis has focused on the ways in which Western-centric 
conceptualizations of history within the field of IR need to be questioned. This 
was done through focusing on the historiographical operations on the Cold War 
and the way in which these were re/produced in the Turkish context naturalizing 
concepts, events and identities and editing the ones that did not fit into the linear 
progression of the Eurocentric conceptualization. The thesis also underlined that 
this re/production also worked to naturalize the idea and ideal of ‘Turkey’ that 
worked to impose linearity on the stories of Turkey.
LOOKING BACK AT THE ARGUMENTS
The  thesis  first  outlined  conceptualizations  of  history  that  would  form  the 
cornerstone of the approach towards analyzing history. The differences between 
the ‘past’, the ‘chronicle’ and the ‘story’ were underlined in order to demonstrate 
how the writing of history involved choices of inclusion and exclusion. Historical 
narratives are stories, stories that have a clear beginning and an end, stories with 
clearly  identifiable  protagonists  and  antagonists,  and  especially  an  easily 
discernible central plot.  The specific organization of the story; where one choose 
622 Laffey and Weldes, ‘Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis’, 556
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to start or end it, who one identifies as the protagonist or antagonist and what one 
identifies to be the moral of the story structure the story and provide a certain 
interpretation of the events discussed. The same events can be told by identifying 
different beginnings and ends, protagonists and antagonists and central plot and 
provide  the  reader  with  a  different  account  of  the  same  events  (sometimes 
focusing  on different  events  and the  priority  of  events  and their  casual  effect 
having changed). 
The  second  chapter  focused  on  the  stories  of  international  relations  and  the 
different perspectives from which stories of the international system, of state and 
sovereignty, of security have been told. This discussion demonstrated the way in 
which  the  ‘critical’  works  on  international  themselves  though  attempting  to 
question  the  ‘traditional’  story  of  international  relations  had  issues  when 
confronting the Eurocentrism of the field. Moreover, even when the Eurocentrism 
was  being  questioned  and  problematized  the  use  of  history  still  remained 
problematic.  The  last  section  of  this  chapter  titled  ‘embedding  non-western 
stories’ highlighted this point by discussing the ways in which non-western stories 
of the international, of the state and of security become silenced and edited out in 
order  to  embedded  into  the  dominant  stories  of  IR.  As  such,  stories  of  the 
international system work to marginalize events, concepts and identities that do 
not fit into the general linear progression of the narrative of IR. The aim of the 
next  section  entitled  ‘Historiographical  Operations  on  the  Cold  War’  was  to 
discuss how this process worked.
The section ‘Historiographical Operations on the Cold War’ was divided into two 
parts;  ‘Discussing the Origins’ and ‘Re/producing the Cold War’.  The chapter 
‘Discussing the Origins’ focused on the main texts within the historiography of 
the Cold War in an attempt to outline the borders that were drawn, events that 
were privileged and identities that were fixed by the historical discourse on the 
Cold War. This part demonstrated the way in which the differing historiographical 
schools  ascribed  to  an  established  definition  of  the  Cold  War  despite  their 
differing  perspectives  on  the  role  of  the  international  system,  the  state  and 
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American  foreign policy.  Furthermore,  the  discussion  of  these different  works 
demonstrated  the  way  in  which  they  were  based  upon  and  re/produced  a 
Eurocentric conception of world politics. This Eurocentrism worked at two levels. 
Firstly, the works took as their starting point a perspective of American foreign 
policy.  Whether  arguing  from  a  ‘traditionalist’  perspective  or  a  ‘revisionist’ 
perspective the premise of the arguments were formed around interpretations of 
American  foreign  policy.  Secondly,  however  American  foreign  policy  was 
interpreted, the story of the international system was premised on an Eurocentric 
conception of world politics.  As such, the story stretched from the Napoleonic 
Wars  to  the  Concert  of  Europe,  from the  unification  of  Germany to the First 
World War and from the First World War to the Second World War in a linear 
progression whereby the issue of the balance of power and how to maintain it 
occupied the center stage. It is within this narrative structure that the interpretation 
of American foreign policy is situated.
This trend was somewhat challenged with the pericentric tradition as it aimed to 
bring in other narratives into the story of the Cold War. Yet the story was still of 
the Cold War. The narratives were only embedded into the larger story rather than 
attempting to present an alternative story. Although this gave agency to the states 
that were overlooked in previous historiographical works it also reified the Cold 
War. As such giving voices to the marginalized stories meant that the dominant 
narratives of these states that fit the Cold War story would have to be brought to 
the  forefront  thereby  strengthening  the  story  of  the  Cold  War  rather  than 
questioning or attempting to unsettle its dominance. 
The chapter entitled ‘Re/producing the Cold War’ discusses the ways in which the 
borders of the historical discourse on the Cold War are re/produced within the 
Turkish academia. This chapter underlined how “hierarchy is not produced by the 
actions  of  states  alone  but  also  in  scholarly  and  popular  analyses  of  world 
politics”.623  The chapter discusses works that focus on the Cold War, bilateral 
relations with the United States and Turkish foreign policy in general. The chapter 
underlined how the historiographical operations on the Cold War are re/produced 
623 Ibid., 558
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within  these  works.  As  such,  the  works  were  premised  upon  a  Eurocentric 
conception  of  world politics  and naturalized  events,  concepts  and identities  in 
order to be able to situate Turkey within the grand narrative of the Cold War. This 
chapter further underlined that embedding into the grand narrative also works to 
reify, re/define and re/formulate an unproblematized and linear story of Turkey 
and  its  road  to  westernization,  modernization  and  democratization.  The  next 
section aimed to problematize the events, concepts and identities that had been 
naturalized through the historiographical operations on the Cold War.
The second main section of the thesis entitled ‘Stories of Silences’ focused on 
unpacking the events, concepts and identities that were naturalized through the 
re/production of the historical discourse on the Cold War. The chapters within this 
section were organized in a manner that reflected the progressive narrative of the 
Cold  War  in  order  to  highlight  the  continuities.  Within  these  chapters  the 
‘process’  of  re/determining,  re/defining  of  events,  concepts  and  identities  is 
underlined. This is further underlined through the organizations of the chapters 
themselves that are divided into three parts; democratization, the international and 
silencing. The point that this section emphasizes is that the concepts, events and 
identities that were naturalized through the historical discourse on the Cold War 
were  neither  fixed  nor  static  but  were  constantly  being  re/formulated  and 
re/defined. 
This  thesis  has  underlined  that  historiography  of  events  is  constitutive  of  a 
hierarchy in international system. Whose stories are told and whose stories are left 
out  is  a  determining factor  in  reproducing a  hierarchy of states,  a  priority  for 
certain concepts and privileging of a specific narration of identities. It is because 
of this that history plays a crucial role in re/producing the Eurocentrism of the 
field of IR and needs to be further problematized. As Laffey states; “power is both 
external to historical narrative and also constitutive of it, inscribed in the narrative 
and the sources on which it draws. The resulting historiography thus participates 
in struggles it claims only to describe or explain624. This creates the story based on 
624 Ibid., 564
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specific version of events and “a progressive linearity was absent on the Other 
side of the civilizational frontier.625” As a consequence states not part of this linear 
progressive  narrative  of  the  development  of  the  international  system aspire  to 
embed their stories within this meta-narrative in order to have their stories told 
and gain agency. In this process they distort, overlook aspects of their stories that 
does not fit this narrative and actually take away their own agency in becoming 
part of the process that reproduces this meta-narrative. Krishna states, “the process 
of knowledge production is from the very outset regarded as the flip side of a 
process of concealment  and unknowing. Among other  things,  this  implies  that 
whether one is for or against abstraction is an irrelevant question since it is an 
unavoidable moment in the constitution of knowledge. Rather, one ought to be 
ever  vigilant  about  what  it  is  that  abstraction  simultaneously  conceals  as  it 
reveals.626” Thus the writing of history, theorizing of the international system is all 
immersed  in  power  relations.  The  aim  here  is  not  to  create  another  linear, 
progressive meta-narrative but to acknowledge the existence of one and analyze 
where and how it works to marginalize and silence voices. 
LOOKING AT THE FUTURE OF THE MAIN 
ARGUMENTS
To summarize, the thesis has aimed to underline three main points with respect to 
decentering  IR.  Firstly,  that  problematizing  history is  an important  part  of the 
project  and  that  more  attention  needs  to  given  to  the  issues  of  not  only 
historicizing  concepts  but  also  telling  histories  of  such  concepts,  events  and 
identities.  Secondly,  that  the  road  to  ‘decentering  IR’  is  not  necessarily  in 
creating, constructing and/or producing alternative theories of IR. The existence 
of Chinese IR or Islamic IR theory will work reproduce essentialism of another 
kind. Furthermore, it will work to reproduce categories such as the nation-state or 
625 John Hobson, ‘Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western imperialism ? 
Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR’, Review of International Studies, 33 (2007) : 
94
626 Krishna,  ‘Race,  Amnesia,  and  the  Education  of  International  Relations’,  in  ed.,  Jones, 
Decolonizing International Relations, 90
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civilization  rather  than  problematizing  them.  Thirdly,  ‘decentering’  IR 
necessitates not only problematizing the concepts, histories and theories produced 
at the center but also focusing on how these are re/produced.
These points will be elaborated further in order to underline avenues for future 
research  in  order  to  decenter  IR.  The  epochs,  events  and  concepts  of 
‘international’ history that is a prominent part of the field of IR need to be further 
problematized.  The last years  have seen more efforts to uncover stories of the 
international and stories of the field of IR but this needs to be furthered. Firstly, 
histories  of  the  international  system has  to  be  brought  forward  in  a  way that 
disrupts the way in which the story of the international, the state and sovereignty, 
and  of  security  utilize  Eurocentric  conceptualizations  of  ‘world’  history. 
Secondly,  the historiography of the field  itself  needs  to  be further  questioned. 
There has been a series of works that has problematized the main story of the 
development of field but its focus remains the production of knowledge at the 
center. As Mignolo states;
“Theories travel, I heard, and when they get places, they are transformed, 
transcultured.  But  what  happens  when  theories  travel  through  the 
colonial difference? How do they get transcultured? Where are theories 
produced? Where do they come from? What function or role did theory 
X play in the place where it emerged and what is the function or role that  
such a theory played in the place where it traveled or has been exported? 
How  are  they  rehearsed  when  they  travel  through  the  colonial 
difference? Are they just being rehearsal in a new scenario or do they 
face their limits in that new scenario”?627
Thus, the focus should not only be on the way in which disciplines, theories and 
concepts developed in the United States and Europe nor should the focus only be 
on  the  different  theoretical  traditions  in  continental  Europe  versus  Anglo-
American academia. These are important works in highlighting the stories of the 
discipline and theories but there are stories that are not limited to the United States 
and Europe. Further elaboration and discussion is needed on the way in which 
disciplines,  theories  and  concepts  travel  and  how  they  are  transformed  and 
trancultured. It needs to be further underlined that;
627 Walter D. Mignolo,  Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and  
Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 173-4
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“The  language  of  modern  politics  is  astonishingly  and  misleadingly 
universal.  Whereever  we  go  in  the  Third  World,  we  meet  socialists, 
liberals,  a   suspiciously  high  number  of  democrats  of  all  kinds, 
nationalists of all varieties, federalists and centralists. Yet, much of the 
time, their actual behavior is quite substantially different from what we 
are  led  to  expect  by the  long-established meanings  of  these  terms in 
Western political and social thought. In studying Third World politics, 
therefore,  we face …. A serious mismatch between the language that 
describes this world, and the objects which inhabit it …. Not [just] single 
isolated  ideas  but  entire  languages  seem  to  be  composed  of 
systematically misleading expressions.628”
It is the route theories take, their different trajectories and the sociologies of the 
fields  that  need  to  be  further  analyzed.  If  there  is  more  than  one  story  of 
international relations and more than one theory of international relations, why is 
it that theories are named ‘realist’,  liberal’  constructivist,  post-structuralist  lead 
one to assume sameness. Could there not be different historiographies of the field 
of IR, reasons for the sameness and consequences of the manner in which theories 
have travelled that have made them ‘same but different’. This does not mean that 
‘different’ schools of IR whether Chinese, Islamist, or Latin American should be 
constructed in a manner that essentializes identities and reproduces hegemonies 
but  rather  that  the  reasons  for  the  silences  in  the  development  of  fields  and 
translation of theories in other contexts should be discussed further in a manner 
that aims to uncover the hegemonic moves within the academia. As Hutchings so 
aptly puts; 
‘It matters just as much how the parameters of dialogue are constructed 
in Chinese, Indian or Latin American IR as it does how they have been 
constructed in a discipline heretofore dominated by US and European 
scholars. If dialogue remains trapped in the sameness/difference binary, 
then the most we can hope for is a geopolitical relocation of disciplinary 
hegemony. [..] Work has to be done not to make sure that ‘non-Western’ 
voices are included in such exchanges but to make sure that excluded 
voices are included. This means paying attention to the power relations 
at work in the academy, wherever that academy is located, as well as in 
the particular issue or question at stake’.629
The  thesis  has  been  an  attempt  to  open  up  space  for  questioning  from  this 
perspective whereby it is not ‘difference’ as such that is trying to be constructed 
628 Sudipta  Kaviraj,  ‘In  Search  of  Civil  Society’,  cited  in  Seth,  ‘Postcolonial  Theory  and  the 
Critique of International Relations’, 181.
629 Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Dialogue between Whom ? The Role of the West/Non-West Distinction 
in Promoting Global Dialogue in IR’, Millennium : Journal of International Relations, 39 :3 
(2011) : 647
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but rather how ‘sameness’ is re/produced within the academia and how that works 
to silence and edit  out events,  concepts,  and identities.  As such, bringing in a 
Turkish perspective on the Cold War into discussion does not equal bringing in a 
non-Western perspective on the Cold War if that Turkish perspective re/produces 
a Eurocentric conceptualization of world politics. It is through analyzing the way 
in which the field has developed, theories have travelled and have been translated 
and history is told in other contexts that the project of decentering IR can have an 
impact. How have these ‘non-Western’ fields developed, how did theories travel, 
how are they applied, which history is used and what are silences within these 
stories and the politics involved in silencing. In that sense an important step needs 
to  be  decolonizing  the  academia  and  uncovering  the  ways  in  which  power 
relations work to silence certain perspectives not only in the Western context but 
also the non-Western context in order to clarify if really subjugated voices are 
being  brought  in  or  if  the  non-Western  talking  is  one  that  re/produces  the 
assumptions and histories of a Eurocentric field.
Specifically  with  respect  to  Turkey,  the  historiography  of  the  field;  its 
development and the way in which theories travel and are translated need to be 
questioned. How has the field of IR developed? What are the silences in the field? 
Who exercises hegemonic power and what are the politics behind this process of 
establishing  hegemony  and  creating  silences.  How  has  ‘realist’,  ‘liberal’, 
‘constructivist’  theories  travelled  into  Turkey  and  what  were  the  silences  and 
absences in these theories as they travelled and were translated?  What are the 
politics behind this process of giving voice to certain aspects of theories while 
silencing  others?  In  that  sense,  the  role  and  complicity  of  the  academia  in 
re/creating and re/producing the hierarchies of the field of IR and of international 
relations needs to be uncovered further.
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 Furthermore,  the  works  of  Bahar  Rumelili630 and  Pinar  Bilgin631 need  to  be 
furthered in an effort to problematize ‘Turkey’ from a postcolonial perspective632. 
Homi Bhabha states ‘counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and 
erase  its  totalizing  boundaries  –  both  actual  and  conceptual  –  disturb  those 
ideological  maneuvers  through  which  ‘imagined  communities’  are  given 
essentialist  identities’.633 Accordingly,  the  aim  has  been  to  emphasize  the 
‘fictionality’  of the categories,  concepts,  identities and events and question the 
linearity imposed upon their stories of development. Underlining the ‘postcolonial 
anxiety’  of  Turkey  will  also  work  to  uncover  ways  in  which  the  ‘imagined 
community’ has been and can be imagined differently. Furthermore as Chatterjee 
so aptly summarized, ‘If nationalism in the rest of the world have to choose their 
imagined communities from certain ‘modular’  forms already made available to 
them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine”?634 In that 
sense, the imaginaries of the Third World are being limited and policed with the 
already  existing  categories  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  nation-state,  a  state,  a 
630 Bahar  Rumelili,  ‘Liminal  Identities  and  Processes  of  Domestication  and  Subversion  in 
International  Relations’,  Review  of  International  Studies,  38:2  (2012):  495-508;  Viatcheslav 
Morozov and Bahar Rumelili, ‘The External Constitution of European Identity: Russia and Turkey 
as Europe-Makers’,  Cooperation and Conflict,  47:1 (2012): 28-48; Bahar Rumelili, ‘Modelling 
Democracy:  Western  Hegemony,  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East’,  in  Viatcheslav  Morozov,  ed., 
Decentering  the  West:  The  Idea  of  Democracy  and  the  Struggle  for  Hegemony .  (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2013).
631  Pinar Bilgin, ‘The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey’,  Security Dialogue, 39:6 
(2008): 593-614; Pinar Bilgin,  ‘Globalization and In/Security:  Middle Eastern Encounters with 
International  Society  and  the  Case  of  Turkey’  in  Stephan  Stetter  ed.,  The  Middle  East  and 
Globalization: Encounters and Horizons  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Pinar Bilgin, 
‘Turkey through western-oriented foreign policy’,  New Perspectives on Turkey, 40 (2009): 105-
125.
632 These works should be taken as starting points to analyzing Turkey through a postcolonial  
perspective  and  opening  the  discussion  for  ‘Turkey’s  postcoloniality’.  Thus  it  needs  to  be 
underlined that despite the attempt to bring in Turkey within postcolonial discussions these works 
do  not  engage  with  postcolonial  theory  such  as  Frantz  Fanon,  Aime  Cesaire  and  Gayatri  
Chakravorty Spivak directly and it is this engagement that is necessary for further exploration of 
Turkey’s postcoloniality. See ; Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York : Grove Press, 
2004) ; Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York : Grove Press, 2008) ; Aime Cesaire, 
Discourse  on  Colonialism  (New  York :  Monthly  Review  Press,  1972) ;  Gayatri  Chakravorty 
Spivak, ‘Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism’, Critical Inquiry 12 :1 (1985) : 243-
261 ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,  A Critique of Postcolonial Reason : Toward a History of the  
Vanishing Present  (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1999) ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
‘Can  the  Subaltern  Speak ?’  in  Cary  Nelson  and  Larry  Grossbery,  eds.,  Marxism  and  the  
interpretation of Culture (Chicago : University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-313.  In that sense, a 
more direct engagement and elaboration is necessary such as the one of Viatcheslav Morozov with 
respect  to  explaining Russian foreign  policy through postcolonial  approaches.  For further  see, 
Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘ Subaltern Empire ?: Toward a Postcolonial Approach to Russian Foreign 
Policy’, Problems of Post-Communism, 60 :6 (2013) : 16-28.
633 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York : Routledge, 1994), 149.
634 Partha  Chatterjee,  The  Nation  and  its  Fragments:  Colonial  and  Postcolonial  Histories  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 5
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democracy  and  so  on.’  As  such,  what  problematizing  ‘Turkey’  through  a 
postcolonial lens reveals with respect to the stories of the state, of sovereignty and 
of democracy will be important in decentering IR.
These questions and points need to be further elaborated upon in order to continue 
the project of decentering IR as it is beyond the scope of any one work to achieve 
that on its own. As this thesis has constantly underlined, all stories are defined by 
what is included and excluded within them and this story was no different. As 
such, the silences created within this story itself also need to be discussed further; 
such  as  furthering  the  disruption  of  the  stories  of  Turkey,  stories  of  the 
international system and stories of the field. The story thus far provided a limited 
disruption on each instance and all of them can be extended further. To conclude 
one is reminded of Samuel R. Delany’s words; “endings to be useful must  be 
inconclusive”635 and  as  such  there  need  not  be  clean  breaks  and  definite 
conclusions but opening up of spaces for further questions though the question 
pertaining to how this ‘story’ ends remains to be answered;
‘Have you thought of an ending?’
‘Yes, several, and all are dark and unpleasant,’ said Frodo.
‘Oh, that  won’t  do!’  said Bilbo. ‘Books ought  to have good endings. 
How would this do: and they all settled down and lived together happily  
ever after?’
‘It will do well, if it ever came to that,’ said Frodo.
“Ah!’  said  Sam.  ‘And  where  will  they  live?  That’s  what  I  often 
wonder’636
635 Samuel R. Delany,  The Einstein Intersection (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1967), 
166
636 J.R.R Tolkien,  The Fellowship of the Rings (New York : Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2004), 
409
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